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
FOR ARMY CLASSES
CIVIL SERVICE CANDIDATES, ETC.

COMPILED AND EDITED BY

H. LATTER, M.A.

ASSISTANT MASTER AT CHELTENHAM COLLEGE

Second Series



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PREFACE

This second series of *Précis Papers* consists of the exercises set in the last five examinations for entrance to Woolwich and Sandhurst (Nos. I.-V.), of eight exercises of similar length and character compiled by me from Parliamentary Papers (Nos. VI.-XIII.), and of four shorter and perhaps slightly easier exercises, also compiled by me from Parliamentary Papers (Nos. XIV.-XVII.). I thought it would be a practical advantage to include these four shorter exercises. They may be used to begin on, or when the time ($1\frac{1}{2}$ hours) required for Nos. I.-XIII. is not available. Nos. XIV.-XVII. will not require more than an hour.

I have collected this second series at the request of teachers who found that the first series (published in 1903) by itself did not contain sufficient examples, and who could not obtain any other suitable book. The exercises in this second series are, I think, easier than those in the first; No. V. is more difficult than the others. The first series contains a specimen worked *Précis* of a series of correspondence; this series contains a specimen *Précis* of evidence. The two series together

provide thirty exercises, not counting those given as specimen exercises ; this is probably about the number which most teachers would wish to set to Army Candidates before their examination.

H. LATTEK.

CHELTEKHAM COLLEGE,
November 1905.

NOTE.—The exercises in the following book are reprinted from Examination Papers and Parliamentary Papers by permission of the Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.

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INTRODUCTION

The instructions given at the Examination in June 1905 for Exercise No. 1, which is here given as a specimen exercise, were as follows:—

“Time allowed, 1½ hours.

“You are desired to write out *in your own words* a Précis of the following evidence.

“The object of the Précis (which should proceed *not answer by answer*, but in the form of a narrative *without* marginal references) is that anyone who had not time to read the original minutes might, by reading the Précis, be put in possession of all the leading features of the evidence. The merits of such a Précis (which ought not to exceed two pages in length) are—(a) to contain all that is important, and nothing that is unimportant; (b) to present this in a consecutive and readable shape, expressed as distinctly as possible, and as briefly as is compatible with distinctness.

“Your Précis should not exceed two pages, or about 400 words.

“*Attention should be paid to Spelling, Handwriting, Grammar, and Style.*”

The instructions are similar where the exercise is a series of letters or a report. The best way to set to work is as follows:—

1. Read through the paper carefully, fixing the chief points in your memory, but making no marks at the side or underlinings.

2. This first reading will enable you to judge what are the most important points. Now read through the paper a second time, and underline or mark at the side what you think important. You may also write at the side, as is done

in the specimen exercise, the different subjects of the evidence or correspondence; this is especially useful where the same subject occurs in separate parts of the evidence or correspondences; it enables you without hunting through the paper to collect quickly all references to the same subject. In the specimen exercise, for instance, we have "Suggestions for stopping drinking" occurring in three places at considerable intervals; in the *Précis* these must appear together in one paragraph.

3. Write your *Précis* in paragraphs. Of course you must not begin a new paragraph for each sentence; but begin a new paragraph wherever you begin a new subject, or wherever there is a break in the narrative. It is better to have too many paragraphs than too few; your own experience will show you that the short paragraph requires less effort in reading than the long. The same rule applies to sentences. Make them short, avoid frequent relative clauses, and choose co-ordinate rather than subordinate sentences. For instance, do not write: "When the news reached St. Petersburg on June 26th that the army had been defeated, the Emperor and his Ministers tried to make the populace believe that victory lay with the Russians;" but write: "On June 26th, news reached St. Petersburg that the army had been defeated; but the Emperor," etc.

4. Where the exercise is minutes of evidence, or a report, you must collect in separate paragraphs all that refers to each subject. Where the exercise is a series of letters, you must also arrange the events in each paragraph in *chronological order*, i.e. begin your *Précis* with the earliest date on which anything essential to the *Précis* occurred. (A specimen exercise of Correspondence is worked out in the first series of *Précis Writing* published in 1903.) Each *Précis* must begin with a heading: "*Précis* of Correspondence (or Minutes, or Report)"—merely repeating the heading of the particular exercise. With evidence or a report you

will have no difficulty about order ; but with correspondence you must be careful, all the more so because the letters themselves are sometimes not arranged in chronological order. You must therefore *look at the dates*, and notice whether they are "telegraphic" or not, so that you may see, for instance, what information was in the hands of the Foreign Office at any particular juncture.

5. The name of the person sending a letter is often of no importance, while the fact which he communicates may be of great importance. In another case it may be important to know the source of the information, for instance, where the accuracy of the statement is disputed. In no case will you begin: "Mr. A.— wrote to Mr. B.— on June 20th, 1900, and said"; for remember that the Précis must not proceed letter by letter, but must be a consecutive narrative. You will sometimes write something of this sort: "The Foreign Office heard on June 20th from the British Consul at Shanghai that," etc. Or it would be more convenient in the case of a long narrative of undisputed facts to give the narrative first, and then to begin a new paragraph with such words as: "The Foreign Office received news of these events from the British Consul at Shanghai on June 20th," and then to proceed to show what action the Foreign Office took.

6. The Précis always has to do with past events. Therefore you must *never use the present tense*.

7. You are told to write "*in your own words*." This means that you must not quote in inverted commas from the evidence, letters, or reports, and consequently *I*, *we*, *you* must never occur. The direction does not mean that you must avoid using any words or sentences occurring in the original, though you will often find that other words than those used in the original will express the meaning more briefly and distinctly.

8. Be careful to spell proper names exactly, and to be *absolutely accurate* in every particular, numbers, dates, and

everything else. Inaccuracy is one of the worst possible faults.

9. Avoid fine writing; the plainest style is the best.

10. Do not add comments of your own, *e.g.* "The Russian Minister replied *with characteristic duplicity*"; "The British Minister appears to have shown great weakness in yielding this point." Avoid altogether such expressions as: "it appears," "of course."

You may easily calculate whether your Précis is about the right length. "Not more than two pages" does not give much guidance, if you do not know the size of the page or the number of words allowed to a page. But you may take it that the limit of 400 words applies to all the exercises in this book, except the last four; in them you should not exceed 300 words. Count the number of words in ten consecutive lines of your writing, and find the average number of words in a line. You will then be able to calculate how many words you have written, and if you find you have exceeded you can sometimes scratch out an unnecessary sentence here and there. Work as hard as you can, especially at the beginning, so as to leave plenty of time for the actual writing; and if you have time to make a fair copy so much the better. Your Précis should not be much less than 350 words.

The following exercise is marked and annotated as recommended, and a Précis appended. Note that the side headings are not in the original.

PRÉCIS WRITING

I.—MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON CANTEENS AND REGI- MENTAL INSTITUTES

AT THE WAR OFFICE, PALL MALL,
Friday, 2nd May 1902.

PRESENT :

The EARL GREY (*President*).

Major-General the Hon. H.
F. Eaton.

Colonel C. H. Bridge.
Colonel A. J. Lambert.

Major L. A. M. Stopford,
D.A.A.G.

Captain H. C. Boehmer.

Colonel BARRINGTON FOOTE, *Secretary*.

Lieut.-General KELLY-KENNY, C.B., called in and examined.

We should like to hear you generally on the management of canteens, and how we can improve them in the interests of the soldier. We should like you to deal with those special points on which you wish to give information to the Committee?—I would like to say generally that ever since I have been in the Army, and particularly since I have held a responsible position, like Adjutant-General on the staff in the Northern District, and also Adjutant-General at Aldershot, and commanding troops at Aldershot, that I see, and particularly on manœuvres, that the curse of the soldier is beer-drinking, and the pushing of the sale of beer. Notwithstanding that the officers try to stop it, it goes on more or less to the

present day—so much so that I think not only is crime increased by it, but that the health of the soldier suffers materially in consequence of it.

Therefore it would be your opinion that it is desirable to place the management of the wet canteens in the hands of someone who has no interest whatsoever in pushing the sale of drink?—Quite so. But that is the difficulty. I have often thought that we might improve our position by abolishing the sale of beer in camp or in barracks altogether, but I believe I am alone in the Army in that view. I do not think I have ever found anyone who agreed with me on that point; and I admit it at once. The reason which is given by Army officers and the general public for that is that it would drive the men into the public-houses in the town. But so many lads join without the slightest taste for beer that I have often thought if the two methods were weighed, the balance would be in favour of the general health and discipline of the regiment and the sobriety of the men; and, though it would make many blackguards a great deal worse, and many drinkers a great deal worse, I think it would save hundreds if we prevented them ever getting the taste for beer which nearly every soldier develops. But there are so many objections to the course I have indicated, and so many experienced officers and Commanding Officers are against it, that I think perhaps it is not worth discussing.

Then I may summarise your evidence on this point in this way; that you would be in favour of making it difficult, rather than easy, for the soldier to get beer in the barracks, always provided that your arrangements are not so stringent as to drive the men out of barracks into the town?—Yes; yielding to the general wish of the Army, I would give up that point, and I would consider now how we can make the sale of beer less injurious to the soldier.

What proposals have you to offer on that point?—I think that the question of the merits of the tenant and regimental system has been a good deal discussed before you? I believe you have had evidence connected with that.

Yes, a good deal of evidence?—I have had some experience

and I know the objections. Like all other military questions you must weigh them in the balance ; but I think on the whole the regimental system is the better system. It has certain disadvantages with regard to the officers no doubt, but I do not think it has the disadvantage it is represented to have—that of taking officers away from their proper duties. I dispute that altogether. I think that of all the duties officers have to perform, the care of the health and the discipline and the comfort of the men is the most important ; and I have found in all the positions I occupied in the Army that the better the regiment was the more interest the officers took in these small details—nothing was too low for them, nothing too mean, and nothing was beyond them or outside their duties. I have always found that in my experience in the Army.

You hold that the management of the canteen is a factor in the well-being of the soldier, and that the good officer therefore takes an interest in the management of the canteen ?—Yes, and the better the regiment the more interest is taken.

And the better conducted becomes the canteen ?—Yes, and the more interest the officer takes.

Therefore you think it is essential that you should not relieve the regimental officer, and the officers of the regiment, from the responsibility of the canteen ?—No. We are always accused in the Army of not being business men, but the moment you try to teach the officers some business habits there is this outcry, that they are being taken away from their proper duties. I have been president of a canteen and it never interfered with my duties. When I was Commanding Officer, my officers who were on the canteen committee (I selected good ones who had an aptitude for it) never allowed it to interfere with their proper duties.

Does what you describe as a general dislike to having the responsibility of the canteen thrust upon officers arise from want of capacity or indolence ?—Of the Commanding Officer, do you mean ?

No, on the part of the average regimental officer ?—They do not like the idea of being considered to be grocers and beer-retailers ; but, as I say, in a good regiment I have never found any objection.

Do you think it is undesirable to make a soldier into a grocer?—Do you mean the officer?

No, the rank and file?—I do not see any objection to that. Are you speaking now with regard to the beer or groceries?

Do you think that men should be taken from their military duties in order to put them on canteen duty, either wet or dry?—There is an objection; but if you do not do it, and have recourse to the tenant system, I think the disadvantages weigh you down. You have not the control of the men; besides which it throws all the corruption and wickedness that are complained of on to another section of the community. The men are often reservists, and it goes on worse than ever.

{ Have instances of corruption come to your notice?—Taking bribes and assisting in pushing the sale of beer.

Is that common in your opinion?—I think it is.

And in the dry canteen, are commissions offered in order to secure the purchase of goods?—No, I do not think so, not to the same extent. My experience is that the greater part of the profit comes out of the beer. Even when we sell the dry goods in the canteen at wholesale prices there is still a profit, and I am convinced it comes out of beer.

Is that impression of yours founded upon particular experience on your part, or is it simply a general idea of yours?—I think it is experience. It came under my notice when I was Adjutant-General at Aldershot.

And you are satisfied that the present system does open the door to corruption?—Yes.

And how are you going to close that door?—I do not think, as long as you have beer-selling, you will ever absolutely close it. We may by more supervision and more inspections do something.

We have had a good deal of evidence before this Committee pointing to the desirability of establishing an organisation which would work the canteens of the Army on a co-operative basis, by which I mean that after a small percentage had been paid on the capital required to establish that organisation, the whole of the surplus profits would be divided among the canteens in proportion to their purchases?—Yes.

The objection that has been taken to that system is that, if it were compulsory, it would put up the backs of the Army to feel that they were obliged to purchase their supplies from a particular quarter; and I think the general opinion which has been expressed before this Committee has been that it is desirable in the interests of free competition to give your regimental officers the widest possible freedom as to the quarter from which they shall obtain their goods, but that, other things being equal, it is certainly desirable that they should get their goods from this organisation which is run in the interest of the soldier and not in the interest of a private firm. Would that be your opinion?—Yes, I certainly think it would, I should be sorry to lay down or to publish any order that they should go to any one institution, even if it was a Government institution or a co-operative store.

You feel it would be impolitic to endeavour to impose a reform or condition?—It would be impolitic; it would not do at all.

You must allow it to grow up gradually, you think?—I should let the Commanding Officer go where he liked.

You would not recommend doing anything more than bring before the regimental officer the alternatives?—Quite so, and I go further. I think that the best system would be that the Commanding Officer should be allowed to make his contracts. Of course, it is part of the duties of the General, both of the Army Corps and the Division, to inspect very carefully the canteen system, and he might compare one with another and bring to the notice of the Commanding Officer that such and such a regiment gets its supplies from such and such an association, that their beer is cheaper or their groceries are cheaper, and so on. I think a great deal might be done in that way, in addition to a very, very strong system of inspection, which we have never had.

You suggest the fullest possible publicity, comparison, and inspection?—Yes, an Army Corps system of inspection. I suppose the Government will not pay for it, but I think the canteens ought to pay for it. There must be some strong highly-paid man to inspect, even if it is a civilian, and if it is a civilian you will have to pay him and pay him very highly.

There is one other question, and that is upon the food of the soldier. The evidence given before this Committee leads

us to suppose that the young soldier is a big eater and a small drinker, and that he slowly becomes a drinker?—I do not know that it is very slowly, but he becomes a drinker.

Most of his money is spent in the purchase of food when he first joins the army?—When he first joins.

Have you ever looked into the question of the soldiers' rations from a scientific point of view?—Yes.

As to how much nutriment there is in them?—Yes, I have.

And are they up to the requirements of a young man?—
 { Soldiers' rations. This question has been frequently before us, and I
 have always thought that the soldier's bread ration
 is sufficient, but I think he ought to get a quarter
 of a pound of meat more. Notwithstanding all that has been
 done, it is a good deal at his own expense. He does not get
 anything like as good rations as the American soldier.

And the German soldier?—I have not compared the German soldier with him, because they are so different. I compared the two Anglo-Saxon armies which enlist voluntarily; and I should think, as well as I can recollect, that the American soldiers' rations are better in the proportion of about four to three.

(*Major-General Eaton.*) I believe the American soldiers, from what I have seen, get free groceries?—Yes.

That is a thing the English soldier does not get?—No, now he gets his messing money.

That is, if he is not doing duty with his battalion, but a man is charged 3*d.* for his groceries?—Of course, the extra pay of the soldier is not quite a canteen question. The messing money was given more or less to help his pay.

(*President.*) What is the exact position of the soldier with regard to the dry canteen. Is it a luxury or a necessity, in order to keep him in a state of efficiency?—It is a necessity.

What has he to pay in order to get the groceries and for his extra food, which you say is a necessity, to keep him in efficiency?—I say it is a necessity in this way. I do not think the man would be driven to hospital if he did not get the supper, but I think he would not be such an effective or strong soldier.

{ (*Major-General Eaton.*) Really, what the soldier gets is
 three-quarters of a pound of meat and bread. Everything
 else—groceries and tea—he has to pay 3*d.* a day for, if he is

in mess?—I say, even if you give him the extra pound of meat, he will still go for his food.

He has to pay 3*d.* a day for it?—The Government gives him that 3*d.* as a pure allowance. Formerly it came out of his pay.

(*President.*) In your view, the soldier gets his rations of bread and meat given him by the State?—Yes.

(*Colonel Bridge.*) Plus an allowance for his groceries and vegetables.

(*President.*) What is his position towards the State?—He gets 3*d.* credited to him, and then out of that 3*d.* the man is efficiently supplied from the canteen—he buys from the canteen the groceries and the vegetables.

(*Colonel Bridge.*) Yes, and the milk, and so on.

(*President.*) That means his pay has been increased 3*d.* a day in order to meet his grocery requirements?—Yes.

So that you could say that he had his groceries free if you had not added the 3*d.* to his pay?—Yes; he would have his 1*s.* a day and his groceries free, but instead of that we have added 3*d.* a day.

He has 1*s.* 3*d.* a day now?—Yes, and he pays for his groceries. He has got a great deal more now—he has got 2*d.* more; he has 1*s.* 5*d.* a day from the 1st April.

Every soldier in the Army?—Every man who is entitled to the messing gets 2*d.* more, and in 1904 he will have 6*d.* more. The soldier's pay is being increased.

(*Major-General Eaton.*) The total amount that can be stopped from a man's pay for grocery and so on is 5½*d.* a day.

(*Colonel Bridge.*) The Government can stop that 3*d.* at any moment when they wish—for instance, in the field they stop the allowance?—Yes; it is only the pay for the messing.

(*President.*) It seems to me a complicated arrangement?—It is, but at first it was intended to do away with supplying groceries by the State, and they thought that would be more complicated still.

But still, I understand from your evidence that in order to keep a soldier in a state of efficiency such as you require to enable him to do his duty properly, it is absolutely essential that he should have groceries, and that he can get those groceries only through the dry canteen?—Yes.

And that that dry canteen, therefore, is a regimental necessity as much as the beef and bread?—Yes, the dry canteen is a necessity, but I will guard myself against saying the beer is.

As far as the dry canteen is concerned, the supplies issued to the soldier are as great a necessity as the rations of bread and meat?—Yes, not necessarily through the canteen; they are a necessity wherever you get them, and therefore it is of the utmost importance that the regimental officer should take the greatest personal interest in the management of the dry canteen.

Therefore you do not think it is desirable to hand over the management of the dry canteen to any firm of contractors to manage for their own profit and not for the interest of the soldier?—No, because I suspect the system. I am told they make nothing, and that they make nothing out of the beer, as some brewers tell me, and the statistics also tell me that the drink has been decreasing since the tenant system was introduced, but I do not believe any of it.

Your knowledge of human nature leads you to believe a man would not take that business up unless there was profit in it?—My experience as well as my knowledge of human nature. I may give an example. In the Salisbury manœuvres, and every other manœuvre I have been at, the men get into camp after a long day's operations and long marches, and the tent and the canteen are ready, but as a matter of fact there is nothing ready but the beer. The bread comes later, the apples come later, the cheese comes later, but the beer is always there, and not only that, but it blocks the road and interferes with the troops coming up.

Is that so in the regimental canteen?—I am now talking about large masses of men at manœuvres. This was when one great firm had had the whole of the supply.

And he making his largest profit on the sale of beer, it was always easy to get beer?—Yes, he pressed the sale of beer when nothing else was ready and when nothing could be got up, but beer was always there. So much so that my staff—I commanded a Division at the last Salisbury manœuvres—instead of attending to their regular military duties, had

to be constantly watching and trying to get other supplies than beer. My Assistant Adjutant-General was told off altogether for the purpose of getting other supplies than beer up into camp.

(*Captain Boehmer.*) In the early part of your evidence you said that the pressing of the sale of liquor was the great evil in canteens, and officers tried to stop it?—Yes.

Is not the great inducement to press the sale of liquor due to the fact that regimental officers depend upon the profits from the sale of beer from their canteen funds for improving the messing of the soldiers?—No, I do not think that the pressing of the sale of beer is due to that, but still I think that the profit on the beer enables them to do a great deal of good for the soldier. At the same time, I am sure no officer in the Army would press the sale of beer for the sake of the profit which it gives.

The improved messing depends to some extent upon the state of the canteen funds?—An officer here and there might be influenced by that, but I think as a body they would not be.

(*Colonel Lambert.*) It has been frequently stated before this Committee that after two years the soldier becomes a beer drinker, though he is an eater in the early part of his service. Can you suggest any steps which might be taken in the canteen to obviate this difficulty?—I have often thought of it, and I would say, first of all, with regard to the difficulty which arises at manœuvres, I proposed at a manœuvring that we should have no beer at all, and that the officers should have no wine—that we should try for those 14 days whether we could not eliminate it altogether. But there were so many objections raised to it. Of course, one must try these things cautiously and judiciously, but I approached Lord Roberts about it, and I think he is rather inclined to take up the idea on some future occasion when we have manœuvres that we might endeavour to have them without any beer or liquor—just to try it as an experiment, of course, not continuing it if it did not succeed. That would help. Then, again, I think there might be an improvement in respect of the hours that the canteens are opened. Of course, we do not want to hurry these things, or to press them unduly,

but I suggested to Lord Roberts, and I think it is in his mind, that we might alter the hours of opening of canteens. I have always thought it objectionable that canteens should open at 12 o'clock. On a field day there is a great rush of the men to the canteen. I do not think in civilian life it is felt that it is necessary to drink after exercise. I have visited some very large firms, and I do not see the same rush to the public-houses that I see to the canteens. So I think that if we approach the matter carefully and cautiously we may be able gradually to shut up the canteens for drinking on the premises—letting the men, however, take a glass or a pint of beer with their dinners. I would not object to that, but I do think that the rush of men, when they come in from marching, to the canteen is very objectionable. It may be said that it is a matter of habit, but whether it is or not, it is a very bad one, and if we can check it in any way it would be a very great advantage to the soldier.

(*President.*) In your circular of December 28th, which we have put upon the notes, you recommend that the men should be allowed to purchase one pint of beer to drink with their suppers?—Yes.

We have been told that the soldier does not care so much for his beer with his dinner?—I think he likes it at all times, but he certainly does not crave for liquor with his food as other people do.

You think that if you made it a little more difficult for him to sit and drink in the wet canteen he would be inclined to have his glass of beer with his food?—I think so; and anything that would drag him away from the wet canteen I should welcome.

(*Major-General Eaton.*) You would not have entertainments in the canteen?—Certainly not; I would have no music or singing or anything of that sort in the drinking-places.

(*Colonel Bridge.*) It has been suggested that it is no use trying to wean men from beer either by refining their surroundings, or by compulsion, so long as you have a ring of public-houses around the barracks, such as you have at Aldershot, ready to receive them with open arms?—Of course the magistrates might refuse to renew the licenses, but they do not. But even then I think a great many men would pass by these public-houses who would be led into the

canteens by their comrades. I mean that if you had no canteen in the barracks there are hundreds of men who would never go into one of those public-houses. On the other hand, a great many would go more and would become worse. But to carry out such a suggestion as that is out of the question, and I would not press it, as there is hardly any one that takes the same view as I do.

One argument which has been used by the Commanding Officer at Aldershot was that directly they try to improve their recreation-rooms and make the canteens unattractive the men simply go outside the iron railings into the public-houses and that their trade increases?—Yes, a great many men do, but a great many do not. A great many would stay and never think of going to these public-houses.

(*Captain Boehmer.*) Of course, the men do not have to dress in the canteen, whereas they have to dress to go out?—Yes, but a soldier is different from a civilian in that respect. A soldier is more or less paid to be disciplined and to obey orders, and if you order him to dress he dresses. A civilian is not paid for that. He is paid to hammer away or dig away all day long, and you cannot compare the two.

But does not the fact that they have to dress to go out of barracks make it easier for them to get drink in the canteen and encourage them to get drink there?—If a man is a drinker I prefer him to go to the canteen, dressed or undressed.

(*Colonel Lambert.*) Can you offer any suggestion as to the better conduct of sergeants' messes?—That question presents great difficulty. I have had great experience of sergeants' messes as well as of canteens. Any tightening up of the rules is resented very much. The only thing I can see is to improve the condition of the sergeants, and I hope the small amount of extra pay they are getting will help in this direction. We must, of course, try and bring the sergeants' mess up to the level, as far as we can, of the officers' mess, by improving the condition of the men and by getting a better class of men into the Army. I see no other way.

By increasing their self-respect and by throwing the whole responsibility upon them?—Yes.

We had evidence from a sergeant-major at Colchester who

took exactly the same line that you have done, but who said it was absolutely essential that the second officer in command should be responsible for the sergeants' mess, but this appeared to the Committee to be a contradiction?—Yes; when the Commanding Officer goes round to inspect I think the sergeants dislike very much the inquisitorial part of the institution.

Would you throw the whole responsibility upon the sergeants themselves?—I would throw it all upon them, except to this extent. The Commanding Officer and the General Officer inspect the officers' mess, and I would have the very same inspection over the sergeants' mess. The Commanding Officer watches the books of his officers, and I would have the same control over the sergeants' mess.

You would apply the same rule to both messes?—Substantially. It would be impossible, perhaps, to apply exactly the same rules, but substantially the same.

That would be your ideal towards which you would work?—
 { Yes, my idea, broadly, is that instead of watching them, and
 { checking them, and suspecting them, I would try and improve
 { their position.

(*President.*) Are there any other points which you would like to bring to our notice?—I ought to add that not only officers of the Army that I have met with, but even advanced temperance advocates, are against my view of stopping the sale of beer in barracks when I have discussed the question with them.

The circular you signed recommends distinctly that they
Measures should be allowed to purchase a pint of beer?—
for Yes; as the system exists you must make the best
stopping of it. Then there is the question of the increased
drinking. facilities for instruction and amusement in the in-
 {stitutions, but I suppose that has been thoroughly
 {threshed out before you.

We have had a good deal of evidence on that point, but we should be very grateful for anything you may have to say?—I think there is no movement more clearly in the right direction than that of increasing the comfort of the soldier in the institutions apart from the canteen.

Your wish is to establish counter-attractions of the most
 {effective character against the wet canteen?—Quite so. It
 {has been suggested ever since I have been in the Army that
 {we ought not to do this out of the profits of beer-drinking;

but I think we should do so, and I have ordered that we should try to pay the library charges out of the canteen; and, of course, the canteen means the beer. I see no objection whatever to making these institutions comfortable and almost luxurious at the expense of the beer.

I suppose you would be of opinion that in the appropriation of the wet canteen profits the General Officer Commanding should be consulted?—Yes, he should be consulted, certainly.

Would you allow the General to have the control of the appropriation?—No, the Commanding Officer.

In order to secure continuity of administration in such a matter as a regimental institute, is it not desirable to have control over the various units who came into one barracks?—Yes.

Supposing you cannot get out of the Treasury the money that you require to put up the recreation-rooms which you think the comfort of your soldiers require, do you think it would be fair to borrow the money for that purpose on the security of your wet canteen receipts?—There are difficulties as to one regiment giving it over to another.

It does not seem to me to matter very much whether there is a change of soldiers or not, because the man who comes in benefits exactly as much as the man who goes out?—Quite so. I quite approve of what you suggest. If the Government give the furniture or fixtures, then I think you could borrow the money. But I think you will have to borrow from the Government, because it sometimes happen that a station is given up, and who is to pay the money? But if you borrowed the money from the Government, then the Government would say, "This is our fault, we have given this up and we must suffer the loss." But I see no reason on earth why the canteens should not spend their money in providing comforts for the soldiers.

(*Major-General Eaton.*) Would you spend the profits of canteens on buildings?—I would, in a permanent place, and where they had very large profits.

(*Colonel Bridge.*) At Aldershot we built what is called the annexe—butcher's shop, fish stall, and so forth—out of the canteen profits. I think we spent nearly £1000 on buildings out of our profits, and, counting the theatre, we spent a great

deal more than £2000 or £3000.—Of course, it depends upon many considerations, and I would not like to run any great risk.

(*Major-General Eaton.*) Do not you think there should be a little more latitude allowed the soldier to take his friends into the coffee bar, subject, of course, to the consent of the Commanding Officers?—Yes, I am very much in favour of it, almost to the pulling down of the walls of the barracks. The more open they are the better. I am dead against the idea of building a wall round the barracks.

You would suggest that the coffee bar should be made as attractive as possible, so that they might meet their friends there?—Yes, I do not think I would allow them to take them into the drinking place.

But into the coffee bar?—Certainly, as long as they are well conducted.

The witness withdrew.

PRÉCIS OF NO. I

PRÉCIS OF MINUTES OF EVIDENCE taken before the Committee on Canteens and Regimental Institutes, at the War Office, Pall Mall, on Friday, 2nd May 1902. [*Present*: The Earl Grey (President); Major-General the Hon. H. F. Eaton; Colonel C. H. Bridge; Colonel A. J. Lambert; Major L. A. M. Stopford, D.A.A.G.; Captain H. C. Boehmer.]*

Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny, C.B., called and examined, said that beer-drinking was the curse of the soldier. He himself was in favour of abolishing the sale of beer in camps and barracks altogether; but he was almost alone in this opinion.

For the management of canteens he preferred the regimental system, under which the control was in the hands of the officers, and there was no desire to push the sale of beer. He had not found that the management of the canteen interfered with the military duties of officers. The proper management of the dry

* [] The words between brackets should be omitted. It is of small importance to know before whom the evidence was given. It would be otherwise if we were writing a précis of the *Report* of the Committee. Then our opinion of the value of the Report would largely depend on our opinion of the persons who made the Report.

canteen was essential to the soldier's health, since he had to get from it all his food except bread and meat. Contractors always pushed the sale of beer, on which they made most of their profits. [On manœuvres, at the end of a day's march, they always had the beer ready, but the other supplies did not arrive till later.]*

To diminish beer-drinking in the army, he suggested that as an experiment they should try manœuvres of 14 days without any intoxicating liquors for men or officers; that there should be a change in the hours at which canteens opened; that gradually canteens should be shut up for drinking on the premises, the men being allowed a pint of beer with their dinners; that recreation-rooms and other institutions apart from the drinking canteen should be made as attractive as possible. [He saw no objection to paying for such improvements out of the profits on beer.]*

He was opposed to the working of canteens on a co-operative basis, on the ground that it would be impolitic to compel commanding officers to buy from a particular source; he recommended a strict system of inspection, which would bring to the notice of Commanding Officers the cheapest sources of supply.

He thought that sergeants' messes could not be improved by stricter inspection, which would be much resented; the only way was to improve the condition of the sergeants and to attract a better class of men into the army.

In the Précis itself (apart from the heading) there are about 350 words. It would be permissible to include some more of the parts marked or underlined in the exercise, but we have here all that is necessary.

* The words between brackets [] may be omitted.

II. — CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ASIATIC LABOUR INTO THE TRANSVAAL MINES

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

Instructions.—"Write out in your own words a Précis of the following Correspondence. Your Précis should proceed *not letter by letter*, but in the form of a narrative *without* marginal references." For further instructions, see Introduction.

No. 1.—GOVERNOR VISCOUNT MILNER TO MR. LYTTETLTON.
—(Received 10.40 p.m., January 3, 1904)

(Telegram.)

January 3rd. No. 1. I have conferred with the Lieutenant-Governor and the members of Executive on the situation created by the vote of the Legislative Council on Sir George Farrar's motion.* They are all unanimous in thinking that the Government ought without unnecessary delay to introduce legislation on the lines laid down in that motion, and I have agreed to their doing so. A draft Ordinance in English and Dutch will therefore be published and widely circulated next week, and will be introduced in the Council when it meets again. The Council has adjourned to the 18th.

* The motion was as follows :—

"That the attention of the Government be called to the report of the Transvaal Labour Commission; that the Government be requested to introduce a draft Ordinance providing for the importation of indentured unskilled coloured labourers for the purpose of supplementing the supply of labour on the mines within the Witwatersand area under such restrictions as will ensure their employment as unskilled workmen only, and their return to their native country on the completion of their contracts; and that in order to secure full consideration of the important issues involved, such draft Ordinance be published in English and Dutch for a reasonable time before being introduced into this Council."

I realise the gravity of this decision, but have no shadow of doubt as to its wisdom. There are no signs of an adequate amount of labour being obtained from existing sources of supply. The consequent depression in every kind of business is increasing daily, the revenue is falling off, many people are out of work, and if the situation does not soon change a considerable exodus of the white population is inevitable. On the other hand, there is nothing wrong with the mines except insufficiency of labour. They are fully equipped for a production at least 60 per cent. above the present, and plenty of capital for further development is assured, if only labour is forthcoming. It appears unjustifiable to refuse to try any remedy not in itself intolerable for a state of things which is causing grave distress to all classes of people in this Colony and affecting the whole of South Africa. No one, indeed, any longer supposes that the experiment of Asiatic labour, even if successful, can do more than supplement the local supply or would justify any relaxation in the immense efforts being made to develop the latter. Anything like a sudden and very abundant influx of Asiatics is out of the question. But in the opinion of the best judges we may hope gradually to obtain an amount of labour from Asia which will substitute steady and substantial progress for the present complete stagnation.

The vote in the Legislative Council, in my opinion, faithfully reflects the present state of public opinion, and the great change which has come over it. A year ago Sir George Farrar's proposal would have found very few supporters in the country. When I left here in August, though opinion was rapidly changing it was still almost equally divided. To-day I consider the scale has turned decisively in favour of imported labour.

The unofficial members of Legislative Council are really representative men, who have from the first shown themselves independent of Government, while sensitive to public opinion. Of these non-official members, 14 in number, 9 voted for the motion, while 4 voted against it, and 1 did not vote. Of the 9 supporters 4 were Boer members, who all spoke as well as voted for the motion. The fifth Boer member took no part. Of the other 5 non-official supporters of the motion, 2 are mining men, 2 are leading men of business, and 1 is

a British farmer who has lived in the country for years and possesses in an exceptional degree the confidence of both Dutch and British. Four of the 9 supporters are from Johannesburg, and the other 5 are from the districts of Heidelberg, Potchefstroom, Rustenburg, Carolina, and Zeerust; that is, from the most diverse parts of the Transvaal. The minority was composed of 2 members from Pretoria and 2 from Johannesburg, all of British race.

One of the latter is a leading member of the Trade Council, and his vote, no doubt, reflects the feeling of a section of the working class, though not, I think, of the majority. On the contrary, there is every indication that the white miners are now preponderantly in favour of Asiatic labour, while the rest of the artisan class is divided. It is a strong minority of the working class generally, with a number of small traders and a few score of professional and commercial men, who at present constitute the active opposition amongst the public. But they are dwindling in numbers, and show nothing like their former keenness.

With regard to the Boer members of Council it may, of course, be said that they only represent a section, as the most prominent of the Boers who fought to the end did not accept seats on the Council. But on the present question Boer opinion is not divided on at all the same lines as it was on the political question. The one Boer member of Council who belongs to the "late surrender" class—and he is very typical of his fellows—supported the motion quite as strongly and on the same grounds as his colleagues who surrendered at an earlier stage of the war.

All the official members supported the motion, it being distinctly understood that they were absolutely free to vote according to their individual convictions. An attempt was made beforehand to discount them as out of touch with local feeling and lacking in experience of the country. As a matter of fact, two of them are born South Africans, four others are permanent residents in the country, and the average residence of those not born in the country is seven years.

While I am strongly of opinion that the question, at any rate in its present phase, only concerns the people of the Transvaal, it may be useful to His Majesty's Government

to know what, as far as I can observe, is the attitude of the other South African colonies. In Rhodesia, as you are aware, there is a strong demand for imported labour. In Natal, which itself depends for prosperity on such labour, there is a marked unwillingness to interfere in the controversy going on in the Transvaal. This attitude of neutrality, which was adopted in the Natal Legislature at a much earlier stage of the controversy, is now endorsed by the press of that colony. From the Orange River Colony there are no important expressions of opinion either way. As far as I can judge, the attitude of the majority of the people is precisely what I believe to be that of the Boers in the Transvaal, namely, that as long as they are not troubled with Asiatics living among them as farmers and traders they would heartily welcome any increase in the supply of labour, from the scarcity of which they themselves suffer acutely. In the Cape alone is there any marked opposition. But this is, in the main, quite clearly due to electioneering. The Bond is seeking to make up for the votes lost to it through disfranchisement by a bid for the native vote, and the natives of the Cape Colony, though they no longer come in any appreciable numbers to work in the Transvaal, have been frightened by the picture of a flood of Asiatics sweeping all over South Africa and supplanting them in their own country. The Progressives on their side cannot afford entirely to lose the native vote, so both parties are competing with one another in protesting against Asiatic labour. I do not mean to say that all the opposition is of this character. There is in every part of South Africa a number of men of unquestionable sincerity who are opposed in principle to imported labour under any circumstances. But I believe it is quite a minority even in the Cape.

NO. 2.—LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR SIR A. LAWLEY TO MR. LYTTELTON.—(*Received January 4, 1904*)

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, JOHANNESBURG,
December 12, 1903.

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Johannesburg,

Stock Exchange, covering Resolutions passed at a General Meeting of Members held on the 8th instant, on the subject of the Report of the Labour Commission. I have, etc.,

A. LAWLEY, Lieutenant-Governor.

Enclosure in No. 2.—RESOLUTIONS PASSED AT A GENERAL MEETING OF MEMBERS HELD ON TUESDAY, 8th December 1903

Resolution No. 1 :—

“ That in the opinion of the Members of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, legislation for the importation of indentured unskilled coloured labour, under proper restrictions, for the use of the mines, should be passed with the least possible delay to supplement the present inadequate supply of African Native Labour.”

Resolution No. 2 :—

“ That a copy of the Resolution be forwarded to His Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor.”

No. 3.—LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR SIR A. LAWLEY TO MR. LYTTTELTON.—(*Received January 4, 1904*)

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, JOHANNESBURG,
December 12, 1903.

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter and resolution from the Johannesburg Chamber of Trade on the subject of the Report of the Labour Commission. I have, etc.,

A. LAWLEY, Lieutenant-Governor.

Enclosure in No. 3.—JOHANNESBURG CHAMBER OF TRADE TO LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR, TRANSVAAL

JOHANNESBURG CHAMBER OF TRADE,
25, 26, and 27 LONDON HOUSE, LOVEDAY STREET,
JOHANNESBURG, *December 5, 1903.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I have the honour, by direction of my Committee, to forward, for your information, the following

resolution unanimously passed at a Special General Meeting of the Members of the Johannesburg Chamber of Trade, held yesterday.

Resolution :—

“That in view of the finding of the Labour Commission, this Chamber affirms the principle of importation of unskilled coloured labourers, and urges upon His Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor of the Transvaal the necessity for immediate legislation to this end under restrictions which will provide for their employment as unskilled labourers only, and for their return to their native country at the expiration of the contracts.” I have, etc.,

E. C. LOWE, Secretary.

His Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor,
Pretoria.

NO. 4.—GOVERNOR SIR W. F. HELY-HUTCHINSON (CAPE) TO
MR. LYTTTELTON.—(*Received 2.45 p.m., January 4, 1904*)

(*Telegram.*)

January 4. No. 1.—Referring to my telegram of August 17, No. 1,* following Minute received from Prime Minister :—

Begins : January 2.—Prime Minister requests that Secretary of State for Colonies may have his attention directed by cable to the Minute* of Ministers of August 17th last relating to the proposal to import Asiatic labour into South Africa, and be informed that the Prime Minister, who is charged with the whole administration of native affairs in this Colony, in which an enormous native population resides, desires to impress on Imperial Government that nothing has occurred since that Minute was drafted to cause him to alter in the slightest degree the views therein expressed as regards the natives, and especially as affecting the great question of federation. *Ends.*

* Not printed.

No. 5.—GOVERNOR SIR W. F. HELY-HUTCHINSON (CAPE) TO MR. LYTTTELTON.—(*Received January 4, 1904*)

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CAPE TOWN,
December 15, 1903.

SIR,—With reference to my despatches noted in the margin * (December 2, 1903; December 9, 1903; December 14, 1903), I have the honour to forward a Petition * to His Most Gracious Majesty the King against the proposed immigration of Asiatics into South Africa.

2. In the letter transmitting the Petition, Mr. J. Iverson states that the Petition has been signed by three thousand seven hundred and thirty-five residents, and that many other Petitions of similar import will follow. I have, etc.,

WALTER HELY-HUTCHINSON.

No. 6.—MR. LYTTTELTON TO GOVERNOR SIR W. F. HELY-HUTCHINSON (CAPE)

DOWNING STREET, *January 16, 1904.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 9th of December,* forwarding a letter from Dr. Jameson on the subject of the proposals for the introduction of Asiatic labour into the Transvaal. I received a summary of this letter from you by cable on the 9th of December.

I have to request that you will inform Dr. Jameson in reply that no final decision on the subject of the importation of Asiatic labourers into the Transvaal has as yet been taken, and that if at any time hereafter such importation should take place it would be for the Cape Colony to protect itself by further legislation against any apprehended influx of Asiatics against which, in the opinion of the responsible Government of the Colony, the Cape might not be already sufficiently guarded by the legislation proposed to be passed by the Transvaal. I have, etc.,

ALFRED LYTTTELTON.

* Not printed.

No. 7.—MR. LYTTTELTON TO GOVERNOR VISCOUNT MILNER.—
(Sent 4.30 p.m., January 16, 1904)

(Telegram.)

January 16. No. 2.—Your telegram No. 1 of 3rd January.* His Majesty's Government, in view of your earnest advice and the information by which you support it, will not withhold sanction to the introduction of the Ordinance, a draft of which you have published. This draft is, I understand, identical with that enclosed in your despatch of 16th November, 1903.†

As it stands, the draft Ordinance would apply to Indian labour imported for the mines. Its provisions, if applied to British Indians, would probably be objected to by the Indian Government; but, on the assumption that it is intended to apply to Chinese only, I make the following observations in the interests of the mines as well as those of the labourers:

The terms and conditions of his employment should be fully stated in the contract with the labourer and clearly understood by him. This is essential.

Of course you will reserve the Ordinance. It will be necessary to ascertain the views of the Chinese Government in order that His Majesty's Government may be assured that the Government will accept its provisions as the basis of the regulations which they desire to be drawn up in concert with the Chinese Ambassador in London.

No. 8.—GOVERNOR THE EARL OF RANFURLY (NEW ZEALAND) TO MR. LYTTTELTON.—(Received 8.10 a.m., January 20, 1904)

(Telegram.)

My Government desire to protest against proposal to introduce Chinese labour South Africa. After years' experience in New Zealand my Ministers agree prohibition of Chinese immigration imperative in the best interests of British communities, especially those with, or likely to have,

* No. 1.

† Not printed.

responsible Government. My Government most reluctantly enter into matters not in their jurisdiction, but consider that they would fail in their duty unless they expressed their great apprehensions. They foresee great dangers, racial, social, political, and sanitary inevitably would be introduced by Chinese influx, however stringent conditions of introduction and employment may be. My Government find it is practically impossible to avoid very many and serious evils that arise, and in South Africa such introduction may create vested interests on the part of employers making it extremely difficult to terminate practice once sanctioned. Earnestly my Ministers recommend that you will consider this question, as the objections, in their opinion, heavily outweigh immediate pecuniary advantage, and they think immediate advantages would be dearly purchased by influx of foreign element, dangerous while unassimilated, and not to be assimilated without prejudice to our progress, institutions, and patriotic ideals.

No. 9.—GOVERNOR VISCOUNT MILNER TO MR. LYTTETLTON.
—(*Received 6.10 p.m., January 20, 1904*)

(*Telegram.—Extract.*)

January 20. No. 1.—Your telegram, No. 2, of 16th January.* The Ordinance was introduced yesterday. The second reading will be taken to-day and Committee stage next week. You will have received by mail before then a copy of the Ordinance as introduced.

We do not look to Indian labour for the mines.

We propose to introduce a provision making it necessary for the Lieutenant-Governor to prescribe the port to and from which indentured labourers would be brought and taken on repatriation, and to arrange with the Government of Natal to pass the necessary legislation for landing arrangements, inspection, and control on transit. The Natal Government is prepared to do this, as it has already expressed a desire that Durban should be the port of landing and re-embarkation, and is ready to introduce the legislation necessary.

I trust that reference to the Chinese Government will

* No. 7.

not involve much further delay. The situation here is of increasing strain, and I foresee that our financial difficulties will be greatly aggravated unless we can begin recruiting soon. An absolute reduction in the number of native labourers was shown last month for the first time. This month, up to date, is even worse. An unprecedented number of claims have been abandoned this month, which shows the financial straits of a large number of claim-holders and involves a further loss of revenue.

No. 10.—GOVERNOR VISCOUNT MILNER TO MR. LYTTELTON.
—(*Received January 25, 1904*)

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, JOHANNESBURG,
January 4, 1904.

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of a draft Ordinance* to regulate the introduction into the Transvaal of unskilled non-European labourers.

The draft Ordinance will be published this week in the *Gazette* in its present form, which, as you will observe, differs considerably from that in which it has been previously sent to you. I have, etc.,

MILNER, Governor.

No. 11.—MR. LYTTELTON TO GOVERNOR THE EARL OF
RANFURLY (NEW ZEALAND).—(*Sent 10.10 p.m., January
25, 1904*)

(*Telegram.*)

I have received your telegram† conveying the views which your Government have formed with regard to the introduction of Chinese labour into the Transvaal. I fully recognise the title of all the self-governing Colonies to express their opinion on so important a question, and especially of those who, like New Zealand, rendered memorable service in the war in South Africa.

But his Majesty's Government have declared that their policy is to treat the Transvaal as though it were a self-governing Colony, unless a distinct Imperial interest is con-

* Not printed.

† No. 8.

cerned, and to interfere as little as possible with local opinion and local wishes. This policy has many reasons to support it, but, among others, it is based on the conviction that each of the States of the Empire, by reason of its direct interests and special knowledge of the conditions affecting it, is best able to deal with its own problems, and it is this conviction which has guided His Majesty's Government in its action in regard to the question of alien races in New Zealand and Australia. It must not be forgotten that there is much that is abnormal in the economic condition of the Transvaal which may call for abnormal measures, and His Majesty's Government, consistently with the policy which they have laid down, could not refuse to accede to the wishes of one part of the Empire on a matter which it regarded as of paramount importance to its well-being in deference to representations from another part of the Empire not directly interested. His Majesty's Government, nevertheless, feel assured that the Transvaal Government will give such weight to the opinion of any self-governing Colony as the exceptional circumstances of their country permit.

I have communicated to Lord Milner the terms of your telegram, and also this reply.

NO. 12.—MR. LYTTELTON TO GOVERNOR SIR W. F. HELY-HUTCHINSON (CAPE)

DOWNING STREET, January 26, 1904.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 30th of December last * transmitting letters and resolutions from George, Paarl, Queenstown, Hanover, King William's Town, and Somerset West, protesting against the introduction of Chinese into South Africa, and to inform you that copies of the resolutions passed at a meeting of the inhabitants of the town and district of George, and of the petition received from the Mayor of Queenstown have been laid before His Majesty the King as desired. I have, etc.,

ALFRED LYTTELTON.

* Not printed.

No. 13.—GOVERNOR VISCOUNT MILNER TO MR. LYTTTELTON.
—(*Received 7 p.m., January 28, 1904*)

(*Telegram.—Extract.*)

Matter most urgent.—28th January. No. 1.—My telegram of 20th January, No. 1.* The Labour Ordinance amended has passed Committee.

No. 14.—MR. LYTTTELTON TO GOVERNOR SIR W. F. HELY-HUTCHINSON (CAPE).—(*Sent 4.1 p.m., January 29, 1904*)

(*Telegram.*)

29th January. No. 1.—Referring to your telegram of 4th January, No. 1,† His Majesty's Government have duly noted Ministers' Minute on subject of importation of Asiatic labour into South Africa, referring to the expression of their views contained in their previous Minute of August 17th and to the resolutions of Cape Parliament adopted in its last Session.

You should now remind your Ministers that the policy of His Majesty's Government was in last July announced to be to treat the Transvaal as though it were a self-governing Colony, unless a distinct Imperial interest is concerned, and to interfere as little as possible with local opinion and local wishes, and that in such a matter as the introduction of Asiatic labour the liberty that is allowed to the Cape Colony and Natal to decide upon what course to pursue in their own interests could not be denied to the Transvaal.

His Majesty's Government entirely adhere to that policy.

The Resolution of the Bloemfontein Conference which gave rise to the expression of opinion by the two Houses of the Legislature was arrived at unanimously by delegates from all the States of British South Africa, including the Cape Colony, and was to the effect that the permanent settlement in South Africa of Asiatic races would be injurious and should not be permitted, but that, if industrial development positively requires it, the introduction of unskilled Asiatic labourers under a system of Government control providing for the indenturing of such labourers and their

* No. 9.

† No. 4.

repatriation at the termination of their indentures should be permissible.

His Majesty's Government are of opinion that, while it is of great moment that the policy adopted by the South African Colonies in all matters of importance should be harmonious, it would not be possible for them, unless some distinct imperial interest is concerned, to refuse to accede to the wishes of the Transvaal on a matter of paramount importance to its well-being and industrial development.

Such a refusal would be rendered even more difficult of justification in view of the precedent long since established in the case of the adjoining Colony of Natal.

III.—CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE ISLAND OF TRISTAN DA CUNHA

(*Time allowed, 1½ hours*)

Instructions as in Exercise II

NO. 1.—ADMIRALTY TO COLONIAL OFFICE.—(*Received
December 30, 1898*)

ADMIRALTY, *December 28, 1898.*

SIR,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, extracts from a letter dated the 15th November, from the Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Ship *Thrush*, reporting his proceedings in connection with the visit of that vessel to Tristan da Cunha. I am, etc.,

H. J. VANSITTART NEALE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

HER MAJESTY'S SHIP *Thrush*,
AT SIMONS TOWN, *November 15, 1898.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report that I left St. Helena on the 25th ultimo, and arrived at Tristan da Cunha on the 3rd instant. I left Tristan da Cunha on the 5th instant, and arrived at this port to-day.

The Islanders were unanimous in saying that November is not at all a good month for visiting the Island, as the weather is always unsettled, and landing may be impossible for several days together. From the middle of December to the middle of March they consider their finest season, from the middle of January to the middle of February being nearly always fine with light winds.

There are at present on the Island 35 males and 37 females : this includes 22 children under 14 years of age. There have been three births since the last visit of a man-of-war.

The health of the Islanders is excellent : the head man, Peter Green, is 91 years of age, and deaf, though in possession of his other faculties.

There are about 800 head of cattle, 600 head of sheep, and 60 donkeys on the Island. This does not include any wild cattle.

I brought away the shipwrecked crew of the *Glenhuntly*, consisting of a master, one mate, and nine men. This ship was abandoned on the 4th June last off the Island, having sprung a leak. I also brought, at their own request, two single men and a married man with his wife and five children.

The Islanders have one good whale-boat, two or three canvas boats, and the whaler supplied by the Admiralty ; there was no difficulty in obtaining part payment for the whaler in Island produce. We took 17 sheep and 156 pounds of potatoes. I have, etc.,

J. W. POCHIN,
Lieutenant and Commander.

Rear-Admiral Sir Robert H. Harris, K.C.M.G.,
Commander-in-Chief.

NO. 2.—BOARD OF TRADE TO COLONIAL OFFICE.—(*Received*
January 16, 1899)

BOARD OF TRADE (FINANCE DEPARTMENT),
7 WHITEHALL GARDENS, LONDON, S.W.
January 14, 1899.

SIR,—I am directed by the Board of Trade to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State, that their attention has been drawn to the assistance afforded by the inhabitants of the Island of Tristan da Cunha in 1898 to the master and crew of the barque *Glenhuntly*, of Liverpool, which vessel was lost off the Island in June last.

One of the wrecked men was enabled to leave the Island by a passing vessel in September, and the others were rescued in November by Her Majesty's Ship *Thrush*.

In acknowledgment of the kindness shown in this instance,

and to the crew of the *Helenslea*, in 1897, the Board have decided to expend a sum of one hundred and twenty pounds in the purchase of provisions and articles for the use of the Islanders, and they will be much obliged if the Secretary of State would secure such assistance of the Crown Agents for the Colonies in the purchase and shipment of the required articles as those gentlemen were good enough to afford in 1894 in the *Allanshaw* case.

Upon hearing that their request can be complied with, the Board will be glad to furnish a list of provisions, etc., of which, according to the report of the Commander of the *Thrush*, the Islanders stand in great need, and to cause the above-named sum to be transferred to the credit of the Crown Agents. I have, etc.,

COSMO MONKHOUSE.

NO. 3.—COLONIAL OFFICE TO BOARD OF TRADE

DOWNING STREET, *January 24, 1899.*

SIR,—I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th January, expressing the desire of the Board of Trade to present to the inhabitants of Tristan da Cunha articles to the value of £120; and asking for the assistance of the Crown Agents for the Colonies in the purchase and shipment of the goods.

2. The Crown Agents have been asked to undertake the business; and it will probably be most convenient that you should communicate with them directly on the subject. A copy of your letter under acknowledgment has been transmitted to them for their information. I am, etc.,

FRED. GRAHAM.

NO. 4.—ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE TO COLONIAL OFFICE.
—(*Received January 24, 1899*)

ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE,
NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE, LONDON, W.C.,
January 24, 1899.

SIR,—I beg to transmit, for your information, a copy of a letter dated 4th November last, which has been received

by Mr. B. R. Balfour, of Townley Hall, Drogheda, from Mr. P. W. Green, of Tristan da Cunha.

My correspondent has asked me to suggest for consideration whether it might not be possible, in mitigation of the distressing state of affairs described by Mr. Green—

1. To send an annual supply of provisions in view of possible arrivals of shipwrecked crews.
2. To contribute towards the support of a schoolmaster (who might also be a clergyman, were a grant made by the S.P.G.).
3. To erect a lighthouse on the Island.

I have, etc.,

J. S. O'HALLORAN, Secretary.

Enclosure in No. 4.—COPY OF LETTER FROM TRISTAN
DA CUNHA TO MR. B. R. BALFOUR

November 4, 1898.

DEAR SIR,—I received your kind letter, and thank you very much for the kind interest you take in our poor desolated Island. I followed your advice and send another letter the Reverend the Secretary of the S.P.G. and prayed to send us an clergyman amongst us. Dear Sir, the rat poison you mentioned is at the time I write this letter not landed. The man-of-war had to proceed to sea again on account of storm and wait for better weather. Dear Sir, you cannot think what great boon this rat poison will be to us. Our Island is overrun with rats and mice, before we could grow grain and fruit of some kind, but this is impossible now. If the Government would only do something in this way for us. But it seems we too far off from the world, and if not some kind souls would remember us sometimes I think nobody would know we are existing. This year was a specially hard one for us. We lost lots of cattle and sheep on account of scarcity of food and grass, and a stormy and hard winter. For five months we got the shipwrecked crew of the British bark *Glenhuntly*, from Liverpool, here, and this made a great hole in our stock too. We had not an ounce of sugar, tea, coffee, or flour all the time, and on account of this bad, stormy winter, we had no chance of boarding any ships successfully,

and do any trade with them. Dear Sir, again I give my best thanks for your kindness, and remain, etc.,

P. W. GREEN.

No. 5.—COLONIAL OFFICE TO ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE

DOWNING STREET, *January 28, 1899.*

SIR,—I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th of January, enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Peter Green, the chief man of the Island of Tristan da Cunha ; and making various suggestions as to measures to be taken for the benefit of the inhabitants of that Island.

2. In reply I am to inform you that the Board of Trade have just expressed their desire to expend a sum of £120 in the purchase of provisions and other articles for the use of the Islanders, in recognition of their kindness to the shipwrecked crews of the *Glenhuntly*, last year, and the *Helenslea*, in 1897 ; and that arrangements are being made to send this present by the next of Her Majesty's Ships which visits the Island. As you are no doubt aware, the Island is visited annually by one of Her Majesty's vessels on the Cape station.

3. As regards the maintenance of a clergyman on the Island, the Secretary of State regrets that there are no funds at his disposal from which a contribution could be made for such a purpose.

4. As regards the erection of a lighthouse, this is a matter for the consideration of the Admiralty and the Board of Trade, to whom a copy of this correspondence is being sent. I am, etc.,

FRED. GRAHAM.

No. 6.—BOARD OF TRADE TO COLONIAL OFFICE.—

(*Received February 17, 1899*)

NOTE.—*A copy of this letter was sent to the Royal Colonial Institute on February 25, 1899*

BOARD OF TRADE (FINANCE DEPARTMENT),
7 WHITEHALL GARDENS,
LONDON, S.W., *February 16, 1899.*

SIR,—I am directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, transmitting

copy of correspondence relating to the requirements of the inhabitants of the Island of Tristan da Cunha.

The Board agree that it is desirable to include in the gifts about to be made to the Islanders a supply of rat poison and terriers. But they desire me to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, that they cannot do more than reward as occasions justify, and cannot place upon funds at their disposal any annual charge to meet possible needs of wrecked crews or of the Islanders themselves.

With respect to the proposed erection of a lighthouse on the Island, I am to state that the Board are advised that the general interests of navigation do not call for the large expenditure which the erection and maintenance of a lighthouse would entail. I have, etc.,

T. H. W. PELHAM.

No. 7.—CROWN AGENTS TO COLONIAL OFFICE.—(*Received
December 22, 1899*)

DOWNING STREET, LONDON,
December 21, 1899.

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose a copy of a correspondence we have had with the Board of Trade as to the possibility of arranging for the conveyance to the Island of Tristan da Cunha this season of the stores now waiting at St. Helena. I have, etc.,

E. E. BLAKE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.—BOARD OF TRADE TO CROWN
AGENTS

BOARD OF TRADE (FINANCE DEPARTMENT),
7 WHITEHALL GARDENS,
LONDON, S.W., *November 15, 1899.*

GENTLEMEN,—Referring to your letter of the 6th instant, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state that they regret to find from a letter (copy enclosed) received from the Admiralty that the Stores, etc., for the Islanders of Tristan da Cunha cannot be forwarded by one of Her Majesty's Ships this season.

The Board purpose writing to the Colonial authorities at St. Helena with the view of ascertaining whether by any chance other means of transporting the stores are available, but before doing so, they would be glad to know whether you can make any suggestion in the present difficulty. I am, etc.,

COSMO MONKHOUSE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.—THE ADMIRALTY TO BOARD
OF TRADE

ADMIRALTY, *November 8, 1899.*

SIR,—With reference to your letter of the 27th April last, and to previous correspondence respecting the conveyance of stores, etc., to Tristan da Cunha, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Board of Trade that owing to the existing state of affairs in South Africa the Commander-in-Chief on the Cape of Good Hope Station will be unable this season to detail a ship to make the usual annual visit to that Island. I am, etc.,

EVAN MACGREGOR.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7

DOWNING STREET, *December 21, 1899.*

SIR,—In reply to your letter of the 15th November, I have the honour to inform you that we have made inquiries through our shipping agents, and they report that they have communicated with every line, both steam and sail, at all likely to convey the stores, etc., for the Islanders of Tristan da Cunha from St. Helena, but they have all declined to entertain the business.

In these circumstances we fear that there is no alternative but to leave the stores at St. Helena until one of Her Majesty's Ships can take them on.

We have communicated this correspondence to the Colonial Office. I have, etc.

E. E. BLAKE.

The Assistant Secretary,
Finance Department, Board of Trade.



No. 8.—MEMORANDUM ON TRISTAN DA CUNHA

(Communicated to Colonial Office, June 11, 1901)

Captain Enos, of a whaling ship, the *President*, spent some days at St. Helena in March, and I took some notes of a conversation which I had with him and Mrs. Enos on the 21st March 1901. He had left St. Helena some ten months previously, but without any definite intention of calling at Tristan, and therefore he had not felt able to take a mail or any goods. He happened to call at Tristan on the 25th December last. His wife is a native of St. Helena, and had been well acquainted with the Tristan people for some 30 years. She said they were in great distress, principally, as I understood, from the want of flour and clothing. They gave me a pair of good stockings which had been woven by the Islanders. The people were in want, also, of salt and sugar, and were unable to cure their fish. They grow their own wool, but were in want of carders. About two dozen men and boys came on board the ship. They seemed quite intelligent people, and could row and scull well. They had three small canvas boats, and one wooden boat obtained from a ship which had been wrecked off the Island. Mr. Peter Green, the headman, was still alive, and continued to act as a patriarch of the community; but there was no missionary or schoolmaster. There were eighteen families on the Island. Of those who came on board, about half expressed a wish to leave the Island, and Captain Enos thought that most of the remainder would wish to leave if some opening were provided for them, and if they could remove or dispose of their cattle. There was only a half barrel of flour on the Island at the time of the captain's visit. He gave them such flour as he could spare in exchange for some of their goods; and he said that by means of barter he had obtained some good potatoes, also beef, mutton, and pigs. The people also had milk, butter, and eggs. I gathered that they did not seem to suffer quite so much from rats as formerly. They said that they did not require dogs, as they could kill the rats for themselves.

B. R. BALFOUR.

No. 9.—ADMIRALTY TO COLONIAL OFFICE.—*(Received
January 13, 1902)*

ADMIRALTY, January 10, 1902.

SIR,—With reference to previous correspondence, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter dated 24th November last, from the Officer Commanding His Majesty's Ship *Beagle*, forwarding a report on the visit of that vessel to Tristan da Cunha. I am, etc.,

EVAN MACGREGOR.

**Enclosure in No. 9.—LETTER REPORTING VISIT TO
TRISTAN DA CUNHA**

**HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP *Beagle*, AT SEA,
November 24, 1901.**

SIR,—I have the honour to report that I arrived off the Island of Tristan da Cunha at daylight on the morning of the 19th instant, but thick weather, with heavy rain, prevented more than just the bare land being discerned, until nearly mid-day, when I was able to communicate with the inhabitants.

2. Although weather was dirty, wind fortunately was in the east, and landing practicable: I therefore proceeded at once with the getting on shore the stores which I had brought for the Island, and of which this year there was a large quantity. By working all my own boats, and with the assistance of the Islanders, this was accomplished, so as to save daylight. The stores were taken by ship's boats to within a couple of hundred yards or so of shore, when they were turned over to the Island boats—these boats being handier for hauling up on the beach, a practice that on account of swell always has to be carried out in landing on the Island.

3. Among the stores were several cases too large and heavy for landing under above circumstances; these had to be shaken, and contents placed in smaller parcels. If it were possible, it would be a good thing to inform future senders

to the Island that cases should not much exceed 100 lbs. in weight, and be of such dimensions as to be readily handled, and easily carried in a small boat. Two or three small cases, too, are better stowed on board ship than one big one.

4. It had been my intention to sail on the 20th, but weather was bad and communication was not practicable with Island until the afternoon that day, and then with difficulty; so for the convenience of the Islanders I decided to remain another day.

5. The next day, the 21st, being fine, I was able to receive on board mails and parcels for conveyance, as well as fresh meat, and several sheep for the ship's company, and I sailed from Island at noon.

6. I give the following general information with regard to Island, and inhabitants:—

(a) There are 18 different families, the population in all being 74.

19 men.

26 women.

29 children.

(b) In the last three years there have been two deaths and eight births. In both cases death was from violent cause.

(c) In the way of live stock the inhabitants have between them:

About 500 head of cattle,

„ 600 sheep,

„ 50 pigs,

and an abundance of poultry.

(d) Potatoes do well, and a good crop is got annually.

(e) Apple trees and peach trees are in fair number and bear well; there are also a few fig trees, but they do not fruit.

(f) The tree of the Island, which, I think, is a Juniper, and upon which the Islanders are dependent for their wood for fuel, is getting scarce in the neighbourhood of settlement, but is abundant farther off, and there is no fear of supply failing.

(g) Communication with passing vessels has become rather more frequent of late; in last twelve

months about eight vessels were communicated with.

- (h) The Islanders have in all five boats : the whaler supplied by Government in 1897, and four small canvas whale boats made by themselves.
- (i) The children's schooling is undertaken by Mrs. Swain, a widow, who also on Sundays conducts a short service.
- (j) The proverbial good health of the Islanders continues ; and any such thing as real sickness remains unknown.
- (k) Mr. Peter Green, now 94 years old, has become quite an imbecile ; in the event of his death a Mr. Samuel Swain, as the oldest resident on the Island, would probably be looked upon as leading man.

7. I landed the first day of my arrival off the Island, and visited several of the houses. Every one expressed delight at the visit of a man-of-war, and pleasure at receiving the very welcome gifts that had been sent by kind friends.

8. I learn that January, February, and March are the best months for visiting the Island ; it is in these months that weather at times becomes so settled that the Islanders are able to make visits to Inaccessible and Nightingale Islands, which are some 20 and 25 miles off.

9. The balance of £12, 13s. 6d. remaining from original debt of £45 due to Government for whaler supplied in November, 1897, was paid off by the Islanders in the form of fresh mutton and potatoes for the ship's company.

The Island consequently now stands free of debt.

10. The inhabitants are in want of a telescope ; and after 1st of next January, will require a copy of the new International Signal Book ; I would respectfully submit these two small wants to the favourable consideration of His Majesty's Government. I have, etc.,

H. V. ELLIOTT, Commander.

Rear-Admiral Arthur W. Moore, C.B., C.M.G.,
Commander-in-Chief, Cape Station.

No. 10.—ADMIRALTY TO COLONIAL OFFICE.—*(Received February 27, 1902)*

ADMIRALTY, February 25, 1902.

SIR,—With reference to your letter of the 12th instant to the Treasury,* and to Admiralty letter of the 10th ultimo, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you that the Commander-in-Chief on the Cape of Good Hope and West Coast of Africa Station has been directed to issue a telescope to the inhabitants of the Island of Tristan da Cunha on the first opportunity of a ship-of-war, payment being taken in kind.

Arrangements are also being made to send a copy of the International Code of Signals to the Island as a gift.

The Treasury and Board of Trade have been informed accordingly. I am, etc.,

H. J. VANSITTART NEALE.

No. 11.—COLONIAL OFFICE TO THE SOCIETY FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE GOSPEL IN FOREIGN PARTS

DOWNING STREET, August 25, 1902.

RIGHT REVEREND SIR,—I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant,* and to express his regret that the clergyman selected has declined to go to Tristan da Cunha.

I am to add that your society will no doubt communicate with this Department on hearing of any other clergyman who is willing to proceed to the Island. I am, etc.,

FRED. GRAHAM.

No. 12.—REAR-ADMIRAL MOORE TO ADMIRALTY

Visit of "Thrush" to Tristan da Cunha Island, January 1903 (Extract.)

Lieutenant Watts-Jones, with the assistance of Surgeon Lobb, has made a useful and interesting Report, and in the

* Not printed.

course of his short visit to the Island evidently took much pains to acquaint himself with the circumstances of the residents, their feelings as to the conditions under which they live, and their views on the subject of their removal elsewhere.

I would ask their Lordships' special consideration as to raising the question of the removal of these people to the Cape.

There seems little doubt that the Islanders must suffer eventually from the conditions under which they live, and their removal is, I consider, but a question of time, and should, in fairness to the people, be undertaken before they become less well fitted, from a mental and moral standpoint, to start elsewhere.

The possibility of removal having been presented to the Islanders, I submit it is very desirable a decision in the matter should be arrived at, and communicated to them at the first possible opportunity, in order that they may remain no longer than is necessary in any doubt as to their future.

A. W. MOORE, Rear-Admiral.

February 23, 1903.

IV.—EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR TO INQUIRE INTO THE NATURE OF THE EXPENSES INCURRED BY OFFICERS OF THE ARMY, AND TO SUGGEST MEASURES FOR BRINGING COMMISSIONS WITHIN REACH OF MEN WITH MODERATE MEANS

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

Instructions.—Write out in your own words a Précis of the following Report. The Report should proceed *not paragraph by paragraph*, but in the form of a narrative, without marginal references. For further instructions, see Introduction

NAMES OF THE COMMITTEE

President.—The Lord STANLEY, C.B., M.P., Financial Secretary to the War Office. *Members.*—Colonel J. H. E. HINDE, C.B., late Commanding the Border Regiment; R. CHALMERS, C.B., Principal Clerk, Treasury; A. HIGGINS, Deputy Accountant-General, War Office. *Secretary*, H. E. DAVIES, War Office

MEASURES RECOMMENDED FOR REDUCING NECESSARY EXPENSES

1. *Provision of Furniture and Equipment for Quarters and Messes at Home Stations*

The existing system under which the furniture and appointments of quarters and messes are supplied almost entirely by Officers themselves throws upon them, individually or collectively, the following expenses:—

- (a) Prime cost of furnishing quarters and upkeep or rent of hired furniture.

- (b) Original provision and maintenance of mess furniture and utensils.
- (c) Heavy recurrent charges, in excess of allowances, for moving articles from station to station with the individual or unit to which they belong.

The Committee believe that these expenses could be very materially reduced if quarters and messes at all home stations were supplied with necessary furniture and utensils by the State, Officers being merely charged, as in the Navy, a small rent for the use of the articles. They, therefore, recommend—

- (a) That all Officers entering the Service in future shall have their quarters furnished on the scale appended to this report, and shall further be provided, on joining, with a free field kit for manœuvres, etc., such Officers to be charged a rent of 1*d.* per diem for each room occupied.
- (b) That all messes at home stations shall, from a given date, be supplied with public furniture, crockery, glass, and utensils, as detailed, and that, for the use of such articles, a rent of 1*d.* per diem shall be charged to all Officers, being members of messes, on the home establishment.

It will be observed that the scale laid down advisedly only contemplates the issue of furniture for unmarried Officers below the rank of Colonel, as the Committee are convinced from previous experience that an issue in kind to married Officers and those of higher rank cannot be worked satisfactorily, owing to the variety of personal tastes and circumstances.

The question of charging the rent has been carefully considered by the Committee, who regard the charge as fair and reasonable, especially in view of the analogous practice of the Navy. The amount fixed, while it is too small to form an appreciable burden to the Officers (who will reap a much more than commensurate advantage from the saving of private expense on the purchase, upkeep, and movement of furniture), will suffice to cover the cost of fair wear and tear, and upkeep, and to render the scheme ultimately self-supporting. A simple and uniform rate, to be levied by automatic and continuous deduction from the Officer's pay, is especially recommended with a view to avoiding compli-

cating book-keeping. In order that the continuity of the deduction may not be broken it will be necessary that the rates of lodging money of Officers who serve under the new system be augmented by a sum sufficient to cover the deduction.

2. Formation and Maintenance of the Regimental Mess

The expense of the original formation and ordinary maintenance of a regimental mess has hitherto been divided between the public and the Officers of the regiment in the following manner :—

- (a) In the case of a newly raised unit, a public grant of £400 (approximately out of a total grant of £500 for mess and band) is made towards the expenses of forming a mess, the balance of the cost of original equipment (including furniture, crockery, plate, linen, etc.), being defrayed by the Officers, partly through contributions on appointment (under paragraph 948, King's Regulations), partly by means of special subscriptions, or a loan to be met by a sinking fund.
- (b) The current charges, for upkeep of mess property and working and incidental expenses of the mess, are covered by Officers' contributions on promotion (paragraph 952, King's Regulations) and the regulation subscriptions (paragraphs 955 and 965), the public mess allowance being devoted to reducing the cost of messing (paragraphs 527, Allowance Regulations ; and 938, King's Regulations).

The great bulk of these expenses will be removed by the adoption of the Committee's scheme, under which mess furniture and utensils will be supplied at all home stations by the public, and such articles as plate, linen, dessert services, and cutlery, will alone continue to be the private property of the regimental mess. The Committee, however, consider it undesirable that any portion of the original outlay on the latter objects should be a charge upon the Officers in the first instance, as it is obviously not to the public interest that an Officer, joining a newly raised unit, should be at a disadvantage with others either pecuniarily or as regards

accommodation within reasonable limits. They also regard as objectionable in principle the system of mulcting officers of a portion of their pay on appointment and promotion when they have additional expenses on many accounts.

They therefore recommend—

- (a) That in the case of newly formed units an initial public grant of £450 shall in future be made to cover the provision of plate, linen, cutlery, etc., for the mess on a scale approximate to that in an appendix to this Report.
- (b) That Officers' contributions of 30 days' pay and difference of pay on appointment and promotion (paragraphs 948 and 952, King's Regulations) shall in future be abolished.

In drawing up the specimen scale appended, the Committee have, to some extent, been influenced by considerations of the average accommodation in established messes rather than the bare necessities of the case. They are, however, satisfied that the standard presented is not an extravagant one, and that a new mess could not in practice be suitably equipped for a less sum, without throwing special burdens on the Officers of the regiment. The provision of a certain portion of articles in silver is recommended as a practical economy, the risk of loss by theft or rough usage being quite inconsiderable (if proper care is exercised), except in the case of manoeuvres, etc., when electro-plated articles should be used.

3. Equipment and Upkeep of Regimental Bands

The expenses incident to regimental bands are at present apportioned as follows, between the State and the Officers :—

- (a) On the creation of a fresh unit, a public grant of £100 (out of a total £500, £400 of which is generally allotted to the mess) is issued in aid of the equipment of a regimental band. Towards the initial expenses of instruments, music, and accessories, the contributions of Officers on appointment (under paragraph 982, King's Regulations) are available, and the balance of the requisite outlay is also provided by the Officers by means of private subscriptions or loan.

- (b) The upkeep of instruments and working expenses of the band are met mainly out of the Officers' contribution on promotion and annual subscriptions (under paragraph 982, i. ii., King's Regulations), the bulk of the Government band allowance (paragraph 685, Allowance Regulations) being devoted to extra pay of the bandmaster (paragraph 985, King's Regulations).
- (c) It must also be observed that, while the regulation subscriptions are confined to the above objects, and limited to Officers above the rank of subaltern, the difficulty of retaining good musicians on the ordinary terms (especially in units where there is little opportunity for making money by private engagements) frequently entails additional expenses in the form of extra pay and inducements to skilled bandsmen, which are generally defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from Officers of all ranks.

The Committee are strongly of opinion that, inasmuch as the provision and maintenance of a good marching band is regarded (for recruiting and other purposes) as part of the necessary equipment of a regiment in the public service, no portion of the initial or current expenses of such a band should be a charge upon the Officers. They also feel that any amelioration in the conditions of service for skilled musicians should, in so far as it is necessary, be a subject for official action, and not for the personal generosity of the Officers in each regiment. They recommend accordingly—

- (a) That on the formation of a fresh unit in future a public grant of £450 shall be made, to provide instruments (including some for instructional purposes), music, etc., for the regimental band.
- (b) That the Government annual band allowance be increased from £80 to £160, to cover additional pay for the bandmaster (under paragraph 985, King's Regulations) and the working expenses of a marching band.
- (c) That the conditions of service for bandsmen be amended so as to render it possible for an expert musician to earn full corporal's pension (of 1s. 8d. a-day) on completion of 21 years' total service.

The amounts named above (in conjunction with details given in an appendix) are, in the opinion of the Committee, sufficient, irrespective of voluntary subscriptions and private receipts, to provide for the formation and upkeep of an adequate marching band. Any development of the regimental band beyond this point should depend solely on the good management of the bandmaster and the possibility under favourable circumstances of increased receipts from private engagements. Extra pay for skilled musicians should only be issued in exceptional cases, where the state of the band fund permits it, and such pay should in no case be given to bandsmen in their first period of service, during the bulk of which they are learning a valuable profession at the public expense.

Officers will thus be relieved of all necessity for expense in connection with bands, and the maintenance of string bands or elaborate orchestras by means of general voluntary subscriptions on their part should be absolutely forbidden, except in the case of large corps like the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, and in the Household Troops.

4. Provision of Horses and Horse Equipment

The Committee have already pointed out that the difference between the necessary cost of service in the Cavalry and Infantry is in a very great measure due to the expenses incident to the provision of chargers by the Cavalryman and his equipment and training as a mounted Officer. These expenses may be classified as follows :—

(a) A Cavalry Officer has to bear the expense of original purchase and depreciation on both his chargers in almost all instances. The alternative arrangement whereby Government horses can be hired by Officers for £10 a-year (under paragraph 625, Allowance Regulations) has been adopted to a very small extent, and is stated to be unsatisfactory for the reasons—

- (1) That animals obtained by such payments do not become the property of the Officer, and can only be used for strictly military purposes ; and
- (2) That it is very difficult to select suitable

Officers' horses from among the ordinary remounts.

- (b) Officers of the Cavalry have to provide and maintain at their own cost, military saddlery, horse clothing, bandages, brushes, and cleaning materials for stable use, and to pay for the shoeing of their chargers.
- (c) While hunting is considered most desirable for a Cavalry Officer, the restrictions at present placed on the use of the first charger and of Government remounts practically compel him to keep additional horses for this purpose, and to incur heavy extra expenditure on civilian grooms and stable accessories.

The Committee are firmly convinced that in so far as horses and saddlery are military necessities to a mounted Officer, they should be provided by the public, rather than the individual, and that a Cavalry Officer should be placed on the same footing in this respect as one belonging to the Field Artillery. Further, in view of the unanimous opinion of military experts, they think it must be recognised that a Cavalry Officer should be better mounted than his men, and that, since hunting must be regarded as a most desirable if not indispensable branch of the professional training of Cavalry Officers in this country, every reasonable facility should be afforded to them for taking part in the sport at the least possible expense to themselves. On these grounds the Committee strongly recommends—

- (a) That all Officers of mounted corps shall be mounted free by the Remount Department (who shall for this purpose be allowed to give prices up to a limit of £25 in excess of those authorised for ordinary remounts), and that none except Government chargers shall be permitted to be used by such Officers on parade or any military duty, nor kept in Government stables.
- (b) In selecting such horses, the purchasing department shall endeavour as far as possible to meet the wishes (approved by his Colonel) of the individual Officer, who shall be allowed to use any such horse for hunting or driving at all times, within a reasonable distance of his station, and to purchase

it at the end of 5 years (the price to be fixed by the department), without prejudice to its continued use on duty, subject only to the general condition that losses caused otherwise than by military service are to be made good by the Officer.

- (c) Military saddlery, horse clothing, and accessories shall be issued from store to all Officers of mounted corps, under the conditions obtaining in the Field Artillery.
- (d) Officers' chargers shall, like other remounts, be shod free of charge by the farrier sergeant-major, who might, if necessary, receive some corresponding addition to his pay.

5. *Purchase of Uniforms and Accoutrements*

The amounts actually expended on purchase and repair of uniform and accoutrements depends necessarily upon the conditions of service and personal habits of the individual Officer, but there exists, both within and without the service, a strong consensus of opinion that the expenses generally incurred on this account by Officers of all arms are excessive, and compare unfavourably with those of foreign armies. This heavy cost of dress is mainly attributed to the following reasons :—

- (a) The existence with official approval of excessively costly patterns of uniform and a superfluous variety of orders of dress.
- (b) The desire in certain parts of the Service for special distinguishing marks, which has resulted occasionally in the retention of obsolete articles of dress, and, generally, in a tendency towards modifications in detail and slight deviations from established patterns of uniform.
- (c) Heavy charges on the part of regimental tradesmen for both uniform and accoutrements, which represent a wholly exorbitant profit on the value of the articles supplied.

The first of these causes of complaint will to a great extent be removed by the recent reduction of orders and simplification of patterns of dress, which should effect an eventual saving of 10 to 20 per cent. on the minimum cost of Officers'.

uniform throughout the Service. The second point has recently been dealt with in an Army Order amending the King's Regulations upon the subject. The question of the fairness of the prices generally paid for fitted and unfitted articles of dress is a matter to which the Committee have given considerable attention. Investigation shows that, while Officers can obtain uniform from the Stores at moderate cost, and accoutrements from the Ordnance Department, they usually prefer to go, for almost all articles, to one of the private firms of tailors generally patronised by the regiment, whose charges in many instances can only be described as exorbitant, whether compared with the charges of other firms or of the Stores, or with any approximate estimate of a fair price. To check such abuses, without encroaching upon the natural desire of the Officer to please himself in such matters, is extremely difficult, and the Committee have discussed several alternative proposals, to which further allusion will be made. After full consideration, however, they venture to submit the following recommendations :—

- (a) Accoutrements and unfitted articles such as putties, Sam Browne belts, badges, etc., should in all cases be procured from the Ordnance Department, who should open an Officers' store for this purpose in London, in the first instance, with possibility of ultimate decentralisation.
- (b) Service dress should (wherever practicable) be made up regimentally by the master tailor, the material for such dress being supplied by the Army Clothing Department on repayment in all cases, to secure uniformity.
- (c) For other fitted articles an arrangement should be made with certain selected firms of tailors (recommended by regiments), who on undertaking to supply articles at prices officially accepted as reasonable for cash, should receive an official appointment as tailors to the regiment or regiments for a term of years, during which all uniform (not made regimentally) should be obtained from such firms, and the Officers urged to pay cash as far as possible, especially in the case of initial outfit.

It is recognised that cash payments form the essence of this scheme, and that these cannot be insisted upon for uniform in all cases, though in that of the newly-joined Officer, recourse might advantageously be had to a system, under which such Officers would be required, on appointment, to deposit with the regimental agent a sum sufficient to cover the cash cost of their outfit. Provided, however, a fair proportion of cash payments can be secured, some such arrangement as is above indicated with private firms of tailors appears to offer the best prospect of protecting Officers against excessive charges without unduly curtailing their liberty of action or conflicting with legitimate trade interests.

An alternative, which will have to be considered if insufficient support on the part of the Officers or opposition on the part of the tailors renders the present scheme abortive, is the establishment of an Officers' tailoring department.

The Committee have also considered suggestions that Officers' uniform of all descriptions should be made by the master tailor of the regiment. But, while strongly advocating such a system as regards service dress, and believing that mess dress could sometimes satisfactorily be obtained in the same way, they think it highly doubtful if, under any conditions, regiments could hope to command and retain at all times the services of master tailors sufficiently expert to deal with full dress. Moreover, from the conditions of the Service, the master tailor might not always be accessible when an Officer wanted uniform.

6. Pay and Clothing of Officers' Servants

The expenses thrown upon Officers in connection with their soldier servants may be grouped under the following main heads:—

- (a) Regulation weekly payments (under paragraph 716, King's Regulations) to personal servants, with additions in some cases, owing to the difficulty of getting suitable men.
- (b) Heavy expenses of extra stable assistance in the Cavalry, owing to the limited utility for military reasons of the second servant or batman.
- (c) Cost of provision and upkeep of plain clothes for soldier-servants, and of livery for use in the mess.

While the Committee have reason to believe that the prescribed rates (especially in regard to the Infantry) have frequently to be exceeded in order to obtain a suitable attendant, they cannot regard a monthly charge of 10s. or so for personal attendance as constituting a serious burden to Officers, and they hold that the employment of soldiers as servants on these terms should be continued and facilitated by every means consistent with military efficiency. On the other hand, they have already pointed out that the limitations to the use of the second servant in the Cavalry lead, among other causes, to the general employment of civilian grooms at great expense to the Officers, and although their proposals in regard to charges will to a certain extent modify the conditions of the case, they think it must be recognised as desirable in the interests of the Service that the batman of a Cavalry Officer should be able to devote his whole time to stable duties. Further, while plain clothes for servants cannot be regarded as necessary from a public point of view, the Committee consider that the heavy charges at present incurred by Officers on the provision of elaborate mess livery are wholly unjustifiable, and that, in so far as a distinctive dress is needed for such purposes, it should be supplied by the public. They, therefore, submit the following recommendations :—

- (a) That Officers' servants shall, at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, be excused as far as possible from all drills and parades, other than the annual course in musketry or riding, the weekly payments by Officers to their servants being continued at such rates as may be laid down by regulation.
- (b) That the groom or second servant in the Cavalry shall be made supernumerary in the regimental establishment in order that he may devote his whole time to the care of Officers' chargers, for which he shall receive extra-duty pay at 6*d.* per diem, in lieu of any payment by the Officer.
- (c) That a simple military uniform shall be issued for the use of Officers' servants in attendance at mess, the use of any livery being strictly prohibited.

V.—CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS AT THE YANG-TSZE PORTS

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

Instructions.—Write a Précis of the proceedings described in the following correspondence. The Précis should proceed *not letter by letter*, but in the form of a narrative, *without* marginal references. For further instructions, see Introduction.

No. 1.—ACTING CONSUL WILLIS TO ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL WARREN

CHINKIANG, August 17, 1900.

SIR,—With reference to your despatch of the 15th instant, I have now the honour to report to you on the question of sending British troops or vessels to the Yang-tsze during the past few months, as far as Chinkiang has been concerned.

On the 23rd June last I addressed a letter to Captain Cumming of Her Majesty's ship *Hermione*, at that time the Senior Naval Officer of the Yang-tsze division, asking that a gunboat should be sent here as a precautionary measure as soon as one could be spared. On the 25th June Her Majesty's ship *Hermione* arrived, and on the 26th I called on the Taotai in company with Captain Cumming. At this interview the Taotai expressed his satisfaction at the arrangements Captain Cumming has recently made with the Viceroy at Nanking, namely, that a British gunboat should be stationed at each treaty port, to co-operate, if necessary, with the local authorities for the maintenance of order.

Her Majesty's ship *Esk* arrived here on the 27th June and the *Hermione* left next morning. On the 8th July Her Majesty's ship *Rosario* arrived, followed by the *Woodcock* on the 10th, which left on the 22nd on being relieved by Her

Majesty's ship *Pigmy*. These vessels were not sent in consequence of any request on my part. I had, however, pointed out verbally to Captain Cumming the geographical importance of Chinkiang, as being at the junction of the north and south canals with the river, and the necessity, in my opinion, of keeping a gunboat here for purposes of observation, even if local conditions were peaceful.

On the 8th August, after receiving your telegram informing me that 2000 troops were due from Hong Kong on the 12th, to be landed at Shanghai with the Viceroy's full consent, I communicated with the Taotai and asked him to issue a Proclamation to this effect. The Taotai telegraphed to the Nanking Viceroy, Liu, and received a reply to the effect that his Excellency thought that the landing of so large a number of troops would disquiet the native mind, and that he had asked the Shanghai Taotai to delay their disembarkment. Consequently the Taotai should not issue any Proclamation.

I was somewhat surprised at this reply. I had requested the issue of a Proclamation, as I held the opinion very strongly that the landing of troops in Shanghai would create a great deal of unrest along the Yang-tze unless it was publicly notified that the Viceroy approved of the measure. I have, etc.,

(Signed) R. WILLIS.

To the Acting Consul-General at Shanghai.

NO. 2.—ACTING CONSUL WILLIS TO ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL
WARREN

CHINKIANG, *August 18, 1900.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge your telegrams of the 13th and 17th July, advising me to send away the women and children if things looked at all threatening; also your telegram of the 18th July, informing me that after consultation with the Senior Naval Officer you had decided to withdraw all women and children from the river ports, and instructing me to make arrangements accordingly.

On the 14th July I received a telegram from Her Majesty's Acting Consul at Soochow informing me that 1500 anti-foreign troops had left that port, bound north *via* Chinkiang,

and that more were to follow. I also heard from the Taotai that these troops had been creating disturbances at Soochow.

Accordingly, I thought it advisable that my women and children should leave, and on the 15th July I issued a Circular in this sense.

On receipt of your telegram of the 18th July, I sent out a further Circular, copy of which is forwarded herewith.

There are thirty-two women and twenty-eight children usually resident in the port. Of these, eighteen women and eighteen children were British, eleven women and six children United States' subjects. The latter had nearly all left before the issue of my Circular.

In addition to these there were about thirty women, mostly British, belonging to the China Inland Mission, temporarily residing here, they having evacuated their up-country stations along the canal. The presence of so many female missionaries, with their semi-Chinese dress, created some excitement, and I had been requested by the Taotai to restrain them from leaving their houses, as he was afraid they might provoke an attack. I did not in any way assent to this request. I have, etc.,

(Signed) R. WILLIS.

Enclosure in No. 2.—CIRCULAR

With reference to my Circular of the 15th instant, it is now my duty to inform British subjects that Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Shanghae, after consultation with the Senior Naval Officer, has decided that all women and children are to be withdrawn from the river ports, and that Her Majesty's Consul-General has been authorised by Her Majesty's Government to take this action. I have accordingly been instructed to arrange for the departure of women and children as soon as possible. They should, at the latest, be out of the port on Saturday next, the 21st instant.

As regards the members of other nationalities under my charge, I trust they will see fit to act in accordance with the above arrangements.

(Signed) R. WILLIS, *Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul, in charge of French, German, and Austro-Hungarian interests.*

I would further request those whom this Circular is addressed to notify me of their intentions.

Circulated on 18th July 1900.

**NO. 3.—ACTING CONSUL WILLIS TO ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL
WARREN**

CHINKIANG, August 20, 1900.

SIR,—With reference to the withdrawal of missionaries from the interior, I have the honour to inform you that I interviewed Dr. Williams, the head of the China Inland Mission at Chinkiang, on the 27th June, and strongly advised the immediate withdrawal of all female missionaries from outlying stations. On the 1st July, on hearing of unrest along the canal, I addressed a letter to him on the subject. On the 3rd July I wrote to Mr. Andrew, who is head of the China Inland Mission at Yangchow.

By the 5th July the outlying Missions at Antung, Ching-chiang-pu, and Kao-yu had been safely withdrawn, one lady only, a Miss Reid of the Antung Mission, meeting with any trouble. She fell into the hands of soldiers, but after threatening her, they let her go without injury. The local officials had entreated these missionaries to withdraw, and had told them that if they did they would protect the property.

The few independent missionaries registered in this Consulate had left their posts for their summer vacation before I had determined on advising their withdrawal.

Missionaries belonging to the China Inland Mission still continue to reside at Yangchow. The Mission has an important station there, and valuable property, and as there is frequent communication by steam-launch between Yangchow and Chinkiang, some 15 miles distant, I have approved of the male missionaries remaining there for the time; though I have warned them to leave on the first sign of trouble. I have, etc.,

(Signed) R. WILLIS.

No. 4.—ACTING CONSUL WILLIS TO ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL
WARRENCHINKIANG, *August 20, 1900.*

SIR,—His Excellency the Viceroy has evidently issued the most stringent instructions to the officials in his jurisdiction to maintain order, and as far as Chinkiang is concerned, I am glad to be able to report that the local authorities appear to have honestly attempted to carry out the Viceroy's instructions.

Even in the interior, according to reports I have received from various missionaries, who have come down from the north and centre of Honan Province *via* the Grand Canal, there was a marked change in the attitude of officials towards them, as soon as they crossed the borders of Anhui or Kiangsu Provinces, every protection being afforded; nor have I, with the one exception of the Roman Catholic Mission at Hsu Chou-fu, in the extreme north of Kiangsu, heard of any destruction of missionary property in these two provinces.

My personal relations, not only with the civil, but with the Chinese military and naval authorities, have been throughout of the most friendly description, and with the exception of the conduct of troops on two occasions, which I have already reported to you, I have had no cause of complaint.

For my part, I have carefully refrained, as far as possible, from taking any measures which would be likely to provoke suspicion or create panic amongst the native population.

After consultation with the Senior Naval Officer and Captain Willoughby, 2nd Bengal Lancers, who is detached by the Intelligence Department for duty here, a plan has been issued for concerted action of the residents in case of an outbreak; but I have throughout strongly objected to any parade of forces, such as landing armed parties from ships for patrol duties, and have also discouraged all amateur volunteering, not considering our power of effectual defence would be thereby appreciably increased. I have, etc.,

(Signed) R. WILLIS.

No. 5.—CONSUL MORTIMORE TO ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL
WARRENWUHU, *August 18, 1900.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report that, thanks to the energetic action of the local officials in maintaining order, the community of Wuhu has not, so far, in spite of numerous rumours, experienced any troubles, nor have I heard of any in the country, except a small affair at Lu Chou-fu early in April.

On receipt of your telegram of the 18th July, I gave orders that all women and children should leave the province. I found that most of them had already done so, those still remaining being members of the China Inland Mission, who were chiefly inland, and to whom their representative here, Rev. W. J. Davey, undertook to convey the intimation to leave, with the wisdom of which he fully concurred.

Shortly afterwards the Taotai handed me a copy of a telegram which he had received from the Governor at Nanking, asking him to see if he could not arrange with me for the temporary withdrawal of all missionaries from the portion of the province north of the river, which was in a disturbed state owing to drought which prevailed and threatened the loss of the rice crop. I therefore asked Mr. Davey to recall all his missionaries from inland (members of other Societies having all previously left), and was shortly afterwards informed that they had all come in safely. I lately learnt, however, that two China Inland missionaries, the Reverends Emslie and Gibb, with their wives and families, were still at Hui Chou-fu, and I have had to ask the officials to escort them to either Wuhu or Hangchow, as may prove most convenient. Upon their arrival there will be no missionaries in the province, except the Roman Catholics, who refuse to leave their posts.

The number of missionaries of British nationality thus affected is fifty-four, besides their wives and families, of the number of which I have no accurate information, but which must be close upon fifty.

Their property has been placed in the charge of the various local officials, and I have not heard of any destruction; but, until the missionaries are able to return, this cannot be verified. I have, etc.,

(Signed) R. H. MORTIMORE.

No. 6.—CONSUL MORTIMORE TO ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL
WARRENWUHU, *August 18, 1900.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report that the officials of this district have throughout adopted a most friendly attitude towards foreigners during the present crisis, and have been unremitting in their efforts to prevent any disturbances. The Taotai, Wu Ching Ch'i, the Magistrate, Chang Chen ch'un, and the Foreign Business Deputy, Cheng Hsien, have constantly called to assure me that they would do their best to keep order, and that I need feel no alarm. Both the Taotai and the Magistrate constantly come round in the night to the neighbourhood of the foreign houses to assure themselves that the troops who are on guard there are on the alert, and, so far as I have heard, no foreign property in Wuhu has been harmed.

The Governor of the province, Wang Chih-ch'un, has also proved very friendly on the only occasion on which I had occasion to appeal to him, viz., in the case of the China Inland missionaries who were burnt out in Honan, and who fled over the border into this province. At my request, the Governor telegraphed stringent orders for their protection and escort to a safe place, and I have since learnt that they reached Chinkiang without experiencing any further troubles. I have, etc.,

(Signed) R. H. MORTIMORE.

No. 7.—ACTING CONSUL CLENNELL TO ACTING CONSUL-
GENERAL WARRENKIUKIANG, *August 28, 1900.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch of the 15th instant, requesting to be furnished with information to be used in compiling Reports for transmission to Her Majesty's Secretary of State and for the information of Her Majesty's Minister in Peking (1) on the attitude of the officials towards Her Majesty's Government; (2) the question of sending British troops or vessels to the Yang-tsze to act in maintaining peace and order; and (3) the

security of the British community in this district, stating the number of persons affected by the partial removal of the community.

Under the first head I am happy to be able to state that no serious evidence of unfriendliness towards Her Majesty's Government, or foreigners in general, on the part of officials in this province has come to my knowledge. They, and in particular the higher authorities, have professed all through the crisis to be loyally co-operating with the Viceroy in repressing disorder and protecting the lives and property of foreigners. That they have not always succeeded in preventing disturbances is perfectly true; witness the riots at Chingtechen (11th July), Jaochow (21st July), besides minor outbreaks; but measures, more or less efficacious, have been taken to punish the ringleaders, and some officials at both Chingtechen and Jaochow have been degraded.

With respect to property the officials have professed a complete readiness to assume responsibility for it so long as peace remains unbroken, but in some instances refuse to give compensation for its loss in case of war, or of their authority being overpowered by internal rebellion or any similar cause. One house in Kiukiang itself, which was evacuated early in July, has been entered and robbed. The officials at once informed me of the fact, and promised to take action, but they have recovered nothing, punished nobody, and refuse to admit that compensation can be claimed. This is a point on which I should be glad of definite instructions.

Under the second head, the question of sending British troops to this district has not arisen. Of British war vessels we have had successively in port—

Her Majesty's ship *Snipe*, from the 19th June to the 23rd June.

Her Majesty's ship *Woodcock*, from the 22nd June to the 7th July.

Her Majesty's ship *Hermione*, from the 1st July to the 3rd July.

Her Majesty's ship *Linnet*, from the 6th July to the 22nd August.

Her Majesty's ship *Wallaroo*, from the 22nd August, still in port.

The Officers commanding Her Majesty's ships *Woodcock*, *Hermione*, and *Wallaroo* have called on the Taotai and Chentai, and have been in each case suitably received, the calls being returned with every appearance of cordiality. But in the case of Her Majesty's ship *Linnet*, Commander Smythe deemed it inadvisable to call, principally because of the attitude assumed by the Chentai in sending me a formal protest against the continued presence of the *Woodcock* in port after the *Linnet* arrived. You are no doubt better informed than I am with regard to the undertaking given to the Nanking Viceroy, by which we agreed not to station more than one British warship at a time in each of the Yang-tsze ports. The Chentai appears to regard it as a matter of great importance to insist on the strict maintenance of this arrangement. In fact, I felt from many slight indications that his policy during the whole month of July and until the middle of August was distinctly one of jealousy towards our naval forces, and that if trouble had occurred, so far from being able to count upon the loyal co-operation of the forces under his command, we should very probably have found in them our only formidable opponents.

Since the 25th July the Taotai, at the request of the Chentai, has objected to foreigners walking or riding on the city walls or in the neighbourhood of the forts on the plea that it is unsafe to do so and might alarm or provoke the population. I conceive that this action is within the rights, strictly construed, of the authorities, and that the present is no time for individuals to place themselves in positions of unnecessary risk, but, at the same time, I look upon the incident as further evidence that the Chinese authorities here have at times been so far from desiring our co-operation as to have been anxious to prevent us knowing any details of their own preparations.

I do not think that there has ever been a time when the British community, as a whole, in this district have been actually confronted with present danger. But there have been many occasions when danger has not been far off—when any accident might have precipitated serious trouble.

This has been due to various causes. The earliest in date was the partial evacuation of Kuling in the latter half of June, which caused a great deal of talk and tended to dis-

organise the considerable Chinese community, whose livelihood depends on the presence of foreigners at that sanatorium.

This danger, after ceasing for a time by the return of residents to Kuling, was renewed in an intenser form when the removal of all women and children from the port and a portion from Kuling and the interior was decided upon in July. For about ten days, beginning on the 17th July, I seriously feared grave trouble, but in the event only one insignificant coolie fracas, and that at the Kiukiang end of the journey, actually occurred. In Kiukiang itself all foreigners had left the city by the end of July, and by the 3rd August all women and children, except four half-castes and the Hindoo-Chinese family of the Goolabs, had left for Shanghae. From one cause or another, the adult male community has also been seriously diminished. Only two Protestant and three Catholic missionaries remain in Kiukiang, the Commissioner of Customs and the agent of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co. are away on sick leave; one of the Customs staff has gone home, another to Shanghae, and another to Kiao-chau with the idea of joining the German forces, and at the present moment the entire foreign community is reduced to thirty-six persons at Kiukiang and four at Kuling.

Between the 17th July and the 25th August the Customs books show that sixty-nine men and ninety-six women left the port for Shanghae. This record must, however, be incomplete, as it appears to take no account of persons who travelled in the Chinese saloons of steamers. I am unable to give the number of children, but I cannot place it under 150. All missionaries have been instructed to come in from the interior, and I expect the last parties to arrive during the current week. At present there are, of British missionaries, fourteen women, two children, and eight men still to arrive; the largest party (seven women and two children, with Mr. Orr Ewing, who has gone to fetch them) being from a place called Yu Shan.

You request information as to the action of the Chinese authorities in maintaining the security of the British community. Taken as a whole, it merits considerable praise. The inevitable excitement among the people, and not least among their own *entourage*, must have made their position one always of difficulty and often of temptation. But both at Kiukiang and in the interior, *e.g.* at Nan Ch'ang, Liukiang,

Chi An, and Hanchou, on the Kan River, and at Anjen, Kuei Ch'i, Yi-yang, Hok'ou, on the Kuanghsin River, and even at Jaochow, in the centre of the disturbed area of this province, the personal attitude of the responsible officials towards British subjects has been one of kindness and apparent good-will.

The Chinese authorities are in a position of considerable difficulty—no doubt, largely of their own creation—from the fact that their troops, mostly new recruits, ignorant, ragged, unpaid, and drawn from the most debased sections of society, are more than half-inclined to think that the object for which they are levied is to protect the foreigners for the moment, but eventually to destroy them, and they are impatient for the word to be given to begin. This undoubtedly complicates the situation.

The situation that has existed here since the Tatung riot is an impenetrable mystery to me. Every native says there is a widespread conspiracy. The officials have made arrests right and left, everywhere from Hankow to Wuhu or beyond. Executions have been very numerous, and there are more to come. For a few days there was a hurried rush of people eager to move out of the city. Then all removals were forbidden. Now, again the prohibition has been taken off. Yet there is no visible sign of disorder anywhere. I have, etc.,

(Signed) WALTER J. CLENNELL.

NO. 8.—ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL FRASER TO ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL WARREN

HANKOW, *August 29, 1900.*

SIR,—In compliance with your Circular despatch of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report on the attitude of the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung towards England since the northern troubles began.

At our interview of the 17th June, described at length in my despatch to you of the 18th June, the Viceroy explained his determination to maintain order and to afford the protection due under Treaty; he also emphasised his desire to be on friendly terms with England. His request that we would not excite the populace by a naval demonstration

was unfortunately misunderstood by the naval officer at Nanking to mean that his Excellency objected to the presence of any of Her Majesty's ships, and this misconstruction, which became widely known, naturally excited doubts of his Excellency's intentions. Even the issue of a Joint Proclamation by his Excellency and the Governor of Hupeh on the 2nd July, in which the words "squadron of men-of-war" occurred, failed to correct the error. His Excellency has consistently held his objection to any great naval display of force, but has never dreamt of interfering with the stationing of one or two vessels at the port. He has, however, given me to understand that the landing of troops here would render the maintenance of peace and order practically impossible. To my announcement of the landing of troops at Shanghae he has made no formal reply, nor has he thought it necessary to reassure the people by Proclamation.

Early in June the three cities of Wuchang, Hanyang, and Hankow had been full of rumours of the kidnapping of children and even of grown persons by means of hypnotism, and, though a concise Notification by the Viceroy that persons spreading such tales would be executed checked its prevalence here, the scare spread to the country districts and inflamed the minds of the people against foreigners, and, in consequence, against converts and Missions.

Distorted accounts of the capture of the Taku forts and of the hostilities in the north caused some excitement; but the Viceroy's Proclamation of the 2nd July, and the vigorous police measures taken by his Excellency soon restored calm.

To foreigners during the past two months the question of interest has been whether the Viceroy could and would keep his troops in order. The Viceroy himself seemed to be in some doubt until the return of his trusted officers, who were attending the Japanese manœuvres when the northern troubles began. The newly-raised "braves" have once or twice turned mutinous, but no serious outbreak has occurred.

A point of his Excellency's policy, which has caused considerable suspicion, is the despatch of troops northward. At the end of June some 2000 or 3000 men passed through Hankow bound for Nanking, where the Governor was said to want a bodyguard. They were unarmed, and did no

mischievous beyond invading the Customs and Chinese Merchants' Steam Navigation Company's premises. During July some 5500 troops, of whom, perhaps, half were drilled men, went from the Hukuang Provinces overland to Honan and on to Chihli. They were led by the anti-foreign Treasurer of Hunan, and their despatch was explained by the constitutional duty of succouring the Emperor. Since July I have not heard of any further detachments leaving, though it was said that the total would reach 10,000.

About the 20th July there was a persistent report that the Viceroy was secretly placing guns on the opposite bank of the river. The German military instructors assured me that the report was baseless, and Lieutenant Brandon, Her Majesty's ship *Pique*, thoroughly searched the bank for a distance of 3 miles in length and breadth without discovering the trace of a cannon. The only guns of position are the two 5-inch Armstrong M.L. within the walls of Wuchang, and they have been there for a long time and are used merely for training purposes.

The rumour led to my being invited to inspect the Viceroy's troops, 2000 artillerymen and a composite force of 3000, with a total artillery of 50 field guns, who have been brought to a high state of efficiency by German instructors. The fact that these men are well and regularly paid, comfortably housed, instructed physically and mentally, and that they can rise from the ranks by good conduct, renders it very unlikely that they would furnish recruits to the forces of disorder or rebellion.

So early as our interview of the 17th June, the Viceroy expressed anxiety as to missionaries at remote points in the interior, and I had about that time suggested to the various Missions that women and children would be better at a Treaty port. The Missions themselves preferred to recall all their members, and at the Viceroy's request, supplied lists of the stations thus left to the care of the local authorities. Since then there have been a few cases of plundering. Towards the end of July the Viceroy and the Hunan Governor issued a satisfactory Proclamation, and I have heard no more complaints from that province, the western part of which seems tranquil.

In the Hankow native city itself, as in Wuchang, the chapels

remained open; but on the 10th August a disturbance, which the newspapers greatly magnified, served as an excuse for requesting the discontinuance of preaching, except at the Missions on Sundays.

Besides safeguarding foreign life and property in his own provinces, the Viceroy has frequently been asked to aid missionaries retiring from Kansuh, Shensi, Shansi, and Honan. In every case his Excellency had readily consented. Detailed telegrams have been sent again and again, not only to his own frontier officers but to the Governors of other provinces with whom his Excellency has expostulated, when necessary, in strong terms.

On the 18th July I received your telegram advising the withdrawal of women and children from the Yang-tze ports. The custom of sending them away to avoid the hot weather rendered it easy to comply with your wish gradually, although careless talk and the evacuation of Kuling did cause some passing excitement among the natives, who took their departure as a sign of impending attack by us. For a while the action of the male portion of the community was watched, and any sign of a general exodus would have been construed into preparation for war. But the Americans followed our example, until the present month when they withdrew their Consulate; the French and Belgian and Italian ladies mostly remain here. The Lu-han Railway about the end of July recalled its foreign employés from all but the first section, that is to 70 kilom., and the step was carried out without serious trouble, the Chinese contractors being left to go on with the earthworks.

At times during the past two anxious months the Viceroy's action in sending troops north, the occurrence of riots at various points, his Excellency's communication of Decrees in which the Peking Government sought to gloss over the northern uprising, and his eagerness to make out that the Empress-Dowager had not incited the outbreak, and had no hostile feeling against foreigners, have inevitably made one uneasy. But on looking back one appreciates the skill and constancy with which his Excellency has met a most serious crisis and done his duty to Chinese and foreigners alike. I have, etc.,

(Signed) E. H. FRASER.

No. 9.—ACTING CONSUL WILTON TO ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL WARREN

ICHANG, *August 27, 1900.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 15th instant.

The attitude of the local officials, civil and military, has been less friendly in the present crisis, and some persistence has been needed to persuade them to exercise their authority. Even at the present time the civil officials do not appear to be alive to their responsibilities.

The Taotai, Shih Liang, who lives at Ching-chou, near Shashih, about 80 miles below Ichang, is a Manchu, and anti-foreign. He is an able man, and has kept Shashih and Ching-chou quiet so far. He is, however, only kept in check through fear of the Viceroy, Chang Chih-tung, whose authority and influence are very great along the river, even beyond the borders of Hupeh into the neighbouring Province of Ssuehuan. The local officials take their cue from the Taotai and shirk their responsibilities as much as they dare.

The Brigadier-General, Fu-ting-chen, is well thought of by the Viceroy, and has, on the whole, behaved correctly and well. To him belongs the credit of having controlled the river, above Ichang and as far as the borders of Ssuehuan, so that foreign travellers have passed down in perfect safety.

Speaking generally, however, I am under the impression that the heart of the civil and military Mandarins in the Ichang Prefecture is not in the work of protecting foreign life and property. The people are incensed against Christian converts, especially those of the Roman Catholic persuasion; but they are generally indifferent to foreigners. The latter would, however, bear the brunt of a popular outbreak against Christian converts.

In accordance with your telegram of the 18th July, I requested the British women and children, numbering six and eight respectively, to leave the port. This was done quietly. Although Ichang was quiet, and has since remained so, I venture, however, to express the opinion that the step taken was a wise one, and all concerned in the removal were

also of the same opinion. Since then the British Protestant missionaries, four in number, have voluntarily left the port.

I have also the honour to state that Lieutenant Hillman, Commander of Her Majesty's ship *Woodlark*, stationed at this port, has co-operated with me in the most cordial manner. I am of opinion that the presence of Her Majesty's ship *Woodlark* has checked the outbreak of disturbances here on two occasions, the 7th July and the 22nd August.

I regret to report that the state of affairs in Ichang and the neighbourhood is less satisfactory than it was a fortnight ago. I do not wish to convey the impression that foreign residents here are in danger, but desire only to record the fact that Ichang is no longer in the peaceful condition that it was a fortnight or three weeks ago. I have, etc.,

(Signed) E. C. WILTON.

No. 10.—ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL WARREN TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received November 5*)

SHANGHAE, *September 25, 1900.*

MY LORD,—Owing to the great pressure of work which has been thrown on the staff of this establishment since the commencement of the crisis in the north, it has been impossible for me to do more than communicate by telegraph, and briefly by private letter, with the various Consular officers in the region of the Yang-tsze Valley. As it is, of course, essential that there should exist some record in an official form of the various negotiations which have taken place, and that some report on the subject should be drawn up, I issued, on the 15th August, a Circular to the various Consuls concerned, inviting them to forward to me, for transmission to your Lordship, their views on the following points:—

1. The attitude of the native authorities towards Her Majesty's Government.
2. The question of sending troops or vessels to the Yang-tsze.
3. The security of the British community in their district.

I am now in receipt of the replies to this Circular, and have already had the honour to forward copies of the same both to your Lordship and to Her Majesty's Minister at

Peking, together with copies of other despatches relating to the condition of affairs in the outports. In the most part these speak for themselves, but there is one point which cannot but fail to impress itself on your Lordship, and that is the evident good faith displayed by the Viceroys at Wuchang and Nanking. Chang Chih Tung more especially has gone out of his way to impress upon the authorities of provinces not under his jurisdiction the necessity of adequately protecting Europeans on their way to the coast, and it is in no small measure due to his exertions that so many missionaries have been enabled to reach places of safety. Similar testimony to the good faith of Liu Kun Yi is afforded by the statement that the suggestions received from Nanking were instrumental in preserving order in Chekiang. When one considers how delicate a matter it is, from a Chinese point of view, for one provincial authority to go out of his way to indicate a line of action to his colleague in a neighbouring province, it will be the more apparent what splendid services the two Viceroys have rendered.

In this connection I would again call your Lordship's attention to the very effective assistance afforded by Tuan Fang, Governor of Shensi. Although his name does not appear in the despatches now under review, the friendly attitude he assumed and the effective protective measures he adopted have been the means of saving many British lives.

It may be urged that the fact of the Viceroys sending contingents to the north was not in accordance with the assurances they gave. But when one considers the extraordinarily difficult position in which they found themselves, and the fact that they still owed and continued to owe allegiance to the Emperor, in whose name these contingents were called for, we may excuse them. In no case did they, I believe, send trained troops.

I venture to express a hope that the friendly attitude assumed by their Excellencies Chang, Liu, and Tuan, will receive due recognition on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

I need hardly point out that the assumption of such an attitude by a Chinese official is infinitely more difficult than would be the case for a European dignitary of the same standing. I have, etc.,

(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

No. 11.—ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL WARREN TO THE MARQUESS
OF SALISBURY.—(*Received November 5*)

SHANGHAE, *September 26, 1900.*

MY LORD,—I have the honour to forward copy of Mr. Consul Sundius' despatch on the condition of affairs at Nanking. This completes the series of reports from Her Majesty's Consuls on the Yang-tsze as far as Ichang.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to Mr. Consul Sundius' good services throughout the past few months. He has been quite alone in the native city of Nanking, living in great discomfort in a native house throughout an exceptionally hot summer ; but he has succeeded in using his proximity to the Viceroy to the best advantage possible in maintaining and strengthening the friendship which his Excellency has always expressed towards Her Majesty's Government. I have, etc.,

(Signed) PELHAM L. WARREN.

VI.—EXTRACTS FROM CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING IMPRISONED TEACHERS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AT MARSOVAN

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

Instructions as for No. II

No. 1.—THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR CLARE FORD

(*Extract.*)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April* 12, 1893.

SIR,—During the Turkish Ambassador's visit to-day I alluded to the case of M. Thoumaian, who had once more been committed to prison.

In the course of a lengthy explanation, his Excellency said that M. Thoumaian was supposed to be a conspirator as well as a professor.

Rustem Pasha added that he had urged on his Government the expediency of sending the long-promised Commission of Inquiry into the complaints of the Armenians.

I replied that such a step would be most desirable. I am, etc.,

(Signed) ROSEBERY.

No. 2.—THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR CLARE FORD

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April* 26, 1893.

SIR,—The Turkish Ambassador communicated to me to-day a telegram which he had received from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 23rd instant, in regard to M. Thoumaian's arrest and detention.

The telegram stated that M. Thoumaian was one of the principal authors of the revolutionary placards; that he had been denounced to the authorities, and that preparations were being made for his trial; and that his guilt having

been recognised by the United States' Legation, and by the authorities of the American College at Marsovan, his name has already been removed from the books of the College. I am, etc.,

(Signed) ROSEBERRY.

No. 3.—SIR CLARE FORD TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERRY.—
(Received May 19)

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 15, 1893.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to enclose herein copy of a despatch I have this day received from Consul Graves, who has been stopping at Angora *en route* to his post at Erzeroum.

I may mention that I received a visit this morning from M. Hoffmann, a Lutheran clergyman residing at Geneva, who has come out here to look after M. Thoumaian, who is his brother-in-law.

M. Hoffmann has just returned from Angora, where he saw M. Thoumaian, who appears to be in good health and to be well treated, thanks to the measures taken by the Vali of that district. The Vali informed M. Hoffmann that, from what he had learnt of the case, there would be no difficulty in proving M. Thoumaian's innocence of the charges which had been preferred against him.

I likewise enclose copy of a despatch from the British Vice-Consul at Angora, as well as that of a letter which he addressed to me on the 10th instant.

I am still sanguine of seeing M. Thoumaian acquitted, as a strong presumption appears to exist that another person of the same name, but who has succeeded in effecting his escape, is the real culprit in the present seditious Armenian movement which has taken place in Asia Minor. I have, etc.,

(Signed) FRANCIS CLARE FORD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.—CONSUL GRAVES TO SIR CLARE FORD

ANGORA, May 9, 1893.

SIR,—Since writing my last despatch to you, I received information as to the treatment which the political prisoners

here, and notably Thoumaian, had met with at the hands of the Turkish authorities, which made it desirable, as I thought, that I should see Thoumaian again, and question him as to the truth of what I had heard.

To-day I called upon the Vali to take leave of him, and thank him for his kind and courteous reception, and I took this opportunity of asking him to send for Thoumaian, in order that I might have some further conversation with him. This he did at once, and I lost no time in asking the prisoner whether he had had reason to complain of his treatment. He assured me that since his arrival in Angora he had been treated with humanity; but that on the way from Marsovan he had been sadly ill-used, being half-starved, cruelly manacled, and beaten. From Marsovan to Tchorum, a distance of 36 miles or two marches, no food was given him, and his hands were confined for five days in wooden manacles which rendered rest impossible, and had left scars which were still distinctly visible to me upon his wrists. At Tchorum, the Kaimakam had thrashed him and other prisoners with a stick for having endeavoured to ease the manacles upon their wrists, when the pain they caused became unendurable. He showed some hesitation in saying this; but I pressed him to tell the truth before the Pasha, who I saw was impressed by his story, and who assured me that he greatly regretted such occurrences. Since the prisoners have been here, I have learnt that Abeddin Pasha has contributed additions to their prison fare from his own kitchen, and has personally directed such improvements in the state of the prison as were compatible with the accommodation it affords.

I asked his Excellency to tell me what the charges against Thoumaian consisted of, and he explained to me that they were mainly as follows:—

1. That five Armenian prisoners from Cæsarea declared that Carabet Thoumaian, under the sobriquet of "Baron Mineh," was the real chief of the revolutionary Committee at Marsovan.

2. That two years ago Thoumaian, together with Kayayan, had made a journey through the interior, stopping at Yuzgat, Cæsarea, and Sivas, ostensibly on business, but really for the purpose of stirring up sedition.

3. That one of the prisoners now at Angora declared that

while at Gemerek, during the above-mentioned journey, he had heard Thoumaian use seditious language.

The Pasha questioned Thoumaian before me on all these heads. As to the first, his Excellency himself admitted that the five prisoners said that they did not know Thoumaian personally, but only believed him to be the "Baron Mineh" in question. Thoumaian being far better known than the Artin Thoumaian, who is generally admitted to have been a leader in the Society, this mistake (or wilful confusion of persons, as the case may be) seems natural enough.

As for the second point, Thoumaian explained it quite naturally by saying that he had made the journey spoken of as a tour, during the college vacation, undertaken partly for the purpose of collecting money from a man whose name he gave, to whom he had advanced money for stock-raising and other business. He had taken another road on the return journey to see something more of the country, instead of returning by the same way.

With regard to the third point, he never remembered having used the seditious language attributed to him, but he recollected an incident which he described, and which might have given rise to the accusation, if the language he used had been distorted or misunderstood.

In conclusion, I would state my belief that the charges against Thoumaian have been manufactured by some of the Sivas authorities for purposes of their own, the Vali and Procureur-Général of Sivas having shown considerable *parti pris* against him, that the accusations appear to me to be trumpery in themselves, but dangerous from the amount of garbled and hearsay evidence which has been introduced into the case, unless the prisoner is ably defended, and the Court which tries him animated with the desire to do justice without fear or favour. As far as I can learn here, no steps have been taken to provide him with counsel, and his friends should remedy this deficiency without loss of time.

The trial has now been postponed to the 20th instant, and I propose, therefore, not to delay my departure any longer, but to start for Sivas to-morrow *viâ* Yuzgat, about nine days being required for the journey. Believe me, etc.,

(Signed) R. W. GRAVES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.—VICE-CONSUL NEWTON TO SIR
CLARE FORD

ANGORA, *May 10, 1893.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch of the 29th ultimo, instructing me to attend the trial of the Armenians.

I also confirm receipt of your telegram of the 7th instant, reading—

“Please inform me by telegraph when Thoumaian trial takes place, and who is defending him.”

To which I replied on the 9th instant as follows :—

“Thoumaian trial cannot commence before 20th instant. No one engaged for defence.”

The lengthy nature of the documents which have recently arrived from Marsovan has delayed the trial until the 20th instant.

The documents are now being arranged, and the charges preferred against the Armenians are in course of preparation, and each prisoner will be supplied with a copy; five days will be allowed to engage counsel and prepare their defence. In case of non-engagement of counsel by the prisoners, the Judicial authorities will appoint a local lawyer to defend them. This, however, is a formal matter. A local man is not likely to exert himself on their behalf, and he would in all probability receive his cue from the Government as to the line of defence. As for Thoumaian, it would be advisable to engage on his behalf a lawyer from Constantinople, who would probably have more influence, and who would not be likely to countenance any overtures the authorities might make to him.

Yesterday I had another interview with Thoumaian, and learnt from him particulars of the treatment he received at the hands of the Turkish authorities.

When arrested at Marsovan, he was put in chains and handcuffed in heavy wooden manacles. On his way from Marsovan to Angora he had to pass through the town of Tchorum, a distance of about two days' journey from Marsovan, and during the whole of the time he says he was kept without food; on arriving at Tchorum he attempted

to loosen the manacles to relieve the pain they were causing. The Kaïmakam, on hearing of this, appeared, and with his own hands gave Thoumaïan and his companions in misfortune a sound beating with a heavy stick, and subjected them even to worse treatment than before.

He also tells me he was in one position for five days, and his manacles were not removed to allow him to partake of his food with ease.

Since his arrival at Angora he has been treated more kindly.

He now bears on his wrists the scars caused by the wooden manacles, and the appearance of these scars tend to show that he must have undergone a great amount of torture and pain.

Some of the prisoners are still in chains; with this exception they are kindly and humanely treated. I have, etc.,

(Signed) TOM NEWTON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.—VICE-CONSUL NEWTON TO SIR CLARE FORD

ANGORA, *May* 10, 1893.

SIR,—I beg to give your Excellency my impressions as to the supposed guilt of Pastor Thoumaïan.

In my conversation with him yesterday in the presence of the Vali, he answered all questions without hesitation, and his explanations of his movements were open and straightforward.

The principal charges against him at present are, that he as President of a revolutionary Society (under the assumed name of "Baron Mineh,") visited some fifteen villages in the Sivas Vilayet, with the object of spreading discontent and inciting the Armenians to active resistance against the Government, and that he disbursed money for this object.

He stated that he did visit these villages, but it was in connection with his Mission work, and also as the Head of a Young Men's Christian Association.

In reply to the accusation of disbursing money for revolutionary purposes, he stated that at a village called Bourhan, in the Vilayet of Sivas, he had a financial interest in a farm, and he advanced money to the occupier for the purpose of

purchasing cattle and farm implements; he said he could substantiate these statements by witnesses who had not been mixed up in this movement.

He is also accused of using seditious language; he explains this by an incident which occurred at the village of Bourhan; while he was staying there the tax-gatherers arrived accompanied by zaptiehs, who put extreme pressure on the Armenian villagers for their taxes. He (Thoumaian) interfered on their behalf, and strong language was used; the result was that Thoumaian and his friends scraped together a few medjidiehs and appeased the zaptiehs.

From my interviews with Thoumaian I am led to believe that he has had nothing to do with this movement.

With respect to some of the other prisoners, there is overwhelming evidence to show that they have participated in this seditious movement, and some of them in my presence asserted such to be the case, and there is little or no hope of their acquittal.

From my opinion of the Vali, whom I have known for the past seven years, I feel sure he will exercise his influence on Thoumaian's behalf, and he will do his utmost to see that justice is fairly and impartially administered, and if there is any doubt he will endeavour to let him have the benefit of it. On the other hand, if found guilty he will be for carrying out the extreme sentence of the law, and apt to be somewhat severe.

The Procureur-Général who has charge of the cases against these men, is a capable man, and is not imbued with any ideas of the old Turkish school of officials, and I think that in his hands the case will meet with a certain amount of fairness. This of course depends upon the instructions he may receive from Constantinople. I have, etc.,

(Signed) TOM NEWTON.

NO. 4.—SIR CLARE FORD TO THE EARL OF ROSEBURY.—
(Received June 7)

CONSTANTINOPLE, *June 2, 1893.*

MY LORD,—With reference to my despatch of yesterday's date,* I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith

* Not printed.

copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Newton, reporting the examination of MM. Thoumaian and Kayayan at the trial of Armenians at Angora. I have, etc.,

(Signed) FRANCIS CLARE FORD.

Enclosure in No. 4.—VICE-CONSUL NEWTON TO SIR CLARE FORD

ANGORA, *May* 29, 1893.

SIR,—I have the honour to confirm my despatch of the 25th instant.*

The Court resumed its sittings on the 27th instant, and a further batch of prisoners were examined, amongst whom were Garabet Thoumaian and Ohannes Kayayan.

I must mention to your Excellency that the prisoners who have been previously examined were examined in the presence of the others, but on Thoumaian being called up for examination, the President ordered Kayayan out of Court.

Thoumaian's case was gone into at some length, and may be summarised as follows: He denied the slightest connection with this movement, nor was he acquainted with some of those who had taken an active part in it. He was then questioned as to the object of his visit last August to Cæsarea, Yuzgat, Sivas, and other villages in the Sivas Vilayet in company with Kayayan. In reply, he stated that as his school was closed for the summer holidays, he was at liberty to make a tour of inspection to the outlying stations which were connected with his mission work. This tour occupied some thirty-five days, and he gave a detailed account of his doings during that time; he also stated that his object in taking a certain route was that he had a financial interest in a farm at a village called Bœurhan, to the proprietor of which he had, some six years ago, advanced a sum of about 100 liras, but for some time past he had not received any reply to his letters as to how the farm was working, and receiving no equivalent against his advance, he took this opportunity of paying a personal visit to the farm in question to learn what was going on. He then described in detail

* Not printed.

his mission work and its object. He was then questioned about the money raised in England by his efforts. He stated that about £4000 had been raised for the object of building a hospital in Marsovan, and of this sum he had received only £100, which had been disbursed gratuitously in relieving the sick and poor in Marsovan and district.

His replies to the President of the Court were given without any hesitation, and his explanations of his movements were clear and straightforward. On his examination being concluded, Kayayan was recalled into Court, and the questions put to him were similar to those put to Thoumaian. He (Kayayan) answered all questions as clearly as Thoumaian had done, and confirmed in every detail Thoumaian's evidence.

This concluded the proceedings of the 27th, and the Court adjourned to the 30th instant.

Nothing has been elicited from the prisoners who have been interrogated up to this date that could implicate Thoumaian in this movement with but one exception. One of the prisoners stated that a document touching on this movement was brought to him to sign. This document bore the signatures of Baron Minni and Baron Varham. On asking whose these signatures were, he was told by the bearers of the document that they were those of Garabet Thoumaian and Ohannes Kayayan. He could not swear to these signatures, but only state what was told to him.

From the evidence of some of the prisoners it seems quite possible that there is a confusion of names, and it is apparently clear that Artin Thoumaian has, in company with Andon Rishtoni, as a ringleader, taken an active part in this movement.

Thirty-two prisoners have undergone the preliminary examination, leaving twenty more to be dealt with. I have, etc.,

(Signed) TOM NEWTON.

NO. 5.—VICE-CONSUL NEWTON TO SIR CLARE FORD.—
(Received at the Foreign Office, June 9)

ANGORA, June 1, 1893.

SIR,—Yesterday I had a private conversation with Arif Bey, the Procureur-Général, about this case, Thoumaian's

in particular. He told me they have sufficient evidence to implicate both Thoumaian and Kayayan in this movement. It is only natural for the authorities to say their case is good. It is quite possible the Government may have been misled as to the identity of Garabet and Artin, the latter having eluded the authorities, they may be trying to put the onus of the affair on to Garabet, in the absence of Artin, or it may be that owing to Artin's known bad reputation he may have used Garabet's respectable name to lend greater weight to the schemes he had in view. There does not appear from the statements of the prisoners to be any doubt as to Artin's action in this movement; he appears to have been an active ringleader.

But as to Kayayan, there is no confusion of names in his case, and the charges against him are the same as those against Garabet Thoumaian, one as President and the other as Secretary of this movement.

I am doing all I can for Thoumaian, that is within the narrow limits allowed me. Anything that has transpired in Thoumaian's favour during the trial I have, as far as I prudently could, kept before the authorities, and I have impressed upon his counsel the absolute necessity of keeping well in mind any weak points on the part of the prosecution that could advantageously be put forward on his behalf.

With respect to the subject of torture, it is quite likely that undue pressure may have been put upon some of the prisoners to make them confess, or to make certain statements. One prisoner stated in Court that his feet were tied and he was suspended from the ceiling with a rope and his head on the ground; he was beaten, and rather than undergo further punishment he signed the paper containing statements which he now denies.

It is extremely difficult in the face of such contradictory statements to arrive anywhere near the truth, or even to form the slightest idea as to the probable result of the trial.

The evidence tendered so far will require a deal of sifting before any definite conclusion can be arrived at, in some cases at least. The case of the five prisoners charged with murder seems clear and convicting, but in other cases there appears to be some doubt. However, as the trial proceeds

further light may be shown on some of the apparently doubtful cases. I have, etc.,

(Signed) TOM NEWTON.

No. 6.—SIR A. NICOLSON TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—
(Received June 16, 3.20 p.m.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 16, 1893, 1.40 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

Vice-Consul at Angora has just informed me by post that sentences on Armenian prisoners were delivered on 12th instant. Thoumaian, Kayayan, and thirteen others condemned to death, eleven acquitted, and remainder sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying from two to fifteen years.

No. 7.—SIR A. NICOLSON TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—
(Received June 16)

(Telegraphic.) CONSTANTINOPLE, June 16, 1893, 1 P.M.

With reference to my immediately preceding telegram, I should be glad to learn whether, in your Lordship's opinion, I should try to obtain either a free pardon or, at all events, a mitigation of the sentences passed on Professor Thoumaian and M. Kayayan. Though it is in the last degree improbable that the sentence of death would be carried out, still exile to some distant part of the Empire might possibly be substituted.

No. 8.—THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR A. NICOLSON

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, June 16, 1893.

The sentences passed on Armenians on trial at Angora, as reported in your telegrams to-day, will produce a painful impression here, and Her Majesty's Government are deeply concerned at the news of them.

Before instructing you to make any representation at the Porte, we must await Mr. Newton's Reports of the proceedings. You should, however, if necessary, pending a full consideration of all the circumstances, do your utmost to prevent the execution or banishment of the prisoners.

No. 9.—SIR A. NICOLSON TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—
(Received June 17)

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 17, 1893, 7.30 P.M.
(Telegraphic.)

The Legal Adviser of the Embassy informs me, with reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, that before being executed, the sentence of the Angora Court must be confirmed by the Cour de Cassation here. I have some doubts as to these strict legal formalities being necessarily observed, as the Tribunal at Angora was a special one; I hope, however, that the usual rule will be followed. No immediate action need in any case be expected.

I have telegraphed to Vice-Consul Newton for fuller details, and am awaiting his answer.

No. 10.—THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR A. NICOLSON
(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, June 19, 1893.

We understand that the evidence against the Armenians tried at Angora is entirely inadequate for conviction. If on examining it we come to that conclusion, it will be our duty to make the strongest representations for the release of the prisoners.

You should mention at the Porte that the result of the trials has caused a strong impression here, and that you presume the sentence will be reviewed by the Court of Cassation.

No. 11.—THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR A. NICOLSON
(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, June 27, 1893.

Her Majesty's Government have been ready to await the result of the trial of the Armenians at Angora, hoping that it would be equitably and exhaustively conducted. From the Report, however, furnished by Vice-Consul Newton, it would appear that there was no evidence of the slightest moment against MM. Thoumaian and Kayayan. I would earnestly urge the Sultan, when he shall have satisfied himself

of the injustice of the sentence, to exercise the prerogative of mercy without delay.

Her Majesty's Government cannot conceal their disappointment at the procedure adopted at the trial and its result, nor can they attempt to control the indignation which it has caused in this country.

NO. 12.—THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR A. NICOLSON

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 29, 1893.*

SIR,—The Turkish Ambassador read me to-day a long telegram from his Government with reference to the recent sentences passed on the Armenian prisoners at Angora. I gathered that the Sublime Porte had presented a proposal to the Sultan that His Imperial Majesty should at once pardon the prisoners condemned to death with the exception of those who had committed breaches of the ordinary law. But the Sultan had hesitated as to his reply, because he thought it would encourage the rebellious in that province, and would also discourage his Mohammedan subjects, who would think that the law was only put into activity against themselves were he always to pardon Armenians, whatever they might do. It would, moreover, be a great encouragement to insurrection if it was supposed that whenever Armenians might conspire they would be shielded from the consequences by the action of the British Government. Rustem Pasha was, however, directed to see me at once, to ask for my views on the question, and transmit them by telegraph without delay, so that the Sultan might be in possession of them before he replied to his Ministers.

I begged his Excellency to remember that I had declined to intervene in any way on behalf of the prisoners until their trial was over, because I was willing to give the Turkish Government credit for granting them a fair trial, and I did not think that any country could well be asked to suspend proceedings in their Courts of Law at the request of another Power. But now our Vice-Consul at Angora had reported on the actual trial that had taken place, and had said it was in effect derisory, and that no evidence had been presented on which the two Armenian professors could be convicted, I confined my views to these two gentlemen, because theirs

was the case with which I was best acquainted. If the Sultan asked my advice, I should urge him to pardon the two professors without an instant of delay, because the promptitude of the act would go far to satisfy British public opinion.

Rustem Pasha asked me if I did not think that if the pain of death were commuted to exile that would be sufficient.

As to that, I said I could only give the opinion that a full and free pardon would be in my judgment the wisest course to pursue.

His Excellency promised that he would at once proceed to telegraph this opinion to the Sultan, and probably to-morrow or the next day he would get a reply.

I expressed my hope it would be to-morrow, as Parliament did not sit on Saturday, and an excellent effect would be produced if it could be announced in the House of Commons that the pardon had been granted. I am, etc.,

(Signed) ROSEBERRY.

NO. 13.—THE EARL OF ROSEBERRY TO SIR A. NICOLSON.

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 3, 1893.*

Her Majesty's Government cannot wait for result of proceedings of Court of Cassation. The Sultan is evidently determined to add to the cruel farce already perpetrated at Angora another mock condemnation. Every additional day, however, that passes over the heads of these innocent prisoners is a new injustice.

NO. 14.—THE EARL OF ROSEBERRY TO SIR A. NICOLSON.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 3, 1893.*

SIR,—The Turkish Ambassador came to see me again to-day. I said I hoped that he had brought with him the news of the pardon of the two Armenian professors, but his Excellency had nothing to tell me except that the Sultan had promised to pardon them should the decision of the Court of Cassation be unfavourable.

On receiving this unsatisfactory communication I expressed great impatience. The release of the professors, I said, was virtually promised last week. I might have awaited the

result of the proceedings before the Court of Cassation if the first trial had been one of a real and substantial character. But that trial had been a mere mockery, and every day that passed over these innocent men in prison only added to the weight of the injustice.

Rustem Pasha left me stating that he would immediately telegraph further on the subject to Constantinople. I am, etc.,

(Signed) ROSEBERRY.

NO. 15.—SIR A. NICOLSON TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERRY.—
(Received July 4)

(Telegraphic.) THERAPIA, July 4, 1893, 2 P.M.

I was received by appointment this morning by the Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs. They told me that the sentences had been confirmed by the Court of Cassation, but that Thoumaian and Kayayan had been pardoned by the Sultan. Orders to liberate the two prisoners at once will be sent to-day; they will have to leave the country and go where they choose.

I hope sincerely that this result will be satisfactory to your Lordship, and I would earnestly urge that it is chiefly in the men's own interest that they should leave the country. Moreover, the Sultan could not allow them to remain in Turkey without serious injury to his own position.

There is this difficulty in regard to the other prisoners. Some are convicted of murder, others on their own confession of participation in secret movements, while others may be innocent, but sufficient information to express an opinion has not reached me.

NO. 16.—THE EARL OF ROSEBERRY TO SIR A. NICOLSON.

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 5, 1893.

SIR,—The Turkish Ambassador announced to me to-day that MM. Thoumaian and Kayayan had been, or would immediately be, released and sent out of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Government wished, however, that it should be known that they had in their opinion absolute proof of the guilt of the accused persons, and that they could not

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allow this to form any precedent for future action by Her Majesty's Government, as they would not admit our right to intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey.

I replied that without going further into the question it was sufficient to say that, if there were evidence of the kind alleged against the accused, it had not been produced at the trial. I am, etc.,

(Signed) ROSEBERRY.

NO. 17.—SIR A. NICOLSON TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERRY.—
(Received July 6)

(Telegraphic.) THERAPIA, July 6, 1893, 12.45 P.M.

Professors Thoumaian and Kayayan will arrive here tomorrow, having left Angora this morning. They will leave by the French steamer on the 8th, and I hope to be able to arrange for them to be lodged till then with the American missionaries.

VII.—SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR NOMINATION AS NAVAL CADETS

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

Instructions as for No. IV

REPORTS OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERVIEW COMMITTEES OF NOVEMBER 1904 AND FEBRUARY 1905

In continuation of Parliamentary Paper Cd. 1962 of 1904, I append the Reports of the last Interview Committees in connection with the nomination of candidates for the qualifying examination for the Royal Naval College, Osborne.

The Committees were composed as follows :—

November 1904.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles F. Hotham, G.C.B.,
G.C.V.O.

The Reverend the Honourable Edward Lyttelton, Head-
master of Haileybury College.

Captain Charles F. G. Sowerby, R.N., then Commander
of H.M.S. *Britannia*.

Viscount Helmsley, of the First Lord's Private Office.

February 1905.

Admiral Sir Archibald L. Douglas, K.C.B., Commander-
in-Chief at Portsmouth (formerly Second Sea Lord
of the Admiralty).

The Right Honourable Arthur H. Dyke Acland.

Vice-Admiral Sir Wilmot H. Fawkes, K.C.V.O.

The Reverend Ernest H. Earle, Headmaster of Bilton
Grange School, Rugby.

Mr. Vincent W. Baddeley, of the First Lord's Private
Office.

SELBORNE.

March 20, 1905.

REPORT FROM ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR CHARLES HOTHAM,
G.C.B., G.C.V.O., PRESIDENT OF COMMITTEES OF JUNE
AND NOVEMBER 1904

I have the honour to report that I presided over two Committees appointed to interview candidates for nominations for the Navy.

The first Committee over which I presided sat in June 1904. The second Committee, in November 1904.

I am of opinion that this system of interviewing candidates by means of a Committee is well calculated to secure the best available boys for the Navy. For boys of the age of 12½ I could not suggest a better plan, and I am quite confident that, for them, it is superior to any system of competitive examination.

There was great unanimity among the members of both Committees in classifying the boys, and, contrary to what might have been expected, they showed as a general rule no nervousness.

There were one or two exceptions to this rule, and in their case allowance was invariably made.

I attach the reports of my colleagues on the two Committees.

CHARLES F. HOTHAM,
Admiral of the Fleet.

REPORTS BY OTHER MEMBERS OF NOVEMBER 1904
COMMITTEE

After helping to examine some 170 boys for the Osborne College, I came to the conclusion that, though the work was taxing and costly in point of time, it was thoroughly satisfactory as a general test of the fitness of the candidates. I think we gradually learnt how to depend less on set questions and more on making the boys talk freely, in tempting them with sufficient questions to see if they knew what they were saying. Of course, it is impossible to prophesy how a little boy will develop, but I have no doubt that for estimating the *present* all-round powers of a boy, this informal conversation, coupled with the paper test afterwards and the time at Osborne, affords the best method of examination

yet devised in England ; and it is greatly to be desired that the entrance to the Army should be regulated on similar lines.

E. LYTTTELTON,
Head Master of Haileybury.

I have the honour to offer the following remarks on the Interview Committee for Naval Cadetships held in November 1904.

I think the system is an eminently practical one for finding out the best boys for the Navy, and at the same time fair to the boys themselves. It was, I found, difficult to judge of the value of the schoolmasters' reports, unless the Head Master was personally known to one of the Committee ; and some were so fulsome as, perhaps, somewhat to prejudice one against the boy, when it was found he had none of the qualifications attributed to him in his report.

More time should, I think, be allowed, as ten minutes in which to interview the boy and discuss his merits was hardly enough in some cases.

CHARLES F. G. SOWERBY,
Captain, R.N.

The number of boys who presented themselves before this Committee was 178.

In accordance with the recommendation of the previous Committee, the sittings were not consecutive for more than two, or at most three, days. This was a great improvement, and had a considerable effect in reducing the strain on the members to a minimum, and in enabling them to retain their freshness of judgment to the end.

As a rule there was complete unanimity as to the broad classification of each boy, but occasionally difficulty was experienced in determining whether a boy should have a plus (+) mark or a minus (-) mark against his class mark or not.

For instance, the Committee might be unanimous in thinking that the boy should be somewhere in the class called β , and yet might not agree exactly as to whether he should be marked β simply or $\beta -$.

I would suggest that in the future, instead of the seven classes ($\alpha +$; α ; $\alpha -$; $\beta +$; β ; $\beta -$; γ) into which the

boys have hitherto been divided, there should be only five ; A, B, C, D, E.

C, being the middle letter, would represent the average. B would be slightly above the average ; A exceptionally so. D would be slightly below the average, and E very much below it.

This classification would, I imagine, be sufficient as a guide to the First Lord of the Admiralty when giving his nominations, and though attempting less, would be of even more value than the present classification, especially when, as hitherto, any special remarks which the Committee may have to make can be recorded by the Secretary.

As some boys classified by one Committee are held over for nomination, and are compared later with boys classified by a succeeding Committee, it is most important, in my opinion, that the same standard should be maintained. It would be an advantage, therefore, if each successive Committee were to have one member included who had sat on the previous Committee.

The special reports furnished by the schoolmasters were very valuable in some cases, but if the parents could be asked to supply the Admiralty with the boys' two or three last terminal reports, a truer knowledge of their attainments and industry would be gained.

These reports are sent to the parents by nearly every school, and they might be used to supplement, if not to replace, the information now obtained.

Under the system of interviewing candidates there may possibly be hardship in a few cases where boys, naturally intelligent, are backward through repeated absences from school due to illness or any other cause, but these cases of hardship are no greater or more frequent than they would be if all the candidates were subjected at that age to a competitive examination.

Cramming, the attendant evil of the competitive system, is at all events made almost, if not quite, unavailing.

Cases of shyness were rare, and, as a rule, could be easily allowed for.

A greater danger than that of under-rating a shy boy is that of over-rating one who is the reverse of shy who is apt to create a too favourable impression unless pains are taken to find out his real capabilities.

The system, taken as a whole, works very well, and appears to me by far the best method which can be devised of sifting out those fit to have nominations from those unfit.

I have no doubt that under this system the Service gets the best of the material which there is to choose from.

HELMSLEY.

FEBRUARY 1905 COMMITTEE.—REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT

27th February 1905.

DEAR LORD SELBORNE,—I understand you want a report on the examination of candidates for Naval Cadetships at the Royal Naval College, Osborne.

You have already received from former boards of examiners many expressions of opinion on the utility of the procedure, and I can do little more than record my full appreciation of the system. It seems to me desirable in every way. It defeats the crammers; it enables the whole style of a boy to be considered, and a correct estimate of his fitness or otherwise for the Navy to be formed.

Objections to the system have been raised on the score that the candidates are often too shy or too young to show what their qualifications for the position of Naval Officers will be. To the first of these objections, I reply that I noticed no shyness on the part of the large number of boys who presented themselves at the recent examination. With regard to the second objection—on the score of youth—the examining board were careful to compare the boys with others of the same age and position in their school when more than one came from the same school. Much attention was paid to the way a boy spoke and to his general manner, and a few inquiries were made as to his home life, recreations during holidays, fondness for games, or any special bent or study. I am quite satisfied with the result of the examination, and am convinced that it has secured the best material to send to Osborne College.

The continuous attention which it is necessary to devote to the examination is a very considerable strain on the examiners, and I would recommend that it should not take place on more than two consecutive days.

I am much indebted to the four gentlemen who were associated with me in this examination. Rear-Admiral Sir Wilmot H. Fawkes, the Right Hon. A. H. Dyke Acland, and Mr. Earle were most keen, interested, and sympathetic, while the advice and assistance of Mr. Baddeley were invaluable. Believe me, yours sincerely,

A. L. DOUGLAS, Vice-Admiral.

REPORTS BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

2 WEAPONNESS PARK,
SCARBOROUGH, *March 16th*, 1905.

MY DEAR SELBORNE,—I found that the work of the Interviewing Committee was very interesting. I was very glad to have the opportunity of judging how far short interviews with the boys face to face could fairly replace to a considerable extent an examination on paper of the kind so common in this country. We are overrun in many parts of our educational system with paper work examinations which are far too many in number, and which do a great deal of harm to our schools and scholars. It would be out of place here to consider how such examinations can be got rid of or replaced by other methods. But the plan that has been adopted at the Admiralty with regard to those boys who wish to become Naval Cadets appears to me, after having taken my share in interviewing about 170 boys, to be a complete success for the purpose that you have in view.

It is quite unnecessary for me to describe the method adopted, which has been fully set out in the Parliamentary paper published last year and the later reports which you have received. There are a few points only that I will notice.

It is important that the Committee should be composed of persons of varied experience who approach the boys from different points of view. This is an arrangement to which I believe you attach considerable importance.

The complete informality with which the proceedings are conducted contributes much to their success. It is essential that everything should be done which will make the boys feel at their ease. If this can be done, and I think it was

very effectively done by our Committee, there is not much fear that the candidates will be misjudged on account of shyness. In the extremely few cases where a boy was obviously nervous full allowance for this was made.

The actual subject matter of the questions put to the boys is of secondary importance. Questions on general knowledge, questions on actual school work done, miscellaneous questions on a boys' tastes and home or school life are all of use in testing the candidate's general intelligence. I understand that our Committee asked rather a larger proportion of questions than usual about the work done in school. But there were many questions of many other kinds, especially in the more doubtful cases. It was more easy than I had expected to ascertain when attempts had been made to cram a boy in an unintelligent fashion on his school work.

The proportion of really well-educated boys certainly seemed to me to be small considering the expensiveness of the schools from which many of them come. But there were a very fair number of pleasant and vigorous boys who, under good training at Osborne and Dartmouth, should have in them the making of good naval officers. Out of 170 boys there were a little over 20 who showed all the signs of being thoroughly intelligent and also well educated, and there were about 40 who were obviously not up to the work or wholly unfit. Among the remaining boys, somewhat over 100 in number, there were considerable differences in intelligence and attainments. To the more doubtful cases among these we gave the greatest attention. I do not doubt that the classification of these boys was fairly correct. The boys with the better marks are quite satisfactory, the boys with the lower marks are of doubtful efficiency for the purpose which you have in view. As regards those who came in the middle of the 100 boys alluded to, some pains were taken to arrive at a specially careful judgment.

No method of selection is or can be infallible. But I think there cannot be the slightest doubt that the method which has been adopted will be far more successful in providing you with good officers in the future than any competitive examination based principally on paper work.

In order that there should be some continuity in the methods adopted by successive Committees, it is important

that there should always be someone present who has acted with previous committees. This plan has, as I understand, been hitherto adopted. Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ARTHUR H. D. ACLAND.

The Board of Examination has seemed to me a very efficient way of securing the most desirable boys for nomination.

It should undoubtedly eliminate the unfit, and ensure clever boys not being passed over.

The difficulty in this or any scheme is to adjudge the place of the average boy and those who will develop later.

The boys, few in number, who were nervous were easily put at their ease. One boy afterwards told his mother that he enjoyed the interview, as it was like a tea party, only there was no tea.

It appears that the boys first examined are usually the worst, owing to their having been kept back by their parents.

It would be better to distribute these older ones, as it is undesirable to have a low standard on the first two days.

I think the Board should not sit for more than two consecutive days, and that twenty-five boys are rather too many for one day.

W. H. FAWKES.

1st March 1905.

As a preparatory schoolmaster who has to deal with boys between the age limits required of candidates for nomination as Naval Cadets, I should like to express my complete satisfaction with the method of selection, of which I was able to form an opinion while serving on the Interview Committee.

There are some remarks and criticisms I hope I may be permitted to add.

1. With regard to the age limits. We preparatory schoolmasters are naturally loth to lose our boys—often our most promising boys—a year before they might otherwise be leaving for their public schools; and I share the belief with many that a boy's last year of preparatory school life is the most valuable time to him from the point of view of the formation of character.

But, on the other hand, the present tendency at public

schools is to claim the boys at an earlier age, and between 12·4 and 13 is no uncommon age for them to proceed to such schools as Eton and Winchester. It may be that the present conditions of life produce an earlier rather than a later development in children. At any rate, any given age will find different boys variously developed; and basing my opinion chiefly on the experience of the Interview Committee I do not think that the ordinary boy of 12·8 (the mean age of Osborne candidates) has failed to reach that state of development that justifies his acceptance or rejection for the Navy. Later age limits would still find some boys undeveloped, while those limits at present fixed by the Naval authorities afford this very great advantage, that candidates found unsuitable after a year's probation at Osborne can then proceed to a public school in the ordinary way.

2. The Director of Naval Education has emphatically stated that any kind of specialisation is to be deprecated. He states in his report of January 4th, 1904, that "up to the time of entry at Osborne it is on every ground desirable that there should be no distinction between the school work of the Navy candidate and that of the boy who means to go to a public school." I am far from an advocate of Greek for young boys, but I believe I should have the support of many preparatory schoolmasters in urging the inclusion of Greek as an alternative subject for the Osborne literary examination—so long, that is, as Greek is retained in the ordinary course of work for entrance at public schools. As it is, it is scarcely reasonable to recommend a boy's beginning Greek at about 11 in the possible event of his failing for the Navy (perhaps for the medical examination) and then having to proceed to a classical school such as Eton or Winchester. But the ordinary Navy candidate, who does not learn Greek, would on rejection for the Navy be at a considerable disadvantage for entering such schools. And the practical result at present is that boys who fail to get a nomination—no small percentage of the candidates—are driven on to the modern sides of their public schools: a result which in the case of classical schools may not be desirable. May I make the suggestion that if to the French paper, which already has German as an alternative, a third alternative was admitted, consisting half of French and

half of Greek (and the time spent on Greek would probably lower the candidate's French standard), the schoolmaster would then feel that he had a free hand in deciding whether a boy should start Greek or not, and would not be biased by the claims of the Navy examination. Further, the last excuse for specialising boys and forming special Navy classes in schools would be removed.

3. As to the time allotted for the interview. Ten minutes seemed to be sufficient in the majority of cases, especially for the very good and very bad candidates. The difficulty of decision came when it was felt that a boy was on the border line of possible rejection or acceptance. In such cases the allotted time had to be exceeded. But I think an average of 15 minutes would be unnecessarily long. Two suggestions might possibly be of use with a view to saving the time of future Committees :

- (1) That a question should be added to the paper sent to preparatory schoolmasters eliciting exact information about the candidate's position in his class, the position of the class in the school, the average age of the class, and the number of boys in the school.
- (2) That instead of a piece for reproduction, better results might be obtained in a shorter time from a suitable picture given to the candidate beforehand, and to be explained in his own words. This would be less of an effort of memory and a better test of a boy's powers of original description. So often a boy was not questioned on his reproduction from a desire on the part of the Committee to economise time, and a feeling that it would be so long before the boy came to the point of the story, if he ever did arrive at it.

4. The questions that seemed to me most useful in helping the Committee to come to a decision were those that bore upon a boy's work at school rather than questions of general information. I do not mean that the latter kind, which were useful in many ways, should be excluded. It is perhaps a chance circumstance whether a boy at 12½ is well-informed for his age or not, whereas it is most important to find out whether he has an intelligent understanding of what he has

been taught and what he may reasonably be expected to have learnt at school. Also it has to be remembered in gauging a candidate's mental powers that a dull boy may come crammed with an intelligent description of his favourite book, the battle of Trafalgar, and other obvious questions.

Personally, I found such a question as the derivation of "Mediterranean," "manuscript," "soliloquise," etc., useful tests of whether a boy could apply his knowledge of Latin. In history the more intelligent boy would associate the name of Henry VIII. with the Reformation, the less intelligent with his six wives. In geometry the more advanced student would suggest a means of measuring the height of a tree from the ground, whereas the expedient of climbing the tree might occur to the practically-minded boy. In arithmetic and Algebra, 25 of $2s.$, and the next odd number to y , do not seem to admit of more cramming than it is desirable that any boy should receive. Such questions as I have mentioned seem to afford a better test of what a boy of $12\frac{1}{2}$ should know than more general questions, such as "the colour of a lobster before it is boiled."

ERNEST H. EARLE,

Bilton Grange, Rugby.

The procedure of the Interviewing Committee may now be said to have taken a settled form. With slight modification it has been adopted by six successive Committees, each of which had an entirely free hand as to the methods it chose to use. Briefly, it is as follows:—

A number of boys are invited to present themselves at a stated hour before each sitting of the Committee. They are then drafted—three at a time—into a separate room where they are given a "ten minutes essay" to write on some easy subject, and if time permits a short piece of prose or poetry to read through. Then they come singly into the Committee Room and have an interview of from ten to fifteen minutes.

The School and Medical reports and the essays are passed round the Committee while the interview proceeds, and the boys are finally assessed by the Committee directly after they have left the room.

In arranging the number of boys to come up on each day, care is taken to allow a considerable margin of time, so that the Committee may keep a boy well over the regular ten minutes if it is not quite satisfied about him.

Members of previous Committees have felt severely the strain of a six hours' session, especially if it has been repeated for six continuous days.

Arrangements are now made, by spreading the dates of the interviews over three or four weeks, to prevent the members of the Committee becoming "stale" at the work.

The present Committee found that so far from having much difficulty in classifying the candidates, it could safely subdivide the large middle or β Class still further.

Good $\beta +$, $\beta +$, poor $\beta +$,

Good β , etc., have accordingly been used as marks for boys who were neither very good nor very bad. This subdivision of the more average boys we felt was not too great a refinement, and at the same time would be of material assistance to the First Lord in his final selection, as the dividing line between the "ins" and the "outs" is bound to be somewhere in this large β Class.

One hundred and seventy boys were interviewed this month and were classed :

+ 2	good $\beta +$ 5	good β 25	$\beta -$ 19
α 8	$\beta +$ 28	β 38	
$\alpha -$ 13	poor $\beta +$ 7	poor β 6	γ 19

It was very noticeable that the best boys were not the oldest. Probably the older boys had in many cases been kept back till the last opportunity for entry owing to doubts as to their ability to pass the qualifying examination. Of course there were exceptions, but these were generally boys who had only in the last few weeks decided to try for the Navy.

Doctor Burge's remarks of last year as to the wide difference in the character of the Schools at which candidates have been educated are equally true in this last Committee's experience. In a deplorably large number of cases the schools have been wretchedly inadequate. There are plenty of excellent private schools in the country, where the fees

are not excessive, and yet some parents seem almost to go out of their way to choose schools—often at a great distance from home—that are small in size and inefficient in methods of teaching. The public elementary schools would often give a far better education.

VINCENT W. BADDELEY.

VIII. — EXTRACTS FROM CORRESPONDENCE
RESPECTING THE AFFAIRS OF TURKEY
AND GREECE

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

For *Instructions*, see No. II

No. 1.—SIR W. WHITE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received by telegraph, April 21)

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 21, 1888.

MY LORD,—Considerable surprise has been occasioned at the Sublime Porte by language recently held by M. Tricoupi to Féridoun Bey, the Ottoman Minister at Athens. It would appear that M. Tricoupi recapitulated a series of grievances against the Turkish Government, for which his Excellency maintained that the Greek Government held the Government of the Sultan responsible.

On the other hand, the Sublime Porte has brought some complaints against the Hellenic Consul at Monastir. These two incidents, together with the fact of the recent appearance of brigands in Macedonia coming from Greece, would tend to bring about less friendly relations than those that have recently existed, in spite of the continued desire on the part of the Sultan to maintain good relations between his Government and that of King George.

His Highness the Grand Vizier has sent me a message through Sir A. Sandison requesting me to beg your Lordship to be good enough to use your kind offices at Athens with a view to establishing a more friendly state of affairs.

I had the honour to send your Lordship the substance of the above by telegraph to-day. I have, etc.,

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

NO. 2.—MR. HAGGARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received by telegraph, April 24)

(Extract.)

ATHENS, April 24, 1888.

I received this morning Sir W. White's telegram of the 21st instant, and I have the honour of informing your Lordship that I find that the general opinion of my colleagues here is that there is no Greek agitation in Macedonia against the authority of Turkey emanating from Athens. It is possible that if the Sultan were made aware of the actual condition of affairs he might put into execution the friendly intentions which he expresses, and thus restore matters to their normal condition.

The Turkish Minister has communicated to M. Tricoupi a letter which was doubtless intended to be of a conciliatory nature, but which had unhappily the contrary effect. In it there was an unfortunate allusion to the brigandage, to which I see that the Grand Vizier also refers in his communication to Sir W. White which your Lordship forwarded to me. This is a point on which the Greeks are very sensitive, and M. Tricoupi particularly resented any representation from Turkey with reference to brigandage, as it is from their neighbour that they have had a great deal of their trouble on this subject. The result was that the whole good effect of the conciliatory nature of the communication was lost.

NO. 3.—THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR W. WHITE

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 25, 1888, 1.5 P.M.

You had better communicate to the Porte the substance of Mr. Haggard's telegram just repeated to you.

Point out that the matter is really grave, and if they force on a quarrel with Greece, they may have serious cause to regret. An outbreak in Macedonia would probably not be confined to that region.

NO. 4.—MR. HAGGARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received by telegraph, April 25)

(Extract.)

ATHENS, April 25, 1888.

At his usual weekly reception to-day, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs produced and showed me the letters written by the Greek Consul which had been seized by the Turkish authorities, and on which they found their complaint against him of stirring up sedition against the authority of the Sultan.

It appears, to begin with, that these letters were written in 1885 and the beginning of 1886, during a time when the relations between the two countries were somewhat strained, and when it might therefore be not unreasonably expected that a Greek Agent would be engaged in agitation. The passages, however, which M. Theotoki read me, and which he said were those complained of, did not appear to be of a very dangerous character, nor did they necessarily, as it seemed to me, apply to the authority of Turkey, and his Excellency stated that the Consul declared that he had not written even these, and that this statement was borne out by the original drafts of the letters which he had produced; that they had therefore been forged and interpolated into the letters. His Excellency went on to say that it having been, therefore, distinctly proved that the Turkish Government had absolutely nothing to go on in their accusation against the Consul, he would be sent back.

I urged His Excellency not to precipitate ("brusquer") matters by doing this, at all events for the present, and pointed out to him that neither Greek *amour-propre* nor their material interests would be injured by the Consul's stay for a short time at least in Athens. I said that it did not seem to me that the matters were sufficiently serious to justify Greece on any ground, and certainly with a due regard to her own interest, in deliberately flying in the face of Turkey, even supposing that there had been a misapprehension; that, moreover, a delay might afford an opportunity for the matter to be cleared up in the amicable manner which I felt sure both the Greek and Turkish Governments desired. His Excellency said that this would have been possible if the incident in question were not the outcome of some and accom-

panied by other acts which indicated a *parti pris* on the part of Turkey, which it would be beneath the dignity of this country to submit to.

The Austrian and German Ministers told me that they had spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in much the same terms as those which I ventured to use.

NO. 5.—CONSUL-GENERAL BLUNT TO THE MARQUIS OF
SALISBURY.—(*Received April 27*)

SALONICA, *April 17, 1888.*

MY LORD,—I have the honour to enclose a copy of a despatch this day addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the circumstances attending the recall of M. Panurias, Greek Consul at Monastir, in connection with alleged insurrectionary movements in Macedonia. I have, etc.,

(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

Enclosure in No. 5.—CONSUL-GENERAL BLUNT TO
SIR W. WHITE

SALONICA, *April 17, 1888.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report to your Excellency that M. Panurias, Hellenic Consul at Monastir, has been recalled. He arrived here on Friday last, and left to-day by the Fraissinet boat for the Piræus.

It is rumoured that his recall is in some way connected with letters of his which have fallen into the hands of the Ottoman authorities at Monastir, and some of which have appeared in various newspapers, particularly in the *Revue de l'Orient*, published at Buda-Pesth.

The letters of this gentleman were found in a correspondence seized in the house of M. Pichion, the Head Master of the Greek School at Castoria.

The authorities have discovered from the correspondence that Pichion was the chief agent in the formation, in 1885, of Insurrectionary Committees at Castoria, Klissura, Nevesca, Florina, Blatzi, and other places in the north-west of Macedonia. Consequently, he and many persons implicated in

the movement, as shown by the correspondence, have been arrested and are to be tried by the court-martial at Monastir.

M. Margariti, a Roumanian, who is at the head of the Roumanian educational propaganda among the Koutzo Vlachs of Macedonia, is employed by Rifaat Pasha, Governor-General of Monastir, in translating a portion of the correspondence in question, and, as this person has always taken a very active part against Hellenism, he is now pointed to by the Greeks as being the person who exposed the agencies at work against the authority of the Sultan.

This suspicion is not altogether unnatural, seeing that in the course of the last ten years M. Margariti has been frequently imprisoned at the instigation of the Greek Bishops and Notables of Macedonia, who denounced his work among the Vlachs as subversive of the authority of the Ottoman Government. I have, etc.,

(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

No. 6.—SIR W. WHITE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received May 5)

(Extract.)

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 28, 1888.

In consequence of the recent violent language of the Athenian press against Turkey, and owing to the Reports received from Féridoun Bey, the Ottoman Minister in Greece, combined with the sudden revival of brigandage in Macedonia, in proximity of the Hellenic frontier, a certain feeling of uneasiness has shown itself in official circles at the Sublime Porte on the subject of the possible unfriendly intentions of M. Tricoupi.

The irritation which has lately manifested itself against Turkey at Athens may, according to trustworthy information, be divided into several heads, such as :

The incident with the Greek Metropolitan of Serres ;

The dispute of the Vali with M. Panurias, Greek Consul at Monastir.

There may be other causes of irritation, but these appear to be the principal ones on which stress is being laid.

Mr. Consul-General Blunt has in his despatches alluded to the difficulties which have arisen with Mgr. Lucas, Archbishop of Serres, and to the injudicious and frequently harsh

treatment to which the Greek clergy and some Bishops have been subjected in Macedonia.

These are no doubt aggravating circumstances, painful to all their co-religionists; but the Œcumenical Patriarch at Constantinople is the proper person to treat these questions with the Palace and the Sublime Porte, and he is doing this with tact and discretion.

The grave accusations brought by the Sublime Porte against the Hellenic Consul at Monastir, M. Panurias, are denied at Athens; these concern the two Governments, and must be dealt with diplomatically according to their merits.

I hope to have it within my power to smooth away the existing difficulties, and M. Condouriotis, the Hellenic Minister here, is showing the most conciliatory disposition.

NO. 7.—SIR W. WHITE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received May 5)

(Extract.) CONSTANTINOPLE, April 29, 1888.

I have been informed that Féridoun Bey, the Ottoman Minister at Athens, is about to return to Constantinople on private grounds, and that Chemzédin Bey has gone out to act as Chargé d'Affaires during the Minister's absence from his post.

I am assured that there are no political grounds for Féridoun Bey leaving that post at this moment, and that he may obtain another Mission, or even promotion.

NO. 8.—SIR W. WHITE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received May 5)

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 30, 1888.

MY LORD.—Whilst at Athens the press and many public men are abusing Turkey, and attributing to the Sublime Porte a systematic intention of disregarding the feelings of the Hellenic Kingdom, and of the Greek Church, the following fact may be worthy of notice.

The Sultan has just sent £T.1000 from His Majesty's privy purse to the Œcumenical Patriarch at Constantinople

as his contribution towards the expenses attending the proper celebration of Easter by the Greek religious community in his capital.

It was Palm Sunday in the Eastern Church yesterday, and the Paschal Feast falls this year on Sunday next, the 6th May.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Mr. Haggard. I have, etc.

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

No. 9.—SIR E. MALET TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received May 7)

(Extract.)

BERLIN, May 5, 1888.

I asked Count Bismarck to-day whether he had any apprehension lest the difficulties between Greece and Turkey should increase and cause anxiety. He replied that he had not received much information on the subject, and he was not inclined to think that there was present danger in that quarter.

No. 10.—MR. HAGGARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received by telegraph, May 9)

ATHENS, May 9, 1888.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inform your Lordship that at the usual weekly reception of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day his Excellency told me that he had just informed the Turkish Minister definitely that the Greek Consul at Monastir would be sent back to his post by the boat leaving to-morrow (Thursday) week.

In view of M. Tricoupi's statement to me that he would be sent back by the next boat leaving after to-day, this may be considered as a concession. The Turkish Minister, nevertheless, begged him, but ineffectually, to give a later date for the Consul's departure.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir W. White. I have, etc.,

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 11.—MR. HAGGARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(*Received by telegraph, May 14*)

ATHENS, *May 14, 1888.*

MY LORD,—At an interview which I had with him to-day, M. Tricoupi informed me that the Porte had, through their Minister here, declared their intention to send to Athens the original documents which are supposed to convict the Greek Consul at Monastir of guilty practices. His Excellency added that, being anxious to be as conciliatory as possible, he had yielded to the appeals of the Turkish Minister, and although he has no doubt that this proposal is only the usual Turkish procrastination, he had agreed to postpone the return of the Consul to Monastir, which had been fixed for Thursday, until after Friday, when the next mail from the Turkish capital is due. After that day the Consul would proceed to his post, whether the documents had or had not arrived, by the next steamer which leaves, so his Excellency believes, next Tuesday.

I have the honour to refer your Lordship, in connection with the above, to my despatch of the 9th instant.

I had the honour of telegraphing the substance of the above to your Lordship to-day, and of repeating it to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. I have, etc.,

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 12.—SIR W. WHITE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(*Received May 17, 8 a.m.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 17, 1888, 1.10 A.M.*

With reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 25th ultimo, the feeling of tension and animosity which then existed seems to have diminished considerably in Greece.

There is, however, still cause for anxiety on one point.

Should M. Tricoupi persist in sending the Hellenic Consul back to Monastir, the Porte appear determined to refuse to allow him to resume his duties, as they are persuaded of the truth of the accusations brought against him.

NO. 13.—SIR W. WHITE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received May 19)

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 15, 1888.*

MY LORD,—There is very little to report from here as to the differences which had arisen between Turkey and the Government at Athens, except that on the whole there appears to exist a more friendly disposition on both sides.

The ecclesiastical grievances of the Patriarchate, which arose from the forcible removal of the Metropolitan of Serres from his See, are being treated, as they ought to be, as internal questions of the Ottoman Empire, and the Œcumenical Patriarch is actively defending its privileges in the matter.

The Porte has taken far too long a time in producing the documents which it says it holds as proofs of the intrigues of which the Hellenic Consul at Monastir is accused; until this has been done, it is impossible to say how far this Government has a right to insist on the definitive recall of that Consul from his present post.

According to my latest information these documents are to be forwarded to Athens, and the Sublime Porte appears to think that their perusal will convince M. Tricoupi that it is desirable that M. Panurias should not return to Monastir as Consul.

The Hellenic Premier has shown a praiseworthy spirit of conciliation by delaying the Consul's return, and M. Condouriotis is of opinion that the Sublime Porte is likewise animated by a desire to have the matter settled in a friendly spirit.

I am sending Mr. Haggard a copy of the present despatch. I have, etc.,

(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

NO. 14.—MR. HAGGARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received by telegraph, May 21)

(Extract.)

ATHENS, *May 21, 1888.*

The Prime Minister informed me this morning that their Consul will return to Monastir without fail to-morrow.

No. 15.—MR. HAGGARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received by telegraph, May 23)

ATHENS, *May 23, 1888.*

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inform your Lordship that M. Panurias, the Greek Consul at Monastir, left Athens to return to his post yesterday.

I have had the honour to inform your Lordship of this fact by telegraph. I have, etc.,

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 16.—CONSUL-GENERAL BLUNT TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—*(Received May 30)*

SALONICA, *May 26, 1888.*

MY LORD,—With reference to my despatch of the 17th April, I have the honour to report to your Lordship that M. Panurias arrived here from the Piræus yesterday morning, and is about to proceed to Monastir to resume his duties as Hellenic Consul in that district. I have, etc.,

(Signed) J. E. BLUNT.

No. 17.—SIR W. WHITE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received June 2)

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 26, 1888.*

MY LORD,—With regard to the relations of the Hellenic Government with the Sublime Porte, I have the honour to report as follows in continuation of my last despatch on the subject, of the 15th instant.

The documents on which the Imperial Government relies as a proof of the charges brought against M. Panurias, the Hellenic Consul at Monastir, have been forwarded at last from here to the Ottoman Legation at Athens a couple of days ago. The delay in their transmission was unnecessarily increased by these papers having been sent to Constantinople by the Vali of Monastir instead of going thence direct to Athens.

In the meantime, M. Panurias has been allowed to return

and resume his duties at Monastir pending further inquiry.
I have, etc., (Signed) W. A. WHITE.

NO. 18.—MR. HAGGARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.
(Received June 5)

(*Extract.*) ATHENS, May 30, 1888.

The Porte seems to have great reluctance in forwarding, for the information of the Greek Government, the original letters on which they founded their accusations against the Consul at Monastir of stirring up sedition, their consequent demand for his recall, and all the subsequent trouble.

Instead of those originals, with which the Greek Government have continually asked to be confronted, they now have sent what the Turkish Minister calls "authentic copies," the documents previously sent having been translations. One of these letters does not even bear the signature of the Consul at all, but purports to have been written by a man who was formerly Dragoman of the Greek Consulate at Monastir, from which post he has, I believe, since been discharged; anyhow, he is no longer employed there. On being shown this letter, he denied ever having written it, and pointed out that he could not have done so, as he was not even at Monastir at the time that it pretends to be dated.

NO. 19.—MR. HAGGARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received June 8)

(*Extract.*) ATHENS, June 1, 1888.

The Prime Minister informed me yesterday that the Greek Government had heard from Consul Panurias that he had been received with the usual formalities by the Turkish authorities, an escort having been sent to meet him, etc.

NO. 20.—MR. HAGGARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(Received June 12)

(*Extract.*) ATHENS, June 7, 1888.

I had occasion to call on the Prime Minister to-day, and the conversation naturally fell on the present phase of the Monastir incident.



According to M. Tricoupi, the position with respect to the Consul is as follows: The Porte made a specific accusation against him of having written certain incriminating letters which they alleged to be in their possession. They have, however, never attempted seriously to substantiate their accusation by the production of the original letters, and have now apparently let that accusation drop, and changed their ground by the production of a letter which was, as they assert, written by the interpreter of the Consulate at Monastir. It would be, of course, open to contention that in any case the Consul was not responsible for his interpreter's writings. This letter, moreover, was supposed to have been written at Monastir, and dated on a day when it was distinctly proved that the man had not been at Monastir at all, but which, it was worthy of remark, was long subsequent to the accession to power of the present Administration. When it was pointed out that the interpreter had not been there at the date given in the letter the Porte immediately said that the clerk, in copying, had made a mistake of six months and had put the 6th October (I think), when M. Tricoupi was in power, and had begun his published policy of peace and reconciliation, instead of the 6th April, when M. Delyanni was in power and a rupture between the two countries was daily expected.

Your Lordship will perceive the difference of inference caused by the date; in fact, as M. Tricoupi remarked, the whole question turns on it, and the mistake of the copying clerk was, to say the least, convenient to the Turkish wish to fix responsibility on the present Greek Government at any price.

It having, however, now been proved that the letter, if written at all, was not written whilst M. Tricoupi was in power, it would appear somewhat *exigant* to hold his Government responsible for it.

M. Tricoupi then came to the responsibility of the Consul. He said that he did not consider that the authenticity of the letter affected M. Panurias one way or the other, the more so that his interpreter was a person of absolutely no importance in the Consular office, who had actually been discharged fourteen months ago at the request of M. Panurias himself for untrustworthiness and intrigue. It would be a little too much if M. Panurias should be held responsible for an incident

in the conduct of this man, conduct for which he himself had requested that he should be dismissed.

No. 21.—SIR E. MONSON TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(*Received June 26*)

(*Extract.*)

ATHENS, *June 21, 1888.*

I inquired yesterday of M. Dragoumis whether Féridoun Bey had made any fresh communication to him respecting the case of the Greek Consul at Monastir.

His Excellency replied that he had seen the Turkish Minister that afternoon, but that the latter had declared he had no communication to make.

M. Dragoumis read me a telegram from the Greek Minister at Constantinople, which he had not long before received, and which stated that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had explained that he had not yet had time to speak to the Grand Vizier on the subject.

No. 22.—SIR E. MONSON TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(*Received by telegraph, August 2*)

(*Extract.*)

ATHENS, *August 3, 1888.*

The Greek Government received yesterday from their Representative at Constantinople news to the effect that the Sultan, desirous of showing his friendly feeling towards Greece, and especially his personal good-will towards her King, had caused orders to be sent to the Vali of Monastir to resume complete official relations with the Greek Consul, M. Panurias.

I lost no time in telegraphing these facts to your Lordship; and when I called upon M. Tricoupi this morning I congratulated him upon the closure of an incident which had threatened to be so troublesome.

M. Tricoupi, while admitting that this was a matter for congratulation, said that unless it was followed by other evidences of the good intentions of the Porte, which he hardly expected would be the case, the step just taken would do but little to improve the relations between Greece and Turkey.

IX.—EXTRACTS FROM CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING CONTRABAND OF WAR IN CONNECTION WITH THE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

Instructions as for No. II

NO. 1.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C. HARDINGE

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 10, 1904.*

SIR,—In my despatch of to-day I desired you to call the attention of the Russian Government to the effects likely to be produced on neutral commerce—effects which have indeed already manifested themselves—by their action in extending the definition of contraband of war, and in authorising unduly stringent measures to be taken in order to prevent articles falling within this extended definition from reaching Japan.

I propose, in this despatch, to discuss more fully, and on its own merits, the question of contraband of war as it presents itself under the conditions to which I have referred.

At the outbreak of hostilities, the Russian Government issued an Order of the 14th February 1904, approving a series of Regulations which they intended to enforce during the war with Japan. This Order was published in the *London Gazette* of Friday, the 11th March 1904. The material rules for consideration are those to be found in sections (8) and (10) of Rule 6, which include, amongst articles contraband of war, (8) every kind of fuel, such as coal, naphtha, alcohol, and other similar materials, and, (10) generally, everything intended for warfare by sea or land, as well as rice, provisions, and horses, beasts of burden, and other animals, which may

be used for a warlike purpose, if they are transported on the account of, or are destined for, the enemy.

In transmitting the Order from which these Rules are taken, the Russian Government stated that all articles enumerated in Rule 6 were regarded as "unconditionally contraband."

This Declaration, it is needless to say, attracted the attention of His Majesty's Government. The description of contraband of war which it contained went far beyond that which has been hitherto accepted.

It has been held by this country, and our officers have been so instructed, that the term "contraband of war" includes only articles having belligerent destination and purpose. Such articles have been classed under two heads:—

1. Those that are primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war, *e.g.* arms and munitions of war, military material, etc.—articles of this kind being usually described as absolutely contraband.

2. Those that may be, and are, used for peaceful or warlike purposes according to circumstances, such articles being usually described as conditionally contraband.

Articles of the first class destined for ports of the enemy or places occupied by his forces are always contraband of war. Articles of the second class are contraband of war only when actually and especially destined for the military or naval forces of the enemy. Coal and provisions are among the articles which are only conditionally contraband.

I accordingly, in my despatch of the 1st June last, instructed you to call the attention of Count Lamsdorff to this question, and, in particular, to express the surprise with which His Majesty's Government found that rice and provisions were to be treated as unconditionally contraband—a step which they regarded as inconsistent with the law and practice of nations. While thus protesting in regard to this particular category of so-called contraband of war, His Majesty's Government felt themselves bound to reserve their rights by also protesting against the doctrine that it is for the belligerent to decide what articles are as a matter of course, and without reference to other considerations, to be dealt with as contraband of war, regardless of the well-established rights of neutrals; and we explained that we

should not consider ourselves bound to recognise as valid the decision of any Prize Court which violated those rights, or was otherwise not in conformity with the recognised principles of international law.

The question of the category of articles covered by Rule 6 (8) of the Russian Declaration, viz. fuel of every kind, including coal, naphtha, alcohol, and other similar materials, was reserved for separate consideration. I may here call your attention to the fact that this treatment of coal as unconditionally contraband is diametrically opposed to the declaration made at the West African Conference, held at Berlin in 1884, by the Russian Plenipotentiary, who stated that his instructions were peremptory, and that his Government refused categorically to consent to any Treaty, Convention, or Declaration of any kind which would imply the recognition of coal as contraband of war.

The extreme measures which have since been authorised by the Russian Government in connection with the search for contraband and the punishment of those concerned in its carriage greatly intensify the effects of the new Russian doctrine.

In these circumstances I have to instruct you to renew the protest which you have already made as to the treatment of provisions and food-stuffs as unconditionally contraband of war. You will add that it is impossible for us to admit the new Russian doctrine, contrary to that which the Russian Government have on former occasions supported, that coal and fuel of every kind are contraband, irrespective of whether they are destined for the use of belligerent forces or not. Still less can we admit that it is within the competence of any Power to abolish by a stroke of the pen the long-established distinction between articles which are conditionally and those which are absolutely contraband of war, and suddenly to announce their intention of including within the latter category a number of articles, in themselves of an innocent description, and largely dealt in by neutral Powers. We are unable to admit that the seizure of cargoes or the vessels containing them, merely upon the ground that they include such articles, and without proof of such destination, is justifiable in international law ; and His Majesty's Government will accordingly consider it their duty to support strenu-

ously claims for compensation put forward by British subjects whose interests have suffered by the application of these Rules.

We desire to add that the confiscation of a neutral ship merely upon the ground that 50 per cent. of her cargo is contraband of war cannot be justified, and we shall support claims put forward in consequence of any confiscations which may take place upon this special ground.

In explaining our views to Count Lamsdorff, you will repeat that we have no desire to place obstacles in the way of a belligerent desiring to take reasonable precautions in order to prevent his enemy from receiving supplies. We cannot, however, admit that the right of taking such precautions implies a consequential right to intercept at any distance from the scene of operations, and without proof that the supplies in question are really destined for the use of the enemy's forces, any articles which that belligerent may determine to regard as contraband of war.

It will be most satisfactory to us if Count Lamsdorff is able to show you that the intention of the regulations on this subject has been imperfectly understood, and that the wording of Rule 6 (10), which is not very clearly drafted, may be taken as implying that proof of the intention to make use of the articles referred to therein for warfare by sea or land, and of their transportation on the account of, or their destination for, the enemy's forces, must be forthcoming before they can be dealt with as contraband. I am, etc.,

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

NO. 2.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF LANS-
DOWNE.—(*Received August 22*)

(*Extract.*)

ST. PETERSBURGH, August 16, 1904.

I had the honour to receive yesterday your Lordship's two despatches * of the 10th instant, containing the views of His Majesty's Government upon the questions of the sinking of neutral vessels, and of the Russian definition of contraband of war.

I called upon Count Lamsdorff to-day, on his return from

* Only one printed.

his weekly audience with the Emperor, and I read to his Excellency French translations of your Lordship's above-mentioned despatches, giving him at the same time copies of the English text which, I impressed upon him, were to be regarded as the official text of your Lordship's communications to me.

Count Lamsdorff listened attentively to what I read to him, and assured me at its conclusion that the subject of my communication would be very carefully considered. He said that the questions which had been raised, and of which there seemed to be an ever-increasing number, were of so complex a nature that he had appointed a small Commission in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whose sole duty would be to carefully study and report to him upon the many questions relating to contraband and the rights of neutrals, which appeared to arise each day in some new form, but that some little time would naturally elapse before the members of the Commission would have had time to come to a decision upon the many points raised, and he feared that in the meantime other cases might arise to still further complicate the situation. He hoped that the Governments interested would rise above the level of the Prize Courts upon whom the decision upon the cases submitted to them devolved.

I told his Excellency that it was not only with the proceedings of the Prize Courts that dissatisfaction was felt, but with the policy of the Russian Government by which the decisions of the Prize Courts were inspired, since it was not within the province of the Prize Courts to decide what articles were to be treated as contraband of war nor what the penalties should be for those convicted of trading in contraband. It was against the policy of the Government that my representations were addressed, and I expressed my hope and conviction that means could be discovered by friendly discussion for safeguarding Russian interests, and at the same time for meeting the just claims of His Majesty's Government. I added that because Russia and Japan chose to make war upon each other, it was no reason that the trade of the whole world should be dislocated for the sake of the belligerents; and it seemed to me that it was their duty to deal gently with neutral trade, and to diminish as much as possible the inconvenience to which international commerce must necessarily under such circumstances be exposed.

**NO. 3.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE**

(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 25, 1904.*

Your Excellency's despatch of the 16th instant.

The observations that you made to Count Lamsdorff on the subject of duty of belligerents towards neutral trade were most appropriate.

You should impress upon him, however, that the subject is one of the greatest urgency, and that whatever is done should be done quickly.

Has anything come of the small Commission which Count Lamsdorff informed you that he had appointed ?

Feeling here in commercial circles is very strong, and if there has been any misapprehension as to interpretation of Rule 6 and explanatory note * addressed to Sir C. Scott by Count Lamsdorff, the sooner it is removed the better.

**NO. 4.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(*Received September 5*)**

(Extract.) ST. PETERSBURGH, *August 27, 1904.*

I called on Count Lamsdorff yesterday afternoon, and I asked his Excellency if he could inform me whether the Commission which, on a previous occasion, he said that he had assembled for the consideration of all questions affecting neutrality and the rights of belligerents had arrived yet at any decision on the very important question of the interpretation of the Russian Regulations respecting contraband of war.

Count Lamsdorff replied that the whole question was still under the consideration of the Commission which he had assembled, and in view of the enormous amount of work which had devolved upon them, and which was increasing every day, he had summoned Professor Martens to St. Petersburg to assist and accelerate, if possible, their deliberations. He was therefore quite unable to give me any indication at present of the decision of the Government on the question at issue.

I told Count Lamsdorff that I regretted very much that

* Not printed.

no decision had yet been taken tending to relieve the present tension, and I urged upon him the importance of dealing with the matter promptly. The position of British commerce was already seriously compromised, but what rendered the situation even more grave was the apparent discrimination which was being made in favour of French and German vessels, and to the detriment of British shipping. I pointed out that the *Arabia* and *Calchas* had been arrested by the Vladivostock squadron during the same cruise, and that although the *Arabia* had been released three or four days after her capture the *Calchas* had been already detained three weeks at Vladivostock, and was still under arrest at that port, and yet the circumstances of the two cases were practically identical. It had also not escaped my notice that while the *Petersburg* and *Smolensk* had been cruising in the Red Sea the vessels of the Messageries Maritimes had been free from any molestation, and that so far I had not heard of any French ships being stopped and examined by a Russian cruiser. It had also been reported that in one case at least a pass had been given to a German vessel by the Russian Consul at Suez. These facts, though insignificant in themselves, and possibly capable of explanation, had given rise to the idea in British mercantile circles that there was an organised differentiation between British and other neutral vessels, and this apparent discrimination, while entailing considerable loss on the shipping community, had made the very worst possible impression on public opinion in England, of which I felt sure that Count Benckendorff must have already informed his Excellency.

Count Lamsdorff warmly repudiated the idea that there had been any discrimination against British shipping, and promised to make inquiries into the cases to which I had alluded. He denied that passes had been given by the Russian Consul at Suez, and said that the Government had rejected a proposal which had been made in that sense. As regards the general subject of contraband, the question at issue was one of interpretation, which required serious consideration, and was not dependent entirely on his Department, since, whatever was decided, had to receive at the same time the concurrence of the naval authorities. He hoped, however, to be able to give me a definite reply within a short space of time.

**NO. 5.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received September 17)**

ST. PETERSBURGH, September 16, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

To-day Count Lamsdorff stated to me officially that instructions have been sent to the Prize Courts and Naval Commanders supplementing and explaining the Regulations respecting Contraband of War, of which section 10, Article 6, had been misinterpreted in some cases. The conditionally contraband character of articles used for peaceful as well as warlike purposes is admitted in the new instructions, but articles of dual use addressed to private individuals in the enemy's country are not necessarily exempt from seizure and condemnation, as such persons might be employed as agents or contractors of the naval or military authorities. In reply to my remark that in such cases the onus of proof would lie with the captors, Count Lamsdorff, while assenting, added that to disprove the charge would be in the interest of the owner.

Count Lamsdorff informed me that horses and beasts of burden must still be considered as absolutely contraband.

**NO. 6.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received September 21)**

ST. PETERSBURGH, September 21, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Count Lamsdorff has informed me in a note that only the articles enumerated in Article 6, section 10, are to be interpreted as conditional contraband, and that horses and beasts of burden are to be excepted from this interpretation. The Commission which has been sitting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not, he added, touched upon the question of the nature of coal.

I had an interview with his Excellency this afternoon, an account of which I am sending in a despatch by post this evening.

**NO. 7.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received September 22)**

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, September 22, 1904.

With reference to my immediately preceding telegram, I made urgent representations to Count Lamsdorff in the course of my conversation with his Excellency yesterday in the sense of your Lordship's despatch of the 10th ultimo, on the subject of the treatment of coal as absolute contraband. His Excellency assured me of his personal conviction that His Majesty's Government will have no further cause for complaint if the new instructions are carried out in the sense in which they were drawn up, but he gave no indication of yielding on the question of principle.

**NO. 8.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received September 24)**

(Extract.) ST. PETERSBURGH, September 21, 1904.

With reference to my telegram of to-day, I have the honour to report to your Lordship that I called upon Count Lamsdorff this afternoon, and pointed out to His Excellency that as regards the question of coal, there was no commodity of more generally pacific use, and that I had already drawn His Excellency's attention to the views of His Majesty's Government as contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 10th ultimo, of which I had had the honour of communicating to him a copy. I told him that it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to admit that a belligerent had the right to extinguish British trade with a country at war when that trade was of a peaceful character, or that coal should be regarded as contraband irrespective of whether it was destined for the belligerent forces of the enemy. I referred to the Declaration made by Count Kapnist at the West African Conference at Berlin in 1884, and I reminded his Excellency of the Declaration made by His Majesty's Government that they will strenuously support the claims for compensation of His Majesty's subjects who have suffered by the application of such Rules. I also added that the

form in which section 10 of Article 6 was drawn up gave the impression that the concluding condition, "if they are transported on the account of or are destined for the enemy," was applicable to all the Articles enumerated in the previous sections which might be employed for peaceful as well as warlike purposes.

Count Lamsdorff, while disclaiming any responsibility for the text of the Rules, maintained that the condition contained in the concluding sentence of section 10 could only apply to the section itself, and not to those which preceded it. As to the question of the contraband nature of coal, it was permissible for the Russian Government to change their views since 1884, during which time many developments and circumstances had occurred which had induced them to modify their opinion. At the commencement of a war every belligerent had hitherto exercised the right of announcing what would be considered as contraband of war, and the list of such articles necessarily varied with the resources of the adversary. Such a right hitherto enjoyed by other Powers could not well be denied to Russia, and the fact that His Majesty's Government had refused to allow coal to be given to the Russian fleet in British harbours proved conclusively that they also regarded coal as contraband of war.

I pointed out that there could be no doubt as to the warlike destination of coal when supplied to a Russian warship, but that that was not conclusive that coal was in all circumstances to be contraband of war. The fact that the Russian Government had placed coal in precisely the same category as arms and munitions of war had made it almost equally difficult for a conscientious neutral Government to supply the one or the other.

NO. 9.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 30, 1904.*

SIR,—I have received your telegram and despatch dated the 16th instant, stating that you had been informed by Count Lamsdorff that the Russian Government have, in consequence of the decision of the Commission appointed

to study the question of contraband of war, issued supplementary instructions to Naval Commanders and Naval Prize Courts, defining the interpretation of section 10 of Article 6 of the Regulations of the 27th February last. According to these supplementary instructions the conditionally contraband nature of rice and provisions, used for peaceful or warlike purposes according to circumstances, is now admitted by the Russian Government.

His Majesty's Government desire to acknowledge the friendly spirit in which their representations in this matter have been met by the Russian Government. They learn with satisfaction that it is not intended to treat rice and provisions as unconditionally contraband of war, and they trust that Count Lamsdorff's anticipation that the decision arrived at will tend to avoid difficulties in the future may be realised.

His Majesty's Government note that, in the view of the Russian Government, such articles are not necessarily free from seizure and condemnation as contraband of war merely because they are addressed to private firms or individuals in the enemy's country, the Russian Government holding that they may nevertheless be in reality intended for the military or naval forces of the enemy.

While His Majesty's Government do not contend that the mere fact that the consignee is a private person should necessarily give immunity from capture, they hold, on the other hand, that to take vessels for adjudication merely because their destination is the enemy's country would be vexatious, and constitute an unwarrantable interference with neutral commerce.

To render a vessel liable to such treatment there should, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the provisions are for the enemy's forces, and it is in such a case for the captor to show that the grounds of suspicion are adequate, and to establish the fact of destination for the enemy's forces before attempting to procure their condemnation.

In bringing to Count Lamsdorff's notice the views of His Majesty's Government, your Excellency should state that, for the reasons mentioned, they trust that the instructions now issued will be interpreted in a liberal and considerate

spirit by the Naval Commanders and Prize Courts to whom they are addressed.

His Majesty's Government cannot refrain from expressing their regret that the same principle has not been admitted in the case of certain other commodities enumerated in the 6th Article of the Regulations issued in February last, such for example as coal, which clearly appear to be susceptible of use for other than warlike purposes. I am, etc.,

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

**No. 10.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received October 3)**

(Extract.) **ST. PETERSBURGH, September 30, 1904.**

With reference to my despatch of the 21st instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract from the *Journal de Saint-Petersbourg* of to-day, containing a communiqué from the *Agence Télégraphique de Saint-Petersbourg*, giving the official interpretation of Article 6, section 10, of the Russian Contraband Regulations, to the effect that the articles coming under that section will be considered contraband only when addressed to the Governments of belligerent Powers, their Administrations, their armies, or their purveyors.

The first paragraph of this communiqué is so ambiguously worded that it would lead one to suppose that only articles not expressly mentioned in the section in question are to be regarded as conditionally contraband, if it were not clear from Count Lamsdorff's note of the 8th (21st) instant (see my telegram of that day), that the contrary meaning is intended.

**Enclosure in No. 10.—EXTRACT FROM THE "JOURNAL DE
SAINT-PÉTERSBOURG" OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1904**

(Translation)

**COMMUNIQUE OF THE "AGENCE TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE" OF
ST. PETERSBURGH**

In consequence of doubts which have arisen as to the interpretation of Article 6, section 10, of the Regulations

respecting contraband of war, it has been resolved, as we are in a position to announce, that the articles in regard to which no decision has been taken shall be considered as contraband of war if they are destined for:—

The Government of the belligerent Powers ;

Their administrations ;

Their army ; or

Their purveyors.

In cases where they are addressed to private individuals these articles shall not be considered as contraband of war.

Vessels shall only be confiscated in cases where prohibited merchandise forms more than half of the cargo.

In the contrary case only the cargo shall be confiscated. All possible measures have thus been taken to insure freedom of commerce to neutral Powers.

It is to be hoped that the Powers will appreciate the considerable latitude which is at present allowed to the free movement of their commerce, and will not give occasion to reproach them with abuses relative to the Regulations on Contraband of War.

**No. 11.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE**

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 8, 1904.*

Your despatch of the 21st ultimo.

You should make a further representation in writing to Count Lamsdorff against the treatment of coal as unconditionally contraband.

**X.—MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE
THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CON-
SIDER THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING
OF OFFICERS OF THE ARMY**

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

For Instructions, see Introduction

**AT ST. STEPHEN'S HOUSE, WESTMINSTER,
Wednesday, 4th December 1901.**

PRESENT :

The Right Hon. A. AKERS-DOUGLAS, M.P. (in the Chair).

Sir Michael F. Foster, K.C.B.,

M.P.

The Rev. Dr. E. Warre, D.D.,

M.V.O.

Mr. F. W. Walker.

**Lieutenant-Colonel F. Ham-
mersley.**

Captain A. H. Lee, M.P.

Captain W. E. CAIRNES, *Secretary.*

**Field-Marshal EARL ROBERTS (Commander-in-Chief), V.C.,
K.G., K.P., etc., examined.**

(Chairman.) We are glad to say that we finish to-day the evidence to be taken by this Committee, but there are some points which we have still to clear up. The first question which we must fully understand before we can come to any conclusion is the number of officers you require every year for the Army. We had it in evidence before, I think, from Sir Coleridge Grove, and from Colonel Delavoye, that you would require 1100, but since then we have had a return from the War Office telling us that the number was 800, and that makes a vast difference in our calculations?—The 1100 was on account of the abnormal state of affairs; 800 is what we will probably want in ordinary times.

Could you tell us at all how that number would be divided between the Engineers, Artillery, and Infantry?—I do not know exactly how the numbers would be divided.

We have got a return which I conclude is correct?—I think there are probably 30 Engineers in the year, double that number of Artillery, and the rest will be Infantry, I suppose.

(*Chairman.*) Might we ask you what your opinion is as to the existing state of Military education in the Army. Are you satisfied, generally, with the officers who served under you in South Africa with regard to their general intelligence?—I think the education should be higher.

Has there been a falling off during your experience?—No, I do not know that, but I doubt whether it has kept up with the standard of the day.

Is the deficiency which you have seen chiefly in general knowledge or in Military technical knowledge?—I think general knowledge.

(*Captain Lee.*) Do you mean in the subjects of a good general education, sir?—Yes.

(*Dr. Warre.*) Is that noticeable in the younger officers or the older men, the company officers or officers on the level of field officers?—I think it is throughout; of course many of them improve in their Military education in time, but I think the general standard of education is not sufficiently high in the Army.

(*Sir Michael Foster.*) But you have no fault to find, Lord Roberts, with the technical education, the technical knowledge of the officer?—I think that could be improved too.

(*Captain Lee.*) Might I ask, sir, from your experience of reports which are sent in to you on Service, of which you must have had an immense number, whether they show a deficiency in the power of expression, and, in fact, command over the English language?—That is what I really meant by saying that I thought the education was not of a sufficiently high standard.

It is marked in that direction?—Yes, and officers when they join very often are unable to write a satisfactory letter or to make a satisfactory report.

Therefore you think that a higher standard, particularly in English, is very desirable?—Certainly.

(*Dr. Warre.*) Do you think that is owing to intellectual

incapacity, or, for instance, to confusion of thought, or is it merely the want of the power of expression in language, bad grammar, and so on?—I think it is deficiency in the power of expression in language.

Bad grammar?—Yes.

And not confusion of thought?—No; I think it is the want of proper training and education, not so much a deficiency in the mental capacity as in the training of it.

A man knowing what he wants to say, but being unable to express it in language?—Yes. Of course it requires practice in a certain way, does it not? A man from reading books will educate himself, putting it generally, but I think the standard of education is not sufficiently high.

Would not that be owing possibly to the fact that officers, after they have dropped their education, read little or nothing? We all know the power of forgetting everything, and after officers have passed through Sandhurst, they will no longer read a book of any kind, except light literature?—I think that is very often the case.

And therefore it is possibly not owing entirely to their previous education but to the disuse of that education; they have not gone on with their education?—I think it is both; I think very often, after a boy joins the Army, for some time he does not give thought about reading anything until he is pushed for an examination, and then he tries to cram for it.

You trace it to the effect of the competition in examination chiefly, a boy having to work up for an examination, and then, when he has done with it, dropping the whole thing?—Yes.

(*Chairman.*) Physically and morally you have no fault to find with the officer at all?—No.

That refers to officers of all classes, including senior officers, but, of course, our reference deals with the younger men especially, and you were satisfied from your recent experience in South Africa as to their *esprit de corps* and fitness generally?—Quite so.

With their gallantry and endurance?—When the Competitive Examinations were first started, some of us had the idea that we might not get the same class of young fellows into the Army with regard to moral and physical training, but that is quite exploded.

Have you been able at all to differentiate between the officers who have entered the Army through Sandhurst and through the Militia?—I do not know whether you were ever told a little trial I had in Ireland as to how they turned out afterwards?

No, and we should like to hear it very much?—There was a question raised, I believe, in the War Office at a Committee as to the Militia Officers being suitable after they joined the Army, and I was written to when commanding in Ireland to find out whether there were more Adjutants from Sandhurst or from the Militia, and whether more men had been recommended to join the Staff College from Sandhurst or the Militia. I was very much interested in the returns; they showed that exactly as many Adjutants came through the Militia as from Sandhurst, and as many Militia officers as Sandhurst cadets had been recommended for the Staff College.

Did you notice any difference in the field in Africa?—No, not after they joined the regiment. I did not hear of any shortcomings of Militia Officers in the Line Battalions or the Cavalry Regiments.

Perhaps I might say that we have communicated with all the Commanding Officers, and we have asked their opinion upon this question, but it has not helped us really very much, because, although the majority of them are in favour of Sandhurst, we find in cross-examination that they have all admitted that they could not differentiate after two years' service, which would rather tend to show that the Sandhurst man had a little more technical knowledge when he joined; but, practically, in two years' time they were very much on a level?—Any shortcomings I heard of were not at all traced by me to the fact that the men came from the Militia.

We also found in cross-examination of the officers that they generally recommended the system under which they had themselves entered the Army. Have you any experience of University Candidates? They have come out very high in the evidence that we have received?—I have met some, and my experience of them is that they are better educated and that they have done well. I think that is the general opinion of men I have asked about them.

(*Sir Michael Foster.*) They have not fallen short in

technical ability owing to their being somewhat late in entering the Army?—No.

(*Dr. Warre.*) There was no complaint as to their being unready to conform to discipline?—I have never heard it.

Some of the evidence put before us seemed to have a prejudice against University men on the ground—I said *à priori*, but that was indignantly rejected by one eminent witness—that, having their minds formed beforehand, they were not so ready to accept the principle of Military discipline, but I could not get any concrete case, and I should like to hear whether you have ever heard of one?—I never heard of one, and I should not believe it at all likely.

(*Captain Lee.*) I gather, then, sir, that you are in favour of taking officers from the Universities?—Yes, in certain numbers.

(*Chairman.*) There is a question I should like to ask which bears upon this subject, namely, at what age the officer should join his unit?—Whether they should be more on a par?

Yes?—Or, rather, whether the age from Sandhurst and the Militia should be raised?

That was the point, and there were two reasons, because, first of all, it gives the boy a longer time to complete the general education which you desire he should possess, and, secondly, it puts the University man more on a level as to the time he enters the Army, and, consequently, the time he leaves it?—I am in favour of it with a view to giving the boy a better education before he comes into the Army.

I do not say our idea is, but my own idea is, that the boy should complete his general education before he goes to Sandhurst, and that he should devote the short time there purely to Military and technical work; but, of course, if the boys join from Sandhurst very early, that handicaps the University man tremendously in his career?—Of course, and I think an increase in the age would be better.

And you would have no objection to seeing the age increased?—Oh no, not at all.

Then that leads us on to the question of the nature of the education to be given in Military colleges; but perhaps I should first ask you if you are in favour of the maintenance of the Military colleges, or whether you would prefer, for the

sake of argument, all the officers to enter the Army through the Militia?—No, I am certainly in favour of Woolwich. I think the result of Woolwich is most satisfactory, both as regards Engineers and Artillery. Of course, as to Sandhurst, I have just told you a story which does not go to show that the Sandhurst cadets after a year or two are better than the others; but I think, if they were properly educated before they went to Sandhurst, and then had a technical military education while there, Sandhurst would probably be very useful.

All the evidence we have had tends entirely in the direction of making the education at Sandhurst purely Military. Then comes the question as to how long you think they ought to remain at the Military colleges. Originally the course at Sandhurst was two years, but that has been whittled down in the case of Sandhurst to one year?—I was at Sandhurst as a boy, and some stopped five years there; four was an ordinary time, and three quite the average.

(*Dr. Warre.*) But their general education was going on then alongside the other?—Yes. I went to Sandhurst soon after I was 14; then I went to Addiscombe, and was there two years, and that certainly was not too long for the Addiscombe course, which is much what the Woolwich course is now.

(*Chairman.*) So that, I take it, that should Sandhurst be maintained, you would prefer an 18 months' or two years' course?—I think so.

I take it that it is essential that a large number of men should come through the Militia if for no other reason, from the absolute necessity of officering that force?—Yes, Sandhurst could not be made large enough to meet all our demands without increasing it very, very extensively.

(*Dr. Warre.*) Would there be any objection to having, say, a thousand boys constituted into a battalion at Sandhurst?—The cost would be very great.

Without making great buildings and just having buildings of the nature they have at Woolwich?—I do not know how you would get the Militia officers at all if that were done.

And yet, on the other hand, the Militia being officered as it is, in a time of crisis, it loses all its officers, so that it is

not practically officered for any purpose when a crisis comes ? —No, but then at that time other officers come into it. The Militia has been pretty well filled up lately, in the hope, no doubt, of getting Commissions in the Regular Army, of which a great number have been given to the Militia in the last two years.

(*Chairman.*) With regard to the Militiamen, we have heard in the evidence that the officers who join through the Militia are practically fitter to take up the command at once of their company, or whatever unit they have, than the boys from Sandhurst, but that they are not so well educated technically ?—I have not heard this.

The Committee have had many people before them who desire that that technical training should be afforded in some way, and it has been suggested that the Militia officers should be attached to Line battalions—the linked battalions, for instance, which are in the Home station for a period every year ?—I think that would be very desirable.

It would appear that Militia officers who serve four months with their battalion the first year, and one month the second year, and in future years until they get their Commission, have not sufficient Military education before they join, and that they ought to have further technical instruction either by being attached to a Line battalion, or else by joining an Instructional Camp. Would there be difficulties about that ? —I think there would be very great advantage from their joining the Line battalions.

(*Dr. Warre.*) Would it be possible for that purpose to have at the great Military centres an instructional battalion or instructional courses to enable each Military centre to be a centre of instruction for the officers of the Army, particularly for these Militiamen ?—I think when an officer joins the Army he would be better with his regiment than anywhere else if the regiment is properly managed.

The difficulty would seem to be that they have not either men or time when the battalion is at home to give the instruction ?—The want of men is certainly a loss, but a great deal can be done with regimental instruction.

(*Captain Lee.*) Might I ask, sir, whether you consider that Militia officers should be allowed to get Commissions in the Militia as young as 17 ? Do you think the age should be

raised ?—I think if you raised the age all round it ought to be done in the Militia too.

I do not mean only for the officers passing from the Militia into the regular Army, but for those entering as *bond fide* Militia officers ?—I think if you do that you take them from their general education before they are ready to go into the Army.

Therefore, it would be desirable from the educational point of view to raise the age at which an officer can get his Commission in the Militia ?—I think so.

(*Dr. Warre.*) With regard to the want of general education, we heard in evidence that there used to be tolerably good garrison libraries well furnished in places ; might not that come under this Inspector-General of Education—the care of libraries, and seeing that officers had the opportunity at the different centres of having approach to good military works, and so on ?—I think that would be very desirable.

So that the officer of the present day, although he may pass a Competitive Examination, has no inducement to work, and if he wanted to work has no opportunity of getting at books ?—That is true.

So that it is really not his fault very much if he does not get on ?

(*Chairman.*) It has further been suggested on the same subject, that in connection with foreign armies there is a journal of military progress, which is regularly, either monthly or quarterly, circulated, and that shows these officers who are desirous of keeping up with modern ideas what is being done. It has been suggested that in connection with the libraries which have been mentioned, some kind of journal of that sort might be instituted.

(*Captain Lee.*) They have them in the Artillery and Engineers now.

(*Witness.*) The Engineers and the Artillery both have it ; young officers write their own ideas on certain questions, and I think it is very useful. Only the other day the question of pom-poms had to be considered, and I at once turned up the *Artillery Journal*, and found some very excellent papers on the subject by officers now commanding pom-pom units in South Africa.

(*Chairman.*) Turning to another subject, the very difficult

subject of the better education of the Cavalry Officer, we find considerable criticism made with regard to the Cavalry and the difficulty of getting officers of good education. It appears to us that the officers all come from the same source, but that the best men are prevented from going into the Cavalry by the very large expense of that force; I have no doubt that has been brought to your notice ?—It is the case, no doubt.

I would like to know whether by simpler uniform or by the provision of chargers by the Government, as I believe is done in the Field Artillery, it might be possible to put the Cavalry within the reach of poorer men, and, in fact, make it more the élite of the Army, as it should be. Is there any chance of our getting the expenditure reduced ?—I think it essential that it must be reduced.

And is it not the fact that you have great difficulty in getting Cavalry Officers ?—Yes, we have to lower the standard of education to get officers.

And that lowered standard of education, unfortunately, follows a man through his career ?—Undoubtedly.

I understood from current gossip that there were certain difficulties in the campaign with regard to finding efficient Commanding Officers of Cavalry ?—Yes.

And that there was a greater change necessary in commands in that branch of the Army than in any other ?—Yes, my experience is that you require a much more brilliant man for a Cavalry than for an Infantry leader.

And yet you get him from the bottom of the list instead of from the top ?—It is most unfortunate, because the Cavalry man has to act on the minute very often; he is much more by himself than the Infantry man is, and has to think a great deal more, and, as a rule, they are not so well educated when they start; they have the same examinations afterwards as the rest of the service have, but they commence badly.

You take them from the bottom of the list instead of the top ?—We do generally.

And it is only this question of expense which causes it, because the evidence we have had has been unanimous upon that point; if it were otherwise the majority of them would choose Cavalry instead of Infantry ?—I do not think it possible for a man to live in the Cavalry without some means, but

what I gather from the men I have consulted on the matter is, that a great deal could be done if Commanding Officers were held responsible that the subscriptions in the regiments, whether for entertainments or for sports, or anything else, should be limited to a certain sum, something within the means of a moderate income, and instead of a man requiring £500 or £600 or £700 a year to live in the Cavalry, it ought to be quite possible to live in the Cavalry on £200 or £300.

(*Captain Lee.*) In fact to put it on the same level as the Horse Artillery?—Yes, I think the Horse Artillery, as a rule, have about that—£200 to £300 a year—and there is no doubt they do everything very satisfactorily; as far as subscriptions and things go, they have nothing extravagant about it, but they join everything, and have their games and their sports. I think it is a matter of really making the Commanding Officer responsible—he must see the mess bills and the sport bills, and everything connected with it, and if the Commanding Officer does not do it he must be removed.

(*Chairman.*) Do you not think the initial expenses amount to a great deal—the uniform?

(*Captain Lee.*) And the chargers.

(*Witness.*) In the Field Artillery it is optional whether a man has a horse or not from Government; he can have a horse or he can have his own, but in the Horse Artillery they are entirely their own horses, and the uniform is as expensive as it is probably in any Cavalry regiment, very nearly, but I never hear of a Horse Artillery officer being in difficulties, although they are not wealthy men at all.

(*Dr. Warre.*) Is there not a difference in pay?—No, the Cavalry and Horse Artillery pay is exactly the same.

(*Mr. Walker.*) One Commanding Officer told us he tried to reduce the expenditure, and he was not supported by the War Office?—I do not know about that; I should doubt that statement.

(*Chairman.*) On the question of initial expenditure I have no doubt a great deal is due to ignorance, perhaps, of the men joining as to the actual necessary outfit; we had an instance the other day of a boy who joined a crack Cavalry regiment whose guardians were called upon to pay £1100 for the kit and chargers?—By the regiment?

That was the cost of the outfit—£1100?—Of course it is

excessive. What we are doing now with regard to the uniform is, that the full dress is not very much altered, but as to the mess dress we make it the same for the Cavalry and Artillery as it is for the Infantry, a plain jacket and vest without any gold braid or ornament of any description, doing away with the gold lace on overalls and things of that sort. You must, I suppose, have an attractive uniform of some sort for Cavalrymen, and you do not want to alter that, but all the rest we are making as cheap as we can. I only signed the paper yesterday suggesting these changes, which, I think, will help materially to reduce the expenses, and, of course, it is possible to make the charger business compulsory in the Cavalry.

In the junior ranks?—Yes. It is not compulsory in the Field Artillery, but optional.

A boy can draw a charger in the Cavalry by paying so much for it?—Yes, undoubtedly, but in the Field Artillery you have a horse given you, it belongs to Government, and is merely kept as your own horse while you are in the battery; it belongs to the battery really.

I labour this point rather because in the evidence we have had before us some commanding officers of Cavalry regiments expressed their preference for such an arrangement, and said that their boys learned their drill very much better if on a steady charger instead of breaking in their own charger and looking after it all the time?—Yes.

(*Sir Michael Foster.*) If that were done would not that still further reduce the necessary private means even below the £300 you spoke of, if the charger were given to the officer by the Government? One witness told us that really all the private means went in horses?—I suppose that means polo ponies and expenses of that sort.

(*Captain Lee.*) I think it meant extravagance which sprang from the association with horses.

(*Sir Michael Foster.*) It went in horses, including, it seemed to me, what he had to pay for his own charger.

(*Chairman.*) As to the polo ponies, I fancy there is a good deal of difference between the encouragement of polo tournaments and the playing of polo; I take it that we are all in favour of playing polo, which no doubt gives an officer nerve and improves his horsemanship, but does not necessarily

entail a very heavy cost upon him, and what mounts up the cost is the one regiment competing against the other, and buying polo ponies at £400 or £500 apiece in order to have something better to win the tournament with?—In India they stopped polo tournaments, and I asked General Luck whether it had in any way interfered with playing polo, and he said, No, it had not, that they stopped the tournaments because they were found so expensive moving about the country, and they entailed other expenses as well.

(*Dr. Warre.*) Moving was one of the things one witness told us caused a very great expense?—Of course it is an expense.

He said that for Cavalry officers that was a very serious expense, and he advocated some system of valuation just as they have at college, the things being passed on, and he also suggested that the Government should provide lodgings?—Furniture, you mean?

There might be a great deal done in that way to lessen the expense?—I daresay there might.

(*Captain Lee.*) On the question of the chargers, I may point out that one of the Colonels commanding Cavalry regiments said that unless it was made compulsory to take the chargers it would be impossible to carry the system out, and he advocated its being made compulsory?—For the junior officers.

Would you see any objection to that?—No, and I doubt, if you do not make it compulsory, whether it would be done.

He said that if left to their discretion, it would not be done?—In the Horse Artillery it is not done.

But for the Horse Artillery as well, would it not be well to have it compulsory?—I have never heard any complaint in the Horse Artillery, but I do not believe it would be done unless it were made compulsory throughout.

XI.—EXTRACTS FROM CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE NORTH SEA INCIDENT

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

For Instructions, see No. II

NO. 1.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C. HARDINGE

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 24, 1904.

We have just received information that the Russian Baltic fleet on the night of the 21st instant suddenly, and without the slightest warning, fired upon the *Gamecock* steam fishing fleet of Hull while engaged in fishing off the Dogger Bank in the North Sea. Several vessels belonging to the fishing fleet are reported missing, and it is impossible to ascertain at present the total number of casualties, but it is known that at least one vessel was sunk and two persons killed, besides a number seriously wounded.

The whole action would seem to have been of the most deliberate character. It is stated that signals were made ordering the fleet to change formation, after which fire was opened, and maintained for a considerable time; that when firing ceased, the Russian fleet, without making the slightest attempt to save life or to ascertain the amount of damage they had done, continued their voyage; that one small vessel remained on the scene of the occurrence for about six hours, and then also, without making any effort to save life, steamed after the fleet.

All the distinguishing lights required by international regulations, with which the Russian naval authorities are presumably well acquainted, were burning on the fishing vessels, which were lit up by the searchlights of the Russian squadron.

The fact that these vessels could have been mistaken for anything but what they were—namely, a peaceful fishing fleet engaged in their ordinary occupations—can only have been due to the most culpable negligence.

You should inform Count Lamsdorff of what has occurred, and say that the indignation provoked by this incident cannot possibly be exaggerated. The action of the Russian Commanding Officer in leaving the scene of the disaster without offering assistance has aggravated this feeling, as before his voyage was resumed he must have known that his fleet had fired upon and seriously injured innocent and defenceless fishermen.

The matter is one which admits of no delay. His Majesty's Government prefer not to formulate their demands until the explanations, which no doubt the Russian Government will hasten to lay before them, have been received, but it will be their duty to require ample apology and complete and prompt reparation, as well as security against the recurrence of such intolerable incidents.

**No. 2.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received October 24)**

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, October 24, 1904.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs state that they have received no official information of the incident, which, however, they deeply regret, and that full reparation will be given if the information published in the press is confirmed.

The same language is used by the Ministry of Marine.

**No. 3.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received October 25)**

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, October 25, 1904.

A message from the Emperor has just been brought to this Embassy by Count Lamsdorff to the following effect:—

No report has reached His Majesty from Admiral Rojestvensky, and he can therefore only consider that the unfortunate accident which has taken place off the Dogger Bank must be attributed to an unfortunate misunderstanding.

The Emperor is, however, anxious, in view of the sad loss of life which has taken place, to convey to His Majesty the King and to His Majesty's Government his sincere regrets at the occurrence; His Majesty will take the necessary measures of reparation to the sufferers as soon as a clear account is given of the circumstances in which the incident occurred.

Count Lamsdorff added that the incident appeared to him incomprehensible, and begged me to express his sincere regrets to your Lordship.

**NO. 4.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE***

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 25, 1904.*

SIR,—The Russian Ambassador arrived in London last night, and asked me to receive him this morning. He told me that he had not yet received any instructions from the Russian Government with regard to the North Sea incident. It was, indeed, almost impossible that he should have received such instructions, for he understood that, although the occurrence had taken place on the night of the 21st instant, we had not heard of it until yesterday, and the Russian Government could scarcely have heard of it sooner. His Excellency added that he had already telegraphed to St. Petersburg, and that he felt sure that the deepest regret would be felt and expressed in Russia by the Emperor, the Government, and, indeed, every one throughout the country. He would take upon himself to say that no difficulty would be experienced in regard to the question of compensation. The question of responsibility was more complicated. It would be difficult to establish without a full report from the naval authorities, and this might take time; but I might depend upon it that no pains would be spared to ascertain where the blame lay.

I told His Excellency that the Prime Minister had arrived from Scotland this morning, and that I was to confer with him immediately, and that it might, in the circumstances, be better that I should not at this moment present to him anything purporting to be a full and complete statement

* Substance telegraphed.

of our demands. It seemed to me, however, self-evident that they would fall under the following heads :—

We should, in the first place, expect an ample apology and disclaimer from the Russian Government.

In the second place, I could not doubt that they would offer the fullest reparation to the sufferers. I assumed that upon these two points there could be no room for doubt.

Thirdly, it would be indispensable that a searching inquiry should be instituted with a view to ascertaining who was to blame for what, if the circumstances were as stated, could only be regarded, not only as a blunder, but as a culpable blunder.

As to this, I thought we should be justified in asking that we should be given an opportunity of satisfying ourselves that the case of the sufferers was properly put forward and taken into consideration by the Court. It followed that we should expect the adequate punishment of the persons, whoever they might be, who proved to be responsible. But, besides this, it would no doubt be our duty to satisfy ourselves that security was given to us against a repetition of such incidents. The only defence as yet put forward, and indeed the only conceivable defence, was that the Russian naval officers had *bond fide* believed that these innocent fishermen were Japanese agents in disguise. The Russian fleet had acted upon this assumption, in spite of the fact that the trawling fleet was upon ground which it habitually frequented, and displayed all the signals required by the international regulations in force. If, in such circumstances, innocent people were fired upon, on the assumption that they were Japanese in disguise, who would be safe, and what was to prevent the Russian fleet, during its long journey to the Far East, from carrying death and destruction with it throughout its course ?

Count Benckendorff said that he felt sure that no difficulty would arise, either as regards the question of apology or as to that of compensation. As he had already said, every effort would be made to place the responsibility for these acts upon the right shoulders, and he saw no reason why we should not be given a full opportunity of bringing forward such evidence as seemed to us material. With regard to the recurrence of such incidents, he could not himself believe

that it was possible, but he felt sure that the Russian Government would be ready to take every precaution to guard against it, and to issue instructions that for the future any suspicious cases should be dealt with with the greatest circumspection.

I again impressed upon His Excellency the need of prompt action by the Russian Government, which would relieve us from the duty of taking our own measures for guarding against a repetition of such acts. His Excellency promised to telegraph the substance of my observations to the Russian Government. I am, etc.,

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

NO. 5.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE

(*Telegraphic.*)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 27, 1904.*

Following telegram was addressed by Admiral Rojestvensky from Vigo at 9.50 p.m. yesterday to Captain Bostroem, Naval Attaché, Russian Embassy:—

“The North Sea incident was occasioned by the action of two torpedo-boats which steamed at full speed under cover of the night, and showing no lights, towards the ship which was leading our detachment. It was only after our searchlights had been turned on that it was remarked that a few small steam craft bearing a resemblance to trawlers were present.

“The detachment made every effort to spare these craft, and ceased firing as soon as the torpedo-boats had disappeared from sight.

“The Russian detachment did not include any torpedo-destroyers, and no Russian vessel of any kind was left behind upon the scene of the incident. It follows that the vessel which is declared to have remained in the neighbourhood of the small fishing boats until daylight must have been one of the two enemy's torpedo-boats, which had only sustained some injuries, the other one having been sunk.

“Our ships refrained from giving assistance to the trawlers on account of their apparent complicity, which they manifested by their persistence in attempting to pass through our line.

"Some of these trawlers did not show their navigation lights for a long time, and others not at all."

NO. 6.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE

(*Telegraphic.*)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 27, 1904.*

My telegram of to-day.

I have told Russian Ambassador officially that we are wholly unable to accept Admiral's explanation, and that it will certainly not carry conviction in this country. I have informed him of our demands, which are as follows :—

1. Before Russian fleet leaves Vigo, inquiry to be made by Russian authorities as to persons responsible for attack on fishing fleet. All these to be left behind, as well as any others whose testimony is essential to elucidation of facts.

2. A full inquiry to be held at once as to the facts by an independent Court with an international character. Procedure might be that laid down in Articles IX. to XIV. of Hague Convention, and Commission might be formed of naval officers of high rank representing the two Powers concerned and, say, three others.

3. Russian Government to undertake to punish adequately any persons found guilty by Commission.

In reply to a question by him, I said that, if these demands were conceded, acute character of crisis would disappear, as Russian Government had already expressed their deep regret, promised liberal compensation, and undertaken to prevent recurrence of similar incidents.

NO. 7.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(*Received October 28*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

ST. PETERSBURGH, *October 28, 1904.*

I received at 9 a.m. this morning from Count Lamsdorff a letter, of which the following is a résumé :—

Admiral Rojestvensky's telegrams will be published in the press to-day.

Minister of Marine, being anxious to throw as much light as possible on the North Sea incident, has ordered the Admiral

to remain at Vigo with those ships by whom it was witnessed. It is hoped that no objection will be raised by the Spanish Government to the prolongation of their stay in Spanish waters.

The Admiral's detailed reports, which have been sent by post, can only reach St. Petersburg in four or five days.

Letter concludes as follows :—

I am absolutely convinced that, with a firm intention to clear up the question with a spirit of calm, good faith, and a spirit of mutual conciliation, we shall not fail to find practical means of settling to general satisfaction the great difficulties temporarily created by the contradictory depositions and the great amount of time involuntarily lost.

**No. 8.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received October 28)**

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, *October 28, 1904.*

Following telegram has been despatched to Russian Ambassador in London :—

(Translation)

“Being desirous of throwing as much light as possible on all that has occurred in the North Sea, the Emperor thinks it would be useful to refer the question for careful investigation to an International Commission of Inquiry, as contemplated by the Hague Convention. By order of His Majesty your Excellency is requested to propose this method of solution to the Government of His Britannic Majesty.”

In communicating the above to me, Count Lamsdorff expressed the hope that this proposal of the Emperor would be well received in England.

**No. 9.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received October 28.)**

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, *October 28, 1904.*

Your Lordship's telegram of yesterday.

In the course of a long interview which I have just had with Count Lamsdorff, his Excellency said that he gladly recognised

your Lordship's attitude as a proof of your readiness to accept the Emperor's proposal for an International Court of Inquiry; the details of the composition and procedure of the Court, which, he thinks, should be as far as possible simplified, may be discussed as soon as news reaches him that the proposal has been formally accepted. The squadron has received instructions not to leave Vigo, and orders will be sent that the officers who were in the best position to judge the actual circumstances of the attack are to be detached from it.

As for the question of punishment, Count Lamsdorff stated that he could not admit the guilt of any Russian officer until the results of the inquiry were known; it would then be time to apportion responsibilities and their consequences on whomsoever they might be found to fall. He therefore declined to discuss this now.

He attributed to the careful moderation of your Lordship's language the peaceful tone which the discussion had taken, at which he expressed great satisfaction. The deepest resentment would have been produced here by any symptom of menace, and the result would have been a war which would have disgraced the civilisation of the twentieth century.

**NO. 10.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE**

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 28, 1904.

Your Excellency's telegram of to-day.

The text of Count Lamsdorff's proposal was communicated to me by the Russian Ambassador after the meeting of the Cabinet.

I told his Excellency that the Emperor's proposal had already been carefully considered by the Cabinet, and was in accord with the suggestion I had made to him on behalf of His Majesty's Government yesterday. It, however, left certain sides of the question untouched. Mr. Balfour was to deliver a speech at Southampton this evening, and I, therefore, asked his Excellency whether I had his sanction to authorise the Prime Minister to make a statement to the following effect :—

The Emperor and the Russian Government, on hearing of the incident, at once expressed their profound regret. Liberal compensation was promised.

The part of the fleet concerned has been detained at Vigo, so that it may be possible to ascertain the responsible officers, who, together with any material witnesses, will not be allowed to proceed with the fleet.

An inquiry will be instituted into the facts, such inquiry to be held by an International Commission of the kind contemplated by the Hague Convention. Any persons found guilty will be tried by the Russian Government and punished adequately.

Instructions will be issued by the Russian Government, so as to secure neutral commerce from risk of interference and prevent the repetition of such incidents.

Count Benckendorff said that I was at liberty to authorise Mr. Balfour to make a statement on these lines.

I entered a protest against the doctrine, which Admiral Rojestvensky was said to hold, that his officers were justified in firing on any boat that came near their ships, and I urged upon his Excellency the importance of special instructions being issued to the Admiral in the interests not only of British, but of neutral commerce of all nations.

No. 11.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE

(Telegraphic.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 31, 1904.*

I learn from the Russian Ambassador that the officers who would have to give evidence before the International Commission have been ordered to land at Vigo immediately. They will proceed, together with the Russian Commissioner, to the place of meeting of the Commission. Count Benckendorff informed me that under these circumstances there was no reason why the Russian ships should be detained any longer at Vigo.

In reply to this communication, I stated that His Majesty's Government must be satisfied on the following points :—

1. That instructions had actually been issued to the Russian fleet to avoid a recurrence of similar incidents.

2. Information as to the rank and position of the officers landed.

3. Settlement of terms of reference to the International Commission. His Majesty's Government consider it essential that the Commission should be authorised to apportion responsibility and blame.

Count Benckendorff expressed strong objection to these stipulations, but promised to telegraph them at once to his Government. You should point out to Count Lamsdorff the reasonableness of them.

His Excellency was particularly sensitive in regard to the question of punishment. I explained to him that the view of His Majesty's Government was that it would be for the Russian Government to inflict punishment, but that it was a necessary condition that the blame should be apportioned by the Commission. Moreover, as the defence set up by Russia impugns not only the conduct of the fishing fleet, but also the manner in which His Majesty's Government have observed neutrality, this stipulation cannot be considered one-sided.

NO. 12.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSLOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE

(*Telegraphic.*)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 31, 1904.*

Following is substance of proposed Agreement for terms of reference to International Commission :—

Preamble, after short recital of facts and damage done, states that two Governments agree that elucidation of questions in dispute shall be referred to an International Commission of Inquiry analogous to that provided for in Articles IX. to XIV. of Hague Convention, and that following Articles are agreed to :—

ARTICLE I. The Commission to consist of five members. Two to be officers of high rank in navies of Great Britain and Russia. France and the United States each to be asked to select one Commissioner, who is to be an officer of high rank in their respective navies. Fifth Commissioner to be selected by agreement between four above mentioned, and, if they cannot agree, choice is to be intrusted to King of (country not yet settled).

ARTICLE II. "The Commission shall inquire into and report upon all the circumstances attending the disaster in the North Sea, and particularly as to where the responsibility for the disaster lies, and the degree of blame which attaches to those upon whom that responsibility is found to rest."

ARTICLE III. provides that Commission shall settle in all respects procedure to be adopted.

ARTICLE IV. is an engagement by both Parties to supply Commission in fullest manner possible with all necessary means and facilities.

ARTICLE V. Commission to meet at Paris as soon as possible after signature of Agreement.

ARTICLE VI. Report of Commission to be communicated to each of the Parties.

Further provisions will probably be required with regard to—

1. Decision by majority.
2. Legal Assessors and Agents.
3. Division of expenses.

NO. 13.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(*Received November 2*)

(*Telegraphic.*) ST. PETERSBURGH, *November 2, 1904.*
North Sea incident.

I have given Count Lamsdorff a French translation of the six Articles of the proposed Agreement and of the last paragraph of your Lordship's telegram of the 31st ultimo.

The text did not tally exactly with that telegraphed by Count Benckendorff, but your Lordship's is accepted as the correct version.

Count Lamsdorff will submit it to the Emperor and Minister of Marine to-day.

NO. 14.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE

(*Telegraphic.*) FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 2, 1904.*

Russian Ambassador made following announcement to me yesterday :—

"Before the Russian Admiral left Vigo, special instructions

were given to him that the Russian fleet, during its voyage to the Far East, is to observe the utmost caution in order to avoid occasioning injury or inconvenience to any neutral shipping which they may encounter.

"The following Russian officers have been left behind at Vigo : Captain de Fregate Klado, Lieutenant Ellis, Lieutenant Shramtchenko, and Ensign Ott, these being the only officers whose presence the Russian Government consider material for the purpose of the inquiry."

NO. 15.—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO SIR C.
HARDINGE

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4, 1904.*

(Telegraphic.—Extract.)

Except for what depends on verbal misunderstandings, there seems now to be very little, if any, difference of opinion between the two Governments.

We are agreed :

1. That until the inquiry is concluded no blame should be attached to any one, still less that any punishment should be inflicted.

2. That the conduct of all persons concerned, and not merely that of Russian officers, should be made the subject of investigation.

3. That punishment should be inflicted according to law if, and when, the blame is proved.

4. We gather that the officers retained are not merely those qualified to act as witnesses, but the persons implicated.

An apparent misunderstanding of our use of the word "responsibility" seems to be causing the difficulty between us.

The International Tribunal alone can determine whether responsibility is equivalent to guilt or is in itself deserving of punishment.

We do not regard this as necessarily the case, but in our view the persons who are responsible are those on whom blame would fall, if blame there was.

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**No. 16.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received November 4)**

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, *November 4, 1904.*

Count Lamsdorff has just sent me a note announcing the acceptance in their entirety of the six Articles of the draft Convention communicated to him by Count Benckendorff and myself.

**No. 17.—COUNT BENCKENDORFF TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received November 5)**

(Translation)

LONDON, *November 5, 1904.*

DEAR LORD LANSDOWNE,—A telegram from Count Lamsdorff, received this morning, instructs me to inform the Government of His Britannic Majesty that the Imperial Government accept the proposals of the British Cabinet with regard to the constitution of the International Commission of Inquiry into the North Sea incident, which is to meet in Paris. Believe me, etc.,

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

**No. 18.—SIR C. HARDINGE TO THE MARQUESS OF
LANSDOWNE.—(Received November 5)**

(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURGH, *November 5, 1904.*

Count Lamsdorff carefully studied your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, which I read to him, and authorised me to inform your Lordship that the whole of it was acceptable to the Russian Government except the last paragraph.

I took the opportunity of telling His Excellency that English public opinion attached great significance to the detachment of so small a number of officers from the fleet, and to its subsequent departure from Vigo. He assured me that punishment would most certainly follow any eventual discovery that responsibility and blame rested either with these four officers or any others.

XII.—EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS OF THE ARMY, 1902

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

For *Instructions*, see No. IV

THE INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION OF ARMY CANDIDATES

Sources of Supply

The Committee have accepted, as a basis for their recommendations under this head, the principle that it is desirable to draw candidates for the Army from as wide an area as possible. Under existing regulations there are four main avenues, namely, Woolwich, Sandhurst, the Militia,—to which it is proposed to add the Yeomanry,—and the Universities, by any one of which the candidate for an Army commission can reach his goal. Among the Universities certain Colonial Universities are included, and a limited number of commissions are annually awarded to selected cadets educated at the Royal Military College at Kingston, Ontario. The Committee would lay stress on the advisability of adding to the number of commissions now offered to the Colonies, in the belief that such a course would not only supply the Army with officers of proved ability, but would add strength to the bonds already existing between the Colonies and the Mother Country. They, therefore, recommend that not less than 50 commissions should be offered annually to the Colonies.

Official Estimate of Future Requirements

For the consideration of the manner in which commissions should be allotted in order to attain this end, it was necessary

to have official information as to the probable number which would be vacant annually in future. With this object the War Office was applied to for an estimate, from which it appears that the future normal requirements of the Army may be taken to be about 800 officers annually, about 135 of which total will be required for the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery, the remainder for the Cavalry, the Guards, the Infantry of the Line, the West India Regiment, and the Indian Staff Corps.

If this estimate be correct, it is clear that Woolwich and Sandhurst alone, with their present combined output of 510 young officers annually, are quite unequal to meeting the requirements of the Service.

These demands cannot be met by passing all candidates through the Militia. In that case 800 officers would be drawn annually from the Militia after a three-years' course of instruction in that branch of the Service, including, as has been suggested, instruction at the School of Musketry and in Garrison Classes. Hence there would probably be at any one time about 4000 young officers in the Militia aspiring to Army commissions. In fact, the Militia and Yeomanry would be provided with a supply of subalterns far in excess of their requirements, and far greater than they could train properly. It would also be necessary to increase very largely the School of Musketry and its staff, and to employ a very large number of officers as garrison instructors for those months in the year during which the Militia officers were free to receive instruction. These instructors would require extra pay, and it would also be necessary to issue pay to all the candidates while undergoing training. A moment's reflection will show that the cost of such a scheme would be prohibitive.

Military Colleges to be retained

If, then, the Militia and Yeomanry are unequal to the task of providing all candidates for commissions, and if it be desirable, as urged by the late Adjutant-General and many other witnesses, to give all candidates a certain amount of technical training before sending them to their regiments, it is not easy to see any alternative to the maintenance of Woolwich and Sandhurst.

Many witnesses have stated that it is impossible, under our present system, to give adequate military training in the units, more especially in the units at home. The fact must not be lost sight of, that in time of war the young men undergoing training in the Military Colleges and in the Militia form practically our only reserve of subalterns. It is, therefore, essential that provision should be made for giving them as complete a military training as possible before they receive their commissions. During the present war no less than 454 young officers have gone straight to the front from the Military Colleges and the Militia, exclusive of those officers of Militia who went to South Africa with their regiments. Of this number, 207 went from Woolwich and Sandhurst, whereas if these colleges had not been in existence, these young men would have been sent into the field without any previous Military training.

There are other arguments for the retention of the Military Colleges, which appear to have influenced the Committee which, in 1888, sat under the presidency of Lord Harris to consider this question. This may be inferred from the following quotations from their Report:—"The evidence we have taken convinces us that to do away with these State-aided establishments would be shortsighted, and not in the truest sense economical. In the case of the Royal Military College and the Royal Military Academy the cadets receive an insight into, and a training for, regimental life, which must be of advantage not only to themselves, but to the Service at large. Further, the experience they gain whilst cadets of the discipline, routine, and administrative details of regimental life, must save a certain amount of supervision by senior regimental officers, and should produce a corresponding gain of time to these latter for more advanced Military duties.

"It is held in some quarters that the State need not expend a penny in training young gentlemen to officer the British Army; that private enterprise would produce the supply, however difficult the examination, and that the State aid so saved would be better spent on the Army itself. But we venture to differ from this opinion. We do not think it is sufficient to look solely at an officer's theoretical acquirements on being commissioned. We believe that the habits

of discipline, of obedience to regulations and to orders, are more surely acquired at establishments which are conducted on Military principles than at those of a private character, and that the result is beneficial to the officers themselves and to the Service they join."

The arguments in favour of the retention of Sandhurst are further strengthened by the nature of the replies received from Commanding Officers. Out of 87 replies to the question whether they preferred the Sandhurst trained cadet to the young officer from the Militia, no less than 50 show a strong preference for the cadet, and only 17 for the Militia officer, the remainder considering that there is but little to choose between them. All the arguments which may be used in favour of the retention of Sandhurst apply with even greater force to Woolwich. It would be impossible to give either in the Militia, in private establishments, or in units of Artillery or Engineers at home, that continuous and progressive Military and scientific training through which cadets are passed at the Royal Military Academy.

Hence, after due consideration of all these points, the Committee recommend that Woolwich and Sandhurst should be retained. In recommending that these establishments should be retained, however, the Committee must not be held to express themselves as satisfied with their existing organisation or administration, subjects which will be dealt with later.

It has been already pointed out, that it is impossible to officer the Army entirely from the Militia; it is equally impossible to pass all candidates for commissions through Sandhurst and Woolwich. The utmost capacity of these establishments at the present moment may be taken to be about 300 at Woolwich and about 400 at Sandhurst. If the course at Woolwich be maintained at its present length of two years, and the cadets at Sandhurst be commissioned after eighteen months—the normal length of the course before the war—the annual output of the two combined will never exceed 410, which will leave no less than 390 to be obtained from outside. This latter number appears to the Committee to be larger than is desirable, and for this reason they would strongly urge the necessity for enlarging both Woolwich and Sandhurst, so as to provide accommodation for an increased

number of cadets, and for eventually extending the Sandhurst course to two years.

Extension of Sandhurst Course

The Committee have been strongly impressed by the mass of evidence in favour of a two-years' course at the Royal Military College. Practically all the Military witnesses are in favour of such a course, in which such subjects as Musketry, Signalling, and the elements of Veterinary Science—for Cavalry cadets—which in the present short course have to be entirely neglected, would be included. A consideration of the evidence on this subject establishes the conclusion that the present course of one year is insufficient, even though the present vacations should be curtailed, and that it will be decidedly in the interests of the Service to extend the course of instruction to two years.

The Committee, whilst strongly of opinion that the Sandhurst course should be extended to two years, are not prepared, in view of the financial considerations involved, to insist that this should be done at once. They trust, however, that, when circumstances permit, funds will be provided for the erection of additional accommodation at Sandhurst sufficient to enable not less than 650 cadets to be received at one time, thus permitting the course to be extended to two years. As regards the length of the Woolwich course, the Committee have no suggestions to offer, the majority of witnesses being satisfied with the present length of course—two years,—an opinion in which the Committee concur.

University Candidates

Another source of supply from which desirable Army candidates have been obtained, and may, in future, under improved regulations, be obtained in considerably greater numbers, exists in the Universities. Though it might be supposed that University candidates, many of whom have received practically no military training before joining their regiments, would not be regarded with approval by the Military authorities, the expression of opinion in their favour is practically unanimous.

The Committee have been much impressed by the readiness with which the great Universities of the United Kingdom

have professed their willingness to make such alterations in their courses of study as may be considered desirable by the Military authorities, stipulating only that the number of commissions offered to University candidates should be increased, and that there should be some finality about the amended regulations.

With the existing regulations the Universities have good reason to be dissatisfied. The period during which a candidate resides at the Universities is so short that he can hardly claim to be a University man at all. This is pointed out by all the witnesses from the Universities, and no evidence in favour of continuing the existing system was placed before the Committee.

As regards the course of instruction which the Universities would be prepared to provide for Army candidates, the general sense of the evidence may be summed up by stating that the Universities are prepared to work up to any standard laid down by the War Office, their candidates being judged by results. The Committee were favourably impressed by a scheme put forward by Cambridge University, under which the course of instruction of the Army candidate would be directed by a "Board of Military Studies," on which Board the Military authorities would be represented by the Adjutant of the University Volunteer Battalion, and by an officer nominated by the authority at the War Office responsible for Military Education. Under this scheme an important part would be played by the University Volunteer Battalion, which would be remodelled, with a view to making it an instructional battalion, with facilities for giving instruction in the duties of all three arms. Oxford, on the other hand, while willing to accept and to work up to any standard laid down by the War Office, seemed not to favour the creation of a school of purely Military instruction at the University. Trinity College, Dublin, like Cambridge, is prepared to form a school of Military Instruction, provided that the students are given facilities by the Military authorities to receive a certain amount of technical training with the regiments of the Dublin garrison.

Sir Henry Craik, representing the Scotch Universities, would insist on some form of Military training, whether in an Instructional Battalion or University Volunteer Battalion,

being provided by all Universities aspiring to send candidates into the Army. There is thus a general consensus of opinion among the witnesses, that the University candidates for the Army should be required to graduate or pass some other adequate test of their general educational fitness, and should receive some form of Military and technical instruction before being commissioned.

With reference to the possibility of efficient Military instruction being given at the Universities, the majority of military witnesses are inclined to believe that this ought to be done in cases where the University authorities are prepared to co-operate. It is eminently desirable that the Universities should be encouraged to organise schools of Military Instruction, but, without some efficient system of inspection, or the institution of something in the nature of a competitive test between the candidates from different Universities, there would be great difficulty in attaining a uniform standard.

This matter cannot be decided without a reference to the relative merits of a system of nomination as opposed to one of competition pure and simple. On this subject there is a diversity of opinion among the Universities themselves, Cambridge and Trinity College, Dublin, desiring nomination, while Oxford deprecates any such system, on the grounds that it "would entirely break down if made a permanent system." Sir Henry Craik appears to be somewhat of the same opinion, and advocates competition between the different Scotch Universities for such commissions as might be offered to them by the War Office.

In view of the general agreement that University candidates should be required to attain some proficiency in Military subjects, it appears to be very doubtful whether a system of nomination, each University being allotted a fixed number of commissions, would work for the good of the Service. The Military instruction at one University might be much more efficient than at another, the qualifying tests might be more severe, yet its candidates would obtain no advantage over the less efficiently instructed candidates nominated by other Universities. Were the principle of open competition, which is recognised in every other examination for the public service, adopted, a decided encouragement would be given to each University to make its Military education as thorough and

efficient as possible. Their teaching, in fact, would be judged by results, and candidates would select that University which succeeded in passing the greatest number of its pupils. The Committee therefore recommend that the candidates from approved Universities, as defined in Appendix B., should compete in a Military competitive examination.

As to the number of commissions in the Army which might be annually set aside for University candidates, the Committee would draw attention to the necessity of giving time for the new system to come into operation before offering any large number of commissions. This is urged by the representatives of the Universities themselves, who realise that the results would very possibly be indifferent if a large number of University candidates were accepted without having gone through the course of training which is recommended. Moreover, it will take time to organise an efficient school of Military Instruction, and the first products of such a school are not likely to be as satisfactory as the men turned out when the teachers and examiners have profited by a few years' experience.

It will, therefore, be advisable not to offer at once the full number which may subsequently be given, but to begin with a smaller number, increasing this as circumstances demand. If the evidence be examined it will be seen that the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford, Trinity College, Dublin, and the Scotch Universities, will be able before very long to furnish together over 100 candidates, at a low estimate. Universities other than the above may also be expected to avail themselves of the opportunities offered. The Committee, therefore, recommend that for the present not more than 90 commissions in the Guards, Cavalry, Line, and Indian Staff Corps, and 10 commissions in the Royal Artillery, be offered annually for competition between the Universities, these numbers being increased in future years as may be required.

Militia and Yeomanry Candidates

The remaining source of supply from which Army candidates can be drawn is the Militia—in future the Militia and Yeomanry. There is very little to be said in favour of a system which makes the oldest constitutional force in the kingdom a mere feeder for the regular Army, with the inevitable result

that, in times of emergency, Militia battalions are first stripped of their best officers and men and, thus depleted, sent on active service. The evidence of the Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces forcibly illustrates the unfortunate results which follow from a continuance of the present system. On the other hand, it is clear from the evidence of the same witness, and from that of all the Militia Commanding Officers examined by the Committee, that the difficulty of officering the Militia would be insuperable if the system of making the commissioned ranks an avenue to a Line commission were abandoned. Such is, in fact, the condition of the force that the junior ranks have to be almost entirely filled by young men who obtain commissions merely with a view to spending as short a time as possible with their Militia units on their way to the Line, while a large proportion of the senior officers are obtained by compelling officers who wish to retire from the Army to spend a certain time in the Militia.

This being the case, the Committee are compelled to acquiesce in the continuance of this system in spite of the many serious objections to which it is open. It is possible, however, to remove many of the blemishes which now disfigure it.

The chief of these consists in the fact that, for eight months in his first year, and eleven months in subsequent years, the young officer of Militia is left to his own resources to pick up those elements of technical knowledge in which he is examined before he can obtain his Line commission. It is true that the Committee have been informed that the War Office encourages young officers of Militia to attend the courses of instruction at the School of Musketry and the School of Signalling, but owing to limited accommodation and other causes the number of officers who avail themselves of these facilities appears to be comparatively small.

Various suggestions have been made as to the manner in which a remedy might be found for this state of things, such expedients as attaching officers to Line battalions for a course of company training, or sending them to instructional or provisional battalions being recommended by different witnesses. A suggestion has also been made that some means might be found of combining a Militia with a University training. This has been generally approved, but the majority of witnesses would hesitate to compel the University candidate

to join the Militia, or the Militia candidate to enter the University. The Committee consequently are unable to recommend any form of compulsion, though they believe that it is expedient to encourage as much as possible a connection between the Militia and the Universities, and have been influenced by this belief in the preparation of their scheme.

Of this scheme full details are given in Appendix C.* It is consequently sufficient to explain here that all Militia and Yeomanry candidates for the Army would be required to serve for not less than two trainings, and to be attached for not less than four months in each of two consecutive years to units of that branch of the Service for which they are candidates. During this period the candidates should be put through a course of company field training, of squadron training, or of gunnery instruction, according to their arm of the Service, and in addition should be required to fire a course of musketry, and to pass out of the third class, being allowed to repeat the course if necessary for this purpose.

Those Militia candidates who are members of a University maintaining an approved Instructional Battalion or School of Military Instruction, should be permitted to receive their technical military training, apart from their annual Militia training, with such Battalion, or in such School, provided always that, in the case of candidates for Cavalry and Artillery commissions, such Battalions or School has been accepted by the War Office as competent to give the necessary training in the duties of the mounted arm or in artillery drills and exercises, as the case may be.

The question of the age at which it should be possible to obtain commissions in the Militia requires some consideration. At present this age is 17, and the balance of opinion among those Commanding Officers of Militia who have been examined on this point appears to be in favour of raising this minimum to 18. It has been pointed out that young men of 17 are too young to have completed their general education, and there are many and various objections to allowing young officers of Militia to return to school during the non-training period. When a young man joins the Militia his school days should be over; therefore, the Committee recommend that

* Not printed.

the age of entry to the Militia should, in future, be not less than 18.

It is therefore recommended that all subaltern officers of Militia and Yeomanry, provided that they have qualified at the entrance examination for Sandhurst and Woolwich, or have graduated or passed such test as may be accepted by the University authorities, and who can produce the certificates of Military proficiency specified in Appendix C., shall be entitled to compete for commissions in the regular Army at the Military competitive examination. This examination should be framed on a syllabus, the outlines of which will be found in Appendix C., and should correspond, as nearly as possible, with the passing out examination from the Military College.

The Committee do not recommend that any limit of age should be fixed above which Militia and University candidates should be debarred from competing for Army commissions, nor do they propose to limit the number of times a candidate may enter for the competition. It will naturally be to the interest of candidates to obtain their commissions at as early an age as possible, but no object is served by closing the door to older men who may wish to serve in the Army for a few years, provided that they are otherwise qualified.

Physical Tests

The question of the imposition of a physical test for all Army candidates has received due consideration. With the exception of Colonel Fox, every Military witness has expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with the physique of the young officer. Under these circumstances it would appear to be unnecessary to impose any physical tests which might introduce undesirable complications into the existing system of examination.

XIII.—EXTRACTS FROM SOMALILAND DESPATCHES

(Time allowed, 1½ hours)

For Instructions, see No. II

No. 1. — FROM REAR-ADMIRAL G. L. ATKINSON-WILLES,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIES STATION, TO AD-
MIRALTY

Hyacinth, AT ILLIG, 23rd April 1904.

SIR,—Be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that on receipt of their Lordships' telegram of the 13th April, I consulted with Commadore T. Bixio, Italian Senior Officer at Aden, and he informed me that as his engines were under repair, he had placed the Italian sloop *Volturmo* at my disposal. I accordingly requested him to send her to Berbera to await my arrival.

2. After coaling, I proceeded in my flagship to Berbera, and held a consultation with Major-General Sir Charles Egerton. At his request I embarked 125 rank and file of the 1st Bn. Hampshire Regiment, under the command of Major S. C. F. Jackson, D.S.O., to garrison Illig when captured. They were distributed as follows: 25 in *Mohawk*, and 100 to *Hyacinth*, with their followers, and eight military Officers. On meeting *Fox*, 50 of the troops in *Hyacinth* were transferred to her.

3. I ordered *Mohawk* to leave Berbera at 5 p.m. on the 16th for Illig, and to anchor off the Gullule River at 5.30 p.m. on the 20th, displaying lights after dark to enable me to anchor *Hyacinth* and *Fox* on *Mohawk*, and to serve as a blind to prevent the Dervish garrison at Illig from knowing of our arrival.

4. *Volturmo* arrived off Illig at daylight on the 21st, as I had requested, and after watching our force disembark, anchored off Illig in the position I had given her previously.

5. I wish here to acknowledge the loyal co-operation that I have received from Commander Stanislav Lorrechio, Royal Italian Navy, and beg that it may be brought to the notice of the Italian Government.

6. *Hyacinth* and *Fox* arrived off Cape Bowen at 6.30 p.m. on the 20th, and took a departure for the Gullule River, without displaying any lights, anchoring at 9.52 p.m. in $5\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms, close to *Mohawk* and opposite landing-place.

7. It is due to Commander Harry Jones, of H.M. ship *Pomone*, who made such an excellent plan of the place in November 1902, that I was able to anchor first *Mohawk*, and then *Hyacinth* and *Fox* in this position.

8. At 4.30 a.m. on Thursday, the 21st April, the boats of the *Mohawk* made a feint to land on Middle Beach (a little strip of sand about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to the north-west of Illig Village), as a Dervish picket was seen there, and I wished their attention taken off the real landing near the entrance of the Gullule River.

9. At dawn (about 5 a.m.) Captain Hood, in charge of the advance party of seamen and marines of the *Hyacinth* and one Maxim, landed with his men and proceeded unopposed to seize the plateau above the south bank of the river. To do this I had ordered them to march up the gorge formed by the river to the road described by Commander Jones in his report quoted above. They took up a position on the plateau at about 1000 yards from the landing-place.

10. The disembarkation proceeded as rapidly as possible, boats returning for the rest of the landing party as soon as cleared. Owing to an increasing surf, none but the advance party got on shore without being wet up to the waist, and some up to their necks.

11. The landing, therefore, took two hours, being accomplished without accident, except that *Fox's* cutter was temporarily swamped.

12. I landed at 5.40 a.m., and at once climbed the cliffs, all subsequent parties doing the same.

13. On arrival on the plateau I established myself on the left, while Captain Hood with his party held the right. As the men came up they took up their positions as I had previously ordered, and as soon as all were placed I gave the order to advance. A few Dervish scouts were observed to be watching

our movements, but on finding us in strength they retired to their works on the heights above Illig village.

14. After marching about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles we came to some rising ground, and our scouts reported that the enemy had retired to his zarebas and stone forts or towers, which soon afterwards came into sight.

15. The Hampshires were ordered to halt, whilst Captain Hood was directed to move to the right, reinforcing the fighting line with the reserves, and then to throw the right forward. When this movement was completed, the Hampshires with one Maxim were on the enemy's right flank, and the line extended across the enemy's rear and overlapped his works.

16. The force was then halted for a short rest.

17. Whilst halted, the Dervishes in their position were blowing horns and shouting defiance, and I am pleased to say that during this time we observed women and children fleeing to safety.

18. On moving forward the enemy opened fire, and as we got within 250 yards the firing became very brisk, and in addition to the rifle fire an old gun discharged canister at the advancing line.

19. The men advanced in splendid order, and it was a pretty sight as seen from my position on the left and directing flank.

20. The fire became very hot on both sides, but the men would not be denied, advancing in short rushes. When about 100 yards from the works, Captain Hood gave the order to charge, when the Hampshires and the whole body of seamen and marines dashed at the zarebas, and turned out the enemy in the most gallant style. Small parties of Dervishes held the two stone forts obstinately, and caused several casualties before they were overpowered.

21. The Maxims were brought to bear on the flying Dervishes, and many were killed and wounded; 58 corpses were afterwards found, and several wounded received medical attention. The British and Italian flags were hoisted on the wall of the zareba.

22. Such close fighting, and the subsequent fighting in the village and caves, caused us to have some casualties, and I regret that the men named on the list were killed and wounded.

23. When at 9.45 a.m. the enemy broke and fled, many of them took shelter in caves on the cliff sides and huts in the village; and whilst our wounded were being embarked the Dervishes fired at them from these caves and huts.

24. I enclose Captain Hood's short narrative, as after the line extended he was some distance on the right. (Enclosure No. 2.)

25. I ordered the caves to be cleared and the huts set on fire. Captain Hood superintended this work with seamen and marines of *Hyacinth*, and it was not completed until 11.30 a.m.

26. During this operation Captain Hood, with Mr. Arthur G. Onslow, Midshipman, and No. Po/9146, John Edward Flowers, Corporal, Royal Marine Light Infantry, of *For*, entered a cave from which they were fired at, and cleared it in a hand-to-hand fight.

27. The four Maxims were carried by their crews, and the way in which they kept up with the line was wonderful.

28. The companies were very well led, and their fire was well under control, especially in *Hyacinth*, Nos. 1 and 2 Companies.

29. The sun was hot, but not a man lagged or fell out, and the gallant manner in which they stormed the works gave me great satisfaction.

30. The conduct of all Officers and men was splendid, and for a short time the fire was pretty hot.

31. I cannot close this letter without mentioning that the landing was effected under some difficulty, owing to the surf, in a satisfactory manner, and without accident.

32. I have reported in a separate letter to the General Officer Commanding in Somaliland on the good work done by the Hampshires and the military Officers sent by him with my concurrence, but I may here state that having 125 such old and seasoned troops was a great comfort to me, and that I was very glad to have their assistance, more especially that of Major S. C. F. Jackson, D.S.O., Commanding the detachment of the 1st Hampshire Regiment, and Captain R. G. Munn, A.D.C. to the General Officer Commanding, who was sent by the General Officer Commanding as Military Adviser to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and to transmit my orders to the military units.

His experiences of Somali tactics made the advice he suggested to me of great value. He formed part of my personal Staff.

33. I intend to entirely demolish Illig as a fortified place, with the caves adjacent, for there is not any doubt that it is much too formidable a stronghold to be held by any natives. I was quite surprised at the natural strength which had been skilfully added to by works during the last south-west monsoon by the Mullah and his Adviser, Haji Sudi, late interpreter of the *Ranger*.

An attack from the beach opposite Illig Village must have been disastrous, even if it did not fail, owing to the natural advantages possessed by the defence. I have, &c.,

GEORGE L. ATKINSON-WILLES,
Commander-in-Chief.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.—CAPTAIN HON. H. L. A. HOOD TO
REAR-ADMIRAL ATKINSON-WILLES.

Hyacinth, AT ILLIG, 21st April 1904.

SIR,—I have the honour to report my personal movements during the capture of Illig, leaving out, according to your orders, details of organisation and general recommendations, and confining myself to what I actually saw.

1. *Landing in the dusk*.—It was too dark to make out clearly the beach, but the white surf breaking on the sand showed up in contrast to the black rocks in time for the boats to be turned and anchored; and the advance party disembarked expeditiously and lined the beach under cover, till sufficient were ashore to advance. The place chosen was the actual mouth of the river. Men were wet up to their waist, and in some cases up to the neck.

2. *Crowning the heights*.—The advance party moved off up the river, clambering up on the left bank, then crossing on to the right bank, and up to the level of the cliffs, by which time they were about a mile inland. No enemy were sighted, though the bed of the river had been recently visited.

A position was taken up which was in view of the ship, of the landing beach, and of most of the pathway up.

When all were assembled, the force moved over towards you, then on the top of the cliffs overlooking the sea.

3. *Detachment of Naval Brigade to the right.*—In accordance with your orders, the Naval Brigade were detached to make a detour to the right, so as to envelop the defences of Illig.

They moved off in fours, under my orders, and, when well round, advanced towards the sea (and Illig), and halted when the left flank of the Marines was abreast of the Hampshires.

No men had fallen out, and the carriage of the Maxim guns and ammunition boxes was a marvellous performance of dogged courage.

4. *Closing on Illig.*—The advance was directed by the left, and on fire being opened by the enemy, the advance continued steadily, until the Hampshires opened fire, when fire commenced all along the line of the Naval Brigade, who advanced by rushes, and gradually swung round the right flank.

The two companies of the *Fox* (in reserve) were moved right away to the right flank, so as to intercept the fugitives in that direction.

The advance was continued by short rushes until it appeared that the fire of the seamen was endangering the left of the line, when I ordered the charge, and in an instant the whole line of the Naval Brigade surged like a sea over the walls. Murphy, Petty Officer G. I., battered in the door, having two men killed close alongside him. (Enclosure No. 4.)

5. *Pursuit.*—Finding that many Dervishes were escaping along the cliffs to the right, I directed all seamen and marines to follow along the top of the cliffs; many Dervishes were shot at and several were killed.

6. *Occupation of adjacent ridge.*—In accordance with your orders a company of seamen were detached away to the southward and occupied an adjacent ridge. The fleeing Dervishes could be seen, and were engaged at long range, but with little result; Lieutenant James remained in charge on the ridge until all signs of the enemy had ceased.

7. *Clearing the village.*—As the enemy's riflemen in the village prevented the embarkation of the wounded, all the available seamen of the *Hyacinth*, with Lieutenant Backhouse, and some marines of all ships advanced down the hill.

Firing was going on from the village, so the force approached to within 100 yards, and after firing a few volleys, rushed the nearest huts and set them alight.

Firing still continued, and two men were wounded, so when possible, volleys were fired before approaching the huts, which were finally all set alight, after ascertaining that no one remained inside.

8. *Continued sniping.*—The men rested on the beach, but as sniping still continued from the village, I collected a few men, with Mr. Onslow, Midshipman (Enclosures Nos. 3 and 5), and cleared a cave, the entrance of which was covered by a wicker hut. It contained three men, all riflemen, who were then killed.

9. *Examination of cliffs to the northward.*—A party of seamen and marines were then taken up the cliffs to the northward; rifle pits, facing the sea, were found in all the caves and openings on the side of the cliffs, and were demolished, the stones being rolled down into the sea.

10. *Embarkation of Naval Brigade.*—It being then nearly 2 p.m., and the men having been on the march since 5 a.m., I conferred with Major Jackson, and having ascertained that his camp was secure, gave orders for the embarkation of the Naval Brigade, leaving 50 marines and four Maxims, under Lieutenant Wilson, to assist the defence. I have, etc.,

HORACE HOOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.—CAPTAIN HON. H. L. A. HOOD TO
REAR-ADMIRAL ATKINSON-WILLES.

Hyacinth, AT ILLIG, 21st April 1904.

SIR,—I have the honour to bring to your notice the gallantry of Mr. Arthur G. Onslow, Midshipman of this ship, during the capture of Illig to-day.

2. When clearing the village of Illig, three riflemen remained in an inner stone cave covered by a wicker house.

3. Sniping occurred, and caused serious injury to a marine of the *Fox*, but the sniping could not be located. Finally it was discovered in this cave. The outer entrance had to be rushed within 6 feet of the entrance of the cave. Mr. Onslow was one of the first to rush in and kill the last of the

Dervishes with a sword which he forced in through the entrance.

4. The cave contained three riflemen, and a plentiful supply of ammunition. I have, etc.,

HORACE HOOD.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.—CAPTAIN HON. H. L. A. HOOD TO
REAR-ADMIRAL ATKINSON-WILLES.

Hyacinth, AT ILLIG, 21st April 1904.

SIR,—I have the honour to bring to your notice the gallantry of John Murphy, Petty Officer, 1st Class, O.N. 174868 (Gunnery Instructor), under the following circumstances :—

In the first rush for the fort, Murphy, after two or three attempts, battered down the wooden door under the fire from inside and from adjacent loopholes. This opened a clear way to the advancing seamen.

Murphy behaved with great coolness, and was tenacious in his purpose to effect this opening, at a moment when the fire was very warm, and when two of the *Hyacinth's* men were killed close alongside him. I have, etc.,

HORACE HOOD.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.—CAPTAIN HON. H. L. A. HOOD TO
REAR-ADMIRAL ATKINSON-WILLES.

Hyacinth, AT ILLIG, 21st April 1904.

SIR,—I have the honour to bring to your notice the gallantry of No. Po/9146, Corporal John Edward Flowers, R.M.L.I., of H.M. ship *Fox*, under the following circumstances :—

When clearing the village of Illig, sniping occurred, and was finally located in a cave at the back of a hut.

After several volleys had been fired without result, the order was given to rush the hut, and Corporal Flowers followed Mr. Onslow, Midshipman, into the mouth of the cave across the muzzles of the rifles. The cave contained three riflemen, with a good supply of ammunition. I have, etc.,

HORACE HOOD.

No. 2.—FROM REAR-ADMIRAL G. L. ATKINSON-WILLES,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIES STATION, TO ADMIRALTY.

Hyacinth, AT ADEN, 1st May 1904.

SIR,—In continuation of my letter of the 23rd instant, reporting the capture of Illig from the Dervishes, be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the Naval Brigade were embarked on the afternoon of the 21st. There was sufficient surf to cause the men to get wet up to the neck, but all were on board by 5 p.m.

Fifty marines, under Lieutenant P. H. Colley, R.M.L.I., and four Maxims with their crews, under Lieutenant F. O'B. Wilson, R.N., of the *Hyacinth*, were left ashore with the detachment of the Hampshire Regiment, to garrison the place under Major S. C. F. Jackson, D.S.O.

Searchlights were trained at night on the shore from the ships.

During the afternoon of the 21st small parties of Dervishes were seen on the cliffs, and were dispersed by shell fire from the ships, my object being to keep them moving.

2. On the following day a large working party was landed to demolish the enemy's fortifications.

Hyacinth's boats, manned and armed, searched the cliffs during the forenoon, while a force of Hampshires and marines and a Maxim worked in conjunction along the cliffs.

Boats, manned and armed, were sent from the *Fox*, under Lieutenant S. H. Radcliffe, to clear the caves on middle beach, and they destroyed the defensive works found there.

In the afternoon I sent the *Fox*, with an Intelligence Officer on board, to Obbia, taking a letter from me to Sultan Ali Yusuf, asking him to persuade the Esa Mahmoud tribe, to whom Illig formerly belonged, and who are friendly to the Italian Government, to reoccupy the place.

The Sultan sent a letter to the tribe accordingly, a copy of which he transmitted to me.

The *Hyacinth's* boats had located a party of the enemy on the cliffs some miles down the coast and shelled them. The bearing of the position was given to *Fox*, and she again shelled them with 4·7-inch and 6-inch guns as she passed, and dispersed them.

At 8 a.m. on that day the *Mohawk* proceeded 10 miles

to sea and buried the men who unhappily lost their lives during the assault on Illig.

3. On the 23rd the Italian sloop *Volturmo* sent a party of bluejackets under a Lieutenant to help in the demolition of the fortifications, and they worked very well with our men. I must again express my appreciation of the loyal co-operation of Commander Lorecchio, the Officers and men of the *Volturmo*.

4. On the 24th the *Fox* returned from Obbia, and the *Volturmo* sailed for Bosaso, taking 17 refugees.

5. By the 25th the enemy's defences were demolished. I landed early in the morning and was satisfied with their complete destruction.

The swell which presages the south-west monsoon had been increasing daily, and I therefore considered it prudent to withdraw the garrison, as it would have been impossible to continue to feed and water them from the ships, and embarkation was becoming very difficult and dangerous. I therefore landed provisions for the refugees who wished to remain at Illig, and the re-embarkation of our men was begun at 10 a.m.—working party first, then garrison, and, lastly, the rearguard with the ensign.

There were then four lines of breakers, of which the second one from the shore was sometimes over a man's head.

To add to the difficulties, the current was running so strongly to the northward that a considerable strain had to be kept on the stern lines from the beach to keep the boats' heads to sea, and any slackening of these lines at once caused the boats to get beam-on to the sea and to swamp.

Boats got away regularly and well, armed cutters, with Maxim guns and picked rifle shots, covering them to put down any attempts at sniping.

When everything was finished, the last boat to leave the shore—a pinnace, filled with men—was swamped, owing to the sternfast being eased prematurely.

The *Hyacinth's* steam cutter, backing in to help, got a rope foul of her screw and went on the rocks, where she was beaten to pieces by the surf; so Captain Hood gave orders to reoccupy the heights temporarily, and for 3 hours the Officers and men struggled with the surf in their efforts to refloat the pinnace.

I eventually decided to leave the two boats for the night, and re-embarked all the party before dark.

6. At 6 a.m. next morning the surf had abated, and I sent a party, covered by two cutters with Maxims, to recover the pinnace, which was done by a party under Commander S. R. Drury-Lowe, of the *Hyacinth*.

The steamboat, however, was a complete wreck, except the boiler, which, being under water and in the surf, had to be abandoned, for the rollers set in again at 8 a.m.

At 9.30 a.m. the *Hyacinth*, with *Fox* in company, sailed for Berbera.

7. The men of the Esa Mahmoud tribe had not arrived when I left, but there were not any Dervishes in the neighbourhood of Illig, as far as the spies sent out could ascertain.

8. (a) The enemy's killed and wounded, counting only bodies actually found, was—

58 killed;
12 wounded.

Of the latter, six were villagers, and were left at Illig with food, after medical treatment; they were not seriously wounded. The other six (four of them Dervishes) were placed under the Doctor's care on board the *Hyacinth*, and have been placed in the Military Hospital, Berbera.

(b) Of the refugees, in accordance with their own requests—

14 were sent to Berbera in the *Mohawk*;
17 to Bosaso in the Italian sloop *Volturmo*;
50 went inland to join their relatives, being provided with 3 days' rations; and
50 refused to leave Illig, so they were left there with a week's rations, and the huts (or "herios") that had sheltered our garrison were left standing for them.

A young woman, two little boys, and a little girl were received for passage in the *Hyacinth*, and transferred to the charge of the authorities at Berbera.

(c) Rifles captured—

26 French Gras rifles, bearing date 1874;
6 muzzle-loading Arab rifles;
1 Martini-Metford, with "B.C.A." marked upon it—evidently one of those captured by the Mullah at Gumburu or Erego.

(d) Other captures—

2 muzzle-loading carronades ;

2 banners ;

11 surf boats (subsequently destroyed) ; and

About 3000 skins belonging to the Mullah.

I have, etc.,

GEORGE L. ATKINSON-WILLES,
Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.

XIV.—PITCAIRN ISLAND.—EXTRACT FROM REPORT FOR 1904

(*Time allowed, 1 hour*)

For *Instructions*, see No. IV. Précis not to exceed about 300 words.

MR. R. T. SIMONS TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE
WESTERN PACIFIC

TAHITI, *June 25th*, 1904.

SIR,—On the 26th of February last, your Excellency instructed me to proceed to Pitcairn Island in order to enquire into its general state of affairs, and I have now the honour to submit the following report on the situation as I found it on my arrival there on the 14th May last, and of the measures adopted by me in consequence.

Government

The Government of Pitcairn Island was formerly conducted by a magistrate assisted by a council of two persons, but "owing to lack of strength and firmness on the part of Government officers" the people became dissatisfied, and on the 3rd October 1892, Captain Rooke, of H.M.S. *Champion*, suggested a change. On his recommendation a president, vice-president, and a judge, and seven members of Parliament, charged "with power to legislate, to plan for the public good, to execute the decisions of the court, and to see that public demands are speedily attended to," were elected by the islanders in the belief that "a larger number of officers will tend to make a stronger Government, and that plans for the public welfare will be executed with greater success." For some time this method of administration worked harmoniously enough, and it is only within the past two or three years

that inquietude has been manifest. During my visit to the island, I perceived that the functions of the members of Parliament had become merged in those of the president; that the judges annually elected were oftentimes incompetent to deal with the matters brought before them, and frequently incapable of enforcing their decisions; that jealousies amongst the officials had become rife, and that, in view of the general laxity observable, a radical change was necessary. Accordingly, before my departure from Pitcairn Island, and in accordance with your Excellency's instructions of the 26th February last, I inaugurated a new system of government, based on the requirements of the community as I found it, the particulars of which I shall have the honour to communicate to your Excellency under separate cover.

Mr. J. R. McCoy

Your Excellency is aware that Mr. Alfred Young had been elected President of the community for the current year, in the place of Mr. McCoy, who had previously held the position for a period of six consecutive years. On enquiry, I learned that this change has come about in consequence of the people's confidence in Mr. McCoy having been somewhat shaken under the following circumstances:—

1. That, as a prominent member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church intimately connected with the Foreign Mission Board of that sect of religionists, Mr. McCoy had found his duties in relation to that body more deserving of attention than the interests and well-being of the islanders.
2. That, in his dealings with the people, Mr. McCoy had gradually become autocratic and arbitrary.
3. That, under Mr. McCoy's presidency, the government of the Island, and the proper administration of justice, had been neglected; and
4. That, in his relations with me, Mr. McCoy had frequently misrepresented the views, desires, and demeanour of the islanders, and equally misled them in regard to my efforts on their behalf, especially in the matter of the cutter *Pitcairn*.

Having always had a high opinion of Mr. McCoy's discretion, I endeavoured to explain away these allegations; but so many

proofs were forthcoming, and the general discontent of the people was so obvious, that I could but conclude that the community had done wisely in superseding him, if only for a time. The Pitcairn people admit that Mr. McCoy has done much for them in the past, and that at one period his administration of the island had been satisfactory. But they insist that during the past two or three years he has assumed towards them an attitude incompatible with his position as a member of the community; and I fear that their contention is not without foundation. Now that I am acquainted with many matters hitherto unknown to me, I am of opinion that Mr. McCoy has become somewhat inflated in consequence of his status among the Adventists in America, and of the deference shown to him as President of Pitcairn Island in his travels abroad. He has doubtless learned to consider himself indispensable in the latter capacity, and probably, for reasons of their own, the Elders of the Adventist Church have encouraged him in that conceit. However this may be, in the circumstances I can no longer venture to recommend Mr. McCoy's recognition by His Majesty's Government as permanent Chief Magistrate of Pitcairn Island. As now advised, it is more desirable in my judgment that he be re-elected to that position by the people—a not unlikely contingency in view of his intelligence and personality, and the fact that he is not entirely without local influence. His abilities are excellent, and should further benefit the community if employed and controlled under the new system of government inaugurated by me. With regard to the charges of misappropriation of certain funds alleged against Mr. McCoy, charges already known to your Excellency, I was able, after due investigation, to convince the people that their accusation had no substantial support. I was bound to admit, however, that he had laid himself open to suspicion in consequence of his disinclination to render detailed accounts, or to afford satisfactory explanations in regard to the matters complained of.

Mr. Petch

Your Excellency is aware that Mr. McCoy has frequently complained of the conduct of Mr. Petch. Accordingly, I proceeded to Pitcairn Island under the apprehension that

I was called upon to deal with a person dangerous to the welfare of the community. On my arrival, however, I was agreeably surprised to find Mr. Petch quietly conducting the only school on the island, respected by all, and on the most friendly terms with the president, and with Mr. McCoy himself. On investigating the charges against him, I could not perceive that Mr. Petch had committed offences deserving punishment, or deportation. He admitted that in his utterances, and otherwise, he may have acted hastily and without proper consideration, but suggested that my investigation on the spot must have shown that vigorous protest against existing abuses had at times been necessary. Before my departure from Pitcairn, I was persuaded that Mr. Petch's commercial abilities and education should be utilised for the benefit of the islanders, and, therefore, I have considered it advisable to appoint him to a suitable position in the new administration.

Mr. Alfred Young

The new president is neither as well educated, nor as intelligent as Mr. McCoy. But in his dealings with me, I found him practical, energetic, willing, and apparently anxious to correct existing evils. Although his moral conduct in the past has not been without reproach, I have seen no sufficient reason for his removal from the position as chief of the community, to which he has been elected by the people for a season.

Pitcairn Islanders

The Pitcairn islanders number 77 males and 92 females, including children and infants, of whom 68 males and 73 females are now resident on the island. They are a hard-working people, more or less healthy, exhibiting certain vicious tendencies which religion has been unable to eradicate. Many of them are narrow-minded and unstable. They have adopted an extraordinary "patois" (derived from the language of the Tahitian women who accompanied the mutineers of the *Bounty* to Pitcairn Island), which is employed in conversation among themselves, although most of the adults can speak the English language fairly well—in some instances very well, considering their circumstances and environment. There are persons of ability among them,

but a few appear to be lacking in intelligence. The children and young people are numerous, and, if properly cared for, should turn out useful members of the community.

Morals

With regard to the morals of the islanders, in the aggregate I fear I can say little in their favour. Petty thefts, brawls, bad language, etc., are faults among them (happily they do not use intoxicants), and it was disquieting to learn that the laws and regulations dealing with those offences had seldom been enforced.

Religion

Some years ago the Pitcairn Island community embraced the faith of the Seventh Day Adventists, a religious sect having its origin and headquarters in the United States. On their Sabbath day, in the observance of which they are scrupulous, the Pitcairn islanders, dressed in their best and looking clean and wholesome, make a favourable impression. They are exemplary in their attendance at weekday prayer meetings and Church gatherings. The Pitcairn people contribute ten per cent. of their produce and of any moneys they may receive as a tithe to the Church, and they pay subscriptions to the Sabbath School and other religious funds. I understand that the produce so contributed is sold, and the proceeds, together with other cash collections, are forwarded to the Foreign Mission Board of the Adventists in America.

Education

Formerly Miss Rosalind Young (a copy of whose book on Pitcairn Island I have the honour to forward under separate cover for your Excellency's information) undertook, with minimum success, the education of the Pitcairn islanders. In the year 1893, however, the Adventists established schools in the island, and instructed adults and children alike. The American teacher employed was properly qualified, and produced excellent results until she was withdrawn in 1896, since which date the schools have been neglected, and to-day the young people are growing up practically in ignorance. Mr. Petch (who has no experience in school work) and Miss Rosalind Young are doing their best in the limited time

at their disposal; for in order to provide for themselves and for others dependent upon them, these persons are compelled to take their share in the general work of the island. The narrow-mindedness and seeming lack of intelligence noticeable in many of the Pitcairn people are more due to ignorance, I think, than to any mental infirmity; and there are now on the island about 40 males and 30 females, ranging from one to seventeen years of age, in need of education and attention. In these circumstances, the question of their present and future welfare is difficult of solution, unless, indeed, your Excellency could in some way come to their aid. It has occurred to me in this connection that, provided the necessary funds were forthcoming, it might not be difficult to find a qualified male teacher accustomed to island life, who, for a time, and for a moderate remuneration, would be willing to undertake the control and education of the younger members of the Pitcairn Island community. Such a person need not necessarily be a white; the islanders would doubtless furnish him with suitable lodging (unfurnished) and with partial board, and Miss Rosalind Young might be engaged at a salary of, say, £15 per annum to take charge of the girls under his supervision. I submit these suggestions with much hesitation, in view of the charge which they involve on the High Commission or other public funds; but the question appears to me to be urgent, and as the islanders are too poor at present to move in the matter, I can see no other satisfactory way of meeting it.

Financial Position, Cultivation, etc.

The Pitcairn islanders are given to exaggerate their financial position. As a matter of fact, under existing conditions they are a poor people—among the poorest in this region, for they have no copra or shell for disposal, and the success of their husbandry is often precarious in consequence of the infrequency of rain. During the past two years, thanks to the cutter, they have sold at Mangareva produce to the value of about £300; to passing ships they have disposed of vegetables and fruits to the value of £60, making a total of about £360, or at the rate of £180 per annum. Out of this sum, they have provided clothing for the women and children, underclothing for the men and boys, kerosene oil, soap,

candles, flour, tinned meat, and other necessities, besides paying the Church tithes, subscriptions and instalments (now amounting to over £60) towards the repayment of the £200 loaned to them by His Majesty's Government. In addition to the foregoing, they have disposed of produce sufficient to defray the working expenses of the cutter, and to procure men's heavier clothing, and other things from passing ships. I observed that their stock of chickens is small, and I ascertained that beyond wild goats, of which there are about 200, there are no animals suitable for food on the island. The islanders cultivate for their own consumption and for commercial purposes, sweet potatoes, yams, taro, melons, and pumpkins; and the fruits available consist of oranges, bananas, and pineapples. Arrowroot, which they cultivate and prepare in limited quantities with much labour and by primitive methods, is their chief source of revenue. Men and women alike take part in the cultivation of the fields, and I was much interested in observing Thursday October Christian, a man of 85 years of age and the oldest resident on the island, do as good a day's work in the open as any of them. Their houses are built of native wood, cut and prepared laboriously, and are thatched with the leaf of the pandanus palm.

Commercial and Financial Prospects

Some years ago, before they adopted the Adventist faith, the islanders possessed many pigs. To-day there are none on the island, but I have recommended the people to start breeding them without delay for ultimate disposal at Tahiti, where they are now worth about £40 per ton, and are always in demand in practically unlimited quantities. Coffee grows luxuriantly at Pitcairn, and the little brought up to Mangareva from time to time has been declared by purchasers to be much superior in quality to that produced in the Cook and Society Groups. I have, therefore, urged its extensive cultivation and preparation for shipment to Tahiti, where it would probably fetch about £25 per ton in quantities not exceeding at present 50 tons per annum. The islanders expressed their anxiety to follow out my suggestions, and probably by this time they have started planting more coffee trees, and procured, perhaps, a boar and a sow or two for

breeding purposes from Mangareva, where, unfortunately, they are scarce, expensive, and of a poor kind. Once the islanders have pigs and coffee for export, it would be an easy matter, I believe, to arrange for direct communication between Tahiti and Pitcairn Islands; and I am confident that by means of these enterprises the Pitcairn people will ultimately be able to acquire a vessel of their own, suitable to that traffic. Moreover, from the revenues to be derived from those pursuits, the islanders should in time be able to procure machinery and appliances adapted to the extensive manufacture of arrowroot, which is of excellent quality at Pitcairn, and worth, commercially, about £12 per ton. I am advised that, under favourable conditions, the islanders could produce and prepare about 250 tons per annum; and there would be but little difficulty, I imagine, in disposing of that quantity annually in California, New Zealand, and Australia by way of Tahiti. Pitcairn Island, it would seem, probably on account of its formation and geographical position, cannot produce cocoanuts adapted to the manufacture of copra.

Communications

The future prosperity and well-being of the Pitcairn people depend entirely upon their ability to maintain communication with the neighbouring islands, especially with Tahiti, the only market available in this region for their more important products. At present, the cutter owned by the islanders, a small vessel of 14 tons, plies more or less regularly between Pitcairn and Mangareva, whence communication with Tahiti and elsewhere may be obtained at intervals of about three months. At Pitcairn Island, however, there is no anchorage, except occasionally in very calm weather; the voyage between it and Mangareva is often long and boisterous, and no docking facilities are to be had at either place, consequently the little vessel is worn and somewhat strained, and its durability is merely a question of time. It is of importance, therefore, that the islanders should be in a position to replace the cutter, when unseaworthy, by a larger and more useful vessel; and the means by which that end may be obtained are disclosed in the preceding paragraph. But, although the people appear willing and anxious enough to carry out my suggestions,

there is no doubt that their energies and foresight are crippled by their indigence, and I fear that they are not likely to move strenuously in the directions indicated unless encouraged to do so. I have, therefore, the honour to express the opinion that if the islanders could be relieved of their liability to His Majesty's Government—the £200 loaned to them in 1902 by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury for the purchase and equipment of the cutter referred to*—they would not only recognise and appreciate the clemency shown to them, but would also be stimulated to exertions which should lead to their greater prosperity and to their ultimate possession of a vessel adapted to direct traffic with Tahiti. So strongly do I feel that this concession would occasion the results mentioned, that I beg respectfully and earnestly to solicit your Excellency's kindly aid in the matter, in order that, should you see no reason to the contrary, the question may be suitably submitted for the consideration of His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies. In the event of a favourable response, I should be grateful if your Excellency would authorise me to utilise the monies already refunded on that account, in the purchase and transport of a few good New Zealand pigs, for breeding purposes at Pitcairn Island.

Division of Land

Finally, I have the honour to transmit herewith for your Excellency's information a memorandum† recording the present division of land at Pitcairn Island, based on the original allotments of the mutineers of the *Bounty*. I have, etc.,

R. T. SIMONS.

His Excellency the High Commissioner
for the Western Pacific.

* Colonial Office note. This has been done.

† Not received in Colonial Office.

**XV.—REPORT TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME
DEPARTMENT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT-
TENDING AN EXPLOSION WHICH OCCURRED
IN AN IRONMONGER'S SHOP AT NEW-
CASTLE EMLYN, IN THE COUNTY OF CAR-
MARTHEN, ON THE 25TH NOVEMBER 1904**

**BY CAPTAIN J. H. THOMSON, H.M. CHIEF INSPECTOR OF
EXPLOSIVES**

(Time allowed, 1 hour)

For *Instructions*, see No. IV. Précis not to exceed about 300 words.

**HOME OFFICE, WHITEHALL, S.W.,
6th December 1904.**

SIR,—I have the honour to report that in pursuance of your Order made under the 66th Section of the Explosives Act, 1875, I have held an inquiry into the circumstances of an explosion which occurred on the 25th ult. in an ironmonger's shop at Newcastle Emlyn, in the County of Carmarthen.

By this explosion six persons were seriously injured, one of whom died three days later. The names of these persons are as follows :—

Killed—

Arthur Lloyd Davies, aged 18.

Injured—

Owen Thomas Nicholas, aged 17.

Ivor Jones, aged 16.

William James Morgan, aged 31.

Daniel Thomas, aged 43.

Annie Jones, aged 19.

I also attended the inquest held by Mr. J. Evans, Coroner.

The premises on which the explosion occurred comprised an ironmonger's shop in the main street of the town, with small workshops at the back. They were in the occupation of Mr. T. M. Daniel, Ironmonger, of Cardigan, and formed a branch establishment of his business. They were not registered for keeping explosive.

The accident occurred at about 7.10 p.m. on the 25th November. About an hour before that time the Manager, Mr. David Nicholas, had left the shop and gone upstairs to the second floor where he was at the moment of the explosion. The shop was therefore in charge of the first apprentice, the deceased, Arthur Lloyd Davies. Immediately before the explosion, Mr. Nicholas's servant, the injured girl, Annie Jones, entered the shop and asked to see Mr. Nicholas. Thereupon a messenger boy, John Jones, who was in the shop, ran upstairs to call the Manager. He was returning, and had reached the bottom step of the staircase when the explosion occurred. By making this boy repeat his action in mounting the stairs, I ascertained that the interval between his leaving the shop and the explosion was about 25 seconds. His evidence as to what was going on in the shop at the time is therefore important.

An examination of the premises showed that the explosion had taken place in a fire-proof safe which stood in a corner behind the counter and close to the shop window. From the evidence of the Manager there were in the safe at the time about 12 to 15 lbs. of blasting powder in one bag, and about 7 to 8 lbs. of sporting powder in canisters. From the effects, I have no reason to doubt that these quantities are correctly stated.

The shop window was completely blown out and the contents thrown into the roadway. Everything in the shop was displaced, but the walls were not thrown down, and the ceiling and floor above were only lifted but not destroyed. A door at the back of the premises was blown out, as was also one window on the first floor. Several panes of glass were broken in other parts of the building, and two or three in a shop across the street. The fire-proof safe was blown to pieces.

All the injured persons were very severely burnt, but

none of them appear to have suffered from fractures or wounds.

In considering the question of the most probable cause of the explosion, it is necessary in the first place to determine what each of the persons present was doing at the time. This can be done with a fair degree of certainty from the evidence of John Jones, which is confirmed by two of the injured persons whom I have interrogated. It is certain that powder was not being sold at the time, and there is evidence that none had been sold that day. The deceased, Davies, was engaged in taking stock of the woodscrews, and for this purpose was standing on a ladder, the foot of which was in close proximity to, if not actually touching, the safe door. The second apprentice, Owen Nicholas, was standing at the farther end of the counter on the same side of the shop, and was engaged in writing down the figures given him by Davies. The third apprentice, Ivor Jones, was standing behind the counter on the side facing the shop window, and was probably conversing with the injured men, Morgan and Thomas, who were customers. Thomas was standing at the counter near Ivor Jones, while Morgan had just turned round with the intention of leaving the shop. The servant girl, Annie Jones, was waiting for her master near the door of the shop.

The door of the safe was closed, but it was not locked, and it is probable that it was not completely closed. According to the evidence of Mr. Nicholas, which I have no reason to doubt, there was nothing in the safe with the powder but an account book, but in a separate drawer there were some gun fittings. It is, therefore, in the highest degree improbable that the ignition can have originated inside the safe. The cause must be looked for in something that happened outside the receptacle itself.

I have considered all the possible causes which presented themselves, and by eliminating those which present no degree of probability, I have reduced the number to two. These are as following:—

1. *Smoking.*—It is possible that any one of the injured men may have been smoking at the time, but there is no evidence that they were, and, indeed, such evidence as I was able to obtain seemed to point the other way. It is

true that a rumour was mentioned at the inquest that Thomas lighted a pipe and threw the match behind the counter. This rumour is said to have originated in a statement of the injured man, Morgan, but though I questioned Morgan as to the cause of the explosion, he made no such statement to me. Moreover, from the position in which Thomas was standing it is most improbable that he would have thrown a match anywhere in the neighbourhood of the safe.

If the accident was caused by smoking at all, the only probable manner in which it could have been so caused was by the deceased dropping a lighted cigarette on hearing the Manager called, but, as I have said, the evidence tends to show that Davies was not smoking at the time.

2. *Fall of some iron article.*—I consider that the most probable cause of the accident was the fall of some iron or steel article displaced by Davies from one of the upper shelves. Any such article falling on the concrete floor would be very likely to ignite the powder dust or grains which undoubtedly must have been spilt on the floor in front of the safe.

In several particulars this accident resembles one which occurred at Chester-le-Street on the 24th September 1895 (No. 101, 1895). In that case powder grains spilt in front of a fire-proof safe were ignited by the fall of a steel tool, and exploded the powder in the safe although the door of the latter was locked and bolted.

The question of blame in connection with this accident is one of considerable difficulty. If my theory as to the cause is correct, the deceased can be held in no way to blame for the occurrence. Even if it were true that he was smoking and threw down a lighted cigarette, he would have been guilty of disobedience of orders and of some degree of carelessness, but seeing that the safe door was supposed to be closed, he cannot be held guilty of such gross negligence as would immediately tend to produce this accident.

The Manager, Mr. Nicholas, had taken such precautions in the keeping of explosive as he thought sufficient, though, as I will presently show, these were not sufficient to satisfy legal requirements. He was not the occupier of the premises, and is, therefore, not responsible that they were unregistered. I do not consider that he should be blamed in the matter.

Mr. Daniel, as the occupier of the shop, is responsible

for not having registered the premises, and for the consequent keeping of explosive in an unauthorised place. When questioned as to the omission, he stated that in the town of Cardigan, where he has registered premises, the officer of the local authority sends round annually to remind persons having registered premises that the registration must be renewed, and that he supposed that the same was done at Newcastle Emlyn, in which case his Manager would have done what was required. I have not the least reason to doubt the truth of this explanation, but it does not relieve Mr. Daniel from the legal responsibility. I do not, however, consider it my duty to instigate proceedings against Mr. Daniel for the irregularity for the following reasons :—

1. The powder was being kept without the slightest attempt of concealment. It was in the front shop, and was served to any adult customer who chose to ask for it.

2. There was by no means an absence of all precautions in keeping the explosive.

3. The Explosives Act had been allowed to become a dead letter in Newcastle Emlyn.

The total absence of any attempt to enforce the law in regard to explosives in this town is a very serious matter, and one which conduced in no small degree to bring about the present accident. Where such a state of things exists, the danger to the public from the keeping of explosives is considerable, and an accident even more serious than the present one may occur at any moment. In the present instance, if the Act had been enforced, and there had been efficient inspection, the legal precautions, to which I refer later, would have been taken, and the accident would have been most unlikely to occur.

Primarily the County Council, being the Local Authority under the Explosives Act, are responsible for this neglect. Under the Local Government (England and Wales) Act, 1888, however, the County Council have power to delegate their duties under the Explosives Act to certain bodies, and in pursuance of this power they passed the following resolution on the 7th November 1889 :—

“That the duties under the Explosives Act, 1875, be delegated to the Members of the County Council residing in each Petty Sessional Division, two Members to form a

quorum in each division, and the Clerks to the Justices to summon the Authority when required."

I am doubtful whether this form of delegation is in accordance with the Local Government Act, but whether this is so or not, I hold that the County Council are responsible that the authority to whom they delegate is not only fully informed of the fact, but is willing and efficient to carry out the duties. Such was not the case in the present instance, for no inspector had been appointed in this Petty Sessional Division, and as far as I can learn the Authority has never been summoned as contemplated in the above resolution. It is right to say, however, that neither the County Council nor their Clerk had any reason to suppose that the Explosives Act was not being enforced in this Division, as the form of delegation has, according to my information, worked well in other Divisions of the County.

That explosive was being kept illegally at Newcastle Emlyn was perfectly well known to the Police. Some time ago Sergeant Harries reported the fact to the Deputy Chief Constable. The latter thereupon reported it to the Clerk to the Justices, Mr. J. Evans, who was also the Coroner in this case. Mr. Evans, however, appears to have been ignorant of the fact that he had any responsibility in the matter, and nothing further was done.

I have taken up the matter with the County Council with a view to this unsatisfactory state of things being remedied.

I have said that the precautions required by law for the keeping of explosives were not fully observed. These are contained in Order in Council No. 16, made under the Explosives Act, 1875. This Order requires that the receptacle in which the explosive is kept shall be "closed and secured to prevent unauthorised persons having access thereto." This has always been held to mean that the receptacle shall be locked. It is needless to say that had this requirement been satisfied, the door of the safe could not have been ajar, as I have reason to believe that it was at the time of the accident. It is true that in the case mentioned above, a fire-proof safe did explode when the door was locked, but it is obvious that the chance of this happening is very much less when the door is fastened, than when it is merely loosely closed.

The above-mentioned Order also requires that "no package containing more than 1 lb. of explosive . . . shall be opened on registered premises." In the present instance it was the custom to sell blasting powder out of a 25 lb. bag, from which it was served by means of a scoop. This method of dealing with gunpowder leads inevitably to the spilling of grains which get trodden into the floor, and cannot be easily swept up. Undoubtedly this spilling of powder grains must have occurred in the present instance, and must have played a large part in causing the accident. It is perfectly easy for traders to obtain blasting powder in 1 lb. bags, and this is habitually done in other places.

The accident shows the importance of another precaution, which, though not required by law, is often enjoined by H.M. Inspectors when visiting registered premises. Wherever the receptacle for explosive, especially if it is a fireproof safe, is placed on a stone or concrete floor, the space around or in front of the receptacle should be covered with lead or linoleum.

The Jury at the Inquest brought in a verdict of Accidental Death, with which I entirely concur. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

J. H. THOMSON, Captain,
H.M. Chief Inspector of Explosives.

The Right Honourable the Secretary of State,
Home Department.

XVI.—CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING SLAVERY
IN THE ISLANDS OF ZANZIBAR AND PEMBA

(Time allowed, 1 hour)

For *Instructions*, see No. II. Précis not to exceed about 300 words.

No. 1.—MR. SINCLAIR TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE.—
(Received June 6)

(Extract.)

ZANZIBAR, May 3, 1904.

I have the honour to transmit herewith an extract from a Report on the Island of Pemba which I have received from Mr. O'Sullivan-Beare, His Majesty's Vice-Consul for that island.

Enclosure in No. 1.—REPORT BY VICE-CONSUL O'SULLIVAN-BEARE ON THE ISLAND OF PEMBA FOR 1903

(Extract.)

The slavery question may be said to be at an end in Pemba. Those slaves who still remain in a state of servitude are slaves only in name, and they continue to be so of their own free will, for there is not a man or woman at this time in the island unaware of the fact that any slave can obtain manumission for the asking. A small number of slaves do apply for and obtain their freedom month by month, but the bulk of the servile population in Pemba appear to be content with their existing status.

During 1903 a total of 448 persons applied for their freedom, of whom 196 were males, 231 were females, and 21 were children, so that the number of adults freed in Pemba during the year 1903 amounted to 427 in all.

(Signed)

D. R. O'SULLIVAN-BEARE.

PEMBA, April 6, 1904.

No. 2.—MR. SINCLAIR TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE.—
(Received June 15)

ZANZIBAR, May 26, 1904.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to transmit herewith Mr. Last's Report for the year 1903 on the working of the Decree for the abolition of the legal status of slavery. I have, etc.,

(Signed) JOHN H. SINCLAIR.

Enclosure in No. 2.—REPORT BY MR. LAST RESPECTING THE
WORKING OF THE DECREE FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE
STATUS OF SLAVERY DURING THE YEAR 1903

ZANZIBAR, May 23, 1904.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward, for your information, the following Report on the working of the Decree for the abolition of the status of slavery during the year 1903.

As I have anticipated in my former Reports, the number of slaves who have thought fit to present themselves for freedom to the Zanzibar Government has been very small.

The reasons for this great decrease in the number offering themselves for freedom are those which I have already discussed in my Report of the 6th February 1902.

It is as well known as ever throughout the Island of Zanzibar that a slave has only to appear and ask for freedom and it is immediately granted. But the slaves have long since discovered that freedom is not such "a bed of roses" as was anticipated. They have learnt that practically they lose far more than they gain by leaving their owners to get freedom, and then having to find a new home and support themselves. They see that they lose all the rights and advantages which go with attachment to a "house," and they gain nothing of a practical or compensating nature in return. If it be said that they get freedom in place of what they relinquish, it may also be said that of the abstract idea of freedom they know nothing, and cannot be expected in any particular way to appreciate it.

To the slaves there is no idea of shame in slavery. If anything, there is, to them, a species of honour—the honour

of being known as belonging to such and such a house—in the same manner that many servants in England consider it an honour to serve certain “houses,” or as the yeomen and serfs of some centuries ago looked upon it as their greatest honour to serve under such a “lord.”

The slave of the present day, who is practically a free person, and has all the legal privileges of a free person, is in much the same position as an ordinary servant at home. The ordinary servant at home gives his services for certain returns—as food, home, wages, etc.—and can retire from service under certain conditions. So also it is with the ordinary slave, who for his services receives land, house, and the general rights and privileges of being attached to a “house.” He is in some respects in a better position than the European servant, for he can practically do as little work as he pleases, and he is at liberty to leave his owner whenever he thinks fit; and if the owner should make any trouble about it, the slave has his remedy in going to the Government and there obtaining his freedom and the legal proofs of it. From his point of view he is vastly better off than many thousands of free workers, who have to work almost night and day in order to obtain the simplest means of existence.

It is quite likely that in the earlier days of the working of the Decree, the slaves may have had the idea that freedom was going to be a very good thing for them; that by some means there would be little or no work to do and plenty of food to eat—quite an ideal state of things for the African slave, as well as for many others. This would have suited the inclinations of the slaves entirely, especially the discontented, the lazy, and the rowdy ones of both sexes; and without doubt this idea in the minds of the slaves, to some considerable extent, accounts for the much greater numbers who were freed at first.

But, in the meanwhile, the slaves have been able to study the effects of the working of the Decree, and they find that freedom is of practical advantage to a very few only. These are chiefly those slaves who were brought up to some profession, as builders, smiths, tailors, and such like, all of whom could earn a fairly good wage, and who being necessarily more intelligent and to some extent less afraid of work (this

latter quality being the outcome of a course of service in apprenticeship) than the ordinary slave, would see the advantage of being able to retain all they earned for their own purposes.

Thus, as might be expected, the worst, and also the most intelligent of the slaves elected to apply for freedom, and they chiefly belonged to those who lived in Zanzibar town and the larger towns of the island.

There still remain in nominal slavery those who have had time to see the effects of freedom on their former companions ; and the outcome of their cogitations on the subject is plainly shown by the number of slaves who applied for freedom during the year 1903. It must be remembered that in such a large body of slaves as existed at the time of the promulgation of the Decree, there must have been a very considerable number who looked up to their owners with respect and regard, and considered themselves as the " Watoto " (children), as they are called, of their masters and mistresses, whose house was their house, and from whom they would have considered it a dishonour to part or to be dismissed. These undoubtedly remain with their owners, and probably form the greater part of the slaves now living on the island.

These slaves have many and great inducements to continue with their owners, for they not only enjoy the usual rights and privileges of their order, but there is also the prospect of a comfortable future before them. This is shown by the wills and documents having reference to the estates and property of the Arabs and others in Zanzibar Island, which continually come under my observation. From these we learn that there is scarcely any estate of importance which has not some part of it left as " Wakf " for the life-long use of the freed slaves of the house, that is, those who acquired their freedom by will, at the death of the former owner or owners of the property. These freed slaves, of course, remain on the estate, cultivate the land which has been made " Wakf " to them, render nominal service to the " house " of their deceased owner, and are really in the position of retainers. If asked, they would probably say that they were the " Watumwa " or " Watoto " (slaves or children) of such a person, but they are as free as, even more free in the eyes of a Moham-medan than, those freed under the auspices of the Zanzibar

Government. From the large body of slaves who are devoted to their owners it is not to be expected that many would seek for freedom from the Government, and it is a well-known fact that they look down with contempt upon those slaves who have done so.

There remain those whose prospects of the future may not be so bright as that of those just mentioned, yet who see and feel that they are in a better condition where they are than they would be if they sought freedom. At present they have a house of their own and as much land as they need or wish to cultivate. As they are really part of the estate, they know that their owners will look after them in want or sickness. Above all, they have but little work to do. They are supposed to work on the estate for four days in each week from 8 o'clock in the morning till about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. But, as there is no rule as to the amount of work they shall do in a given time, they naturally do as little as possible. These slaves, taking into consideration their easy circumstances of life and the rights and privileges they enjoy as slaves, naturally compare their present state with that of former slaves now freed, who have to work every day and all day, and with that have to be careful of the pice they earn in order to get the necessities of life. In such a comparison they cannot but conclude that their present state is the better, and that there is little or nothing of practical advantage to them to be gained by seeking freedom from the Government.

From the above remarks on the feelings of the slaves themselves regarding freedom, and also taking into consideration what I have said in my former Reports, it will be seen that the decrease in the number of slaves applying for freedom is only what could be reasonably expected. It may be briefly stated that those who are slaves now do not wish for freedom, and will not apply for it.

I am strongly of opinion that the number of slaves who will apply to be freed by the Zanzibar Government in the future will be very small, and though one or two here and there, for some real or fancied cause, may think that the state of freedom will be better than the present one of slavery, this will be the outcome of some pique, dispute, or jealousy, but not of the love of freedom itself.

The slaves who will be freed in the future are those who will be freed by their owners. This the owners do as a religious duty, to prepare their way to future happiness, and the slaves so freed look upon freedom as an honour conferred on them. I have, etc.,

(Signed) J. T. LAST.

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF SLAVES FREED IN ZANZIBAR DURING THE YEAR 1903

During the Month of—	Number of Slaves.	
	Male.	Female.
January	3	2
February	3	2
March	1	3
April	1
May	9
June	3	2
July	1	2
August	1	3
September	1
October	5
November	2	6
December	4
Total freed slaves	14	40
	54	

No. 3.—FOREIGN OFFICE TO MR. CAVE

(Extract.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 31, 1904.*

The Marquess of Lansdowne has had under his consideration the Reports on the condition of slavery in the Islands of Pemba and Zanzibar which were contained in Mr. Sinclair's

despatches of the 3rd and 26th May last respectively, and I am directed by his Lordship to offer the following remarks upon their contents :—

First, as regards Pemba : Vice-Consul O'Sullivan-Beare observes that the slavery question may be said to be at an end in Pemba. This is a very satisfactory testimony to the success of the policy initiated by the late Marquess of Salisbury, and described in the instructions to Sir A. Hardinge which were laid before Parliament in "Africa No. 1 of 1897." It corroborates the opinion expressed by Sir C. Hill after his visit to Pemba in 1900, as given at p. 25 of "Africa No. 4 of 1901."

The Report by Mr. Last, contained in Mr. Sinclair's despatch of the 26th May, calls for no special comment, except that it affords a remarkable corroborative testimony to the wisdom of the policy embodied in the Decree of 1897, and Lord Lansdowne looks forward with satisfaction to the time when the working of the Decree will have automatically put an end to the status of slavery in Zanzibar.

**XVII.—REPORT TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME
DEPARTMENT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES
ATTENDING AN EXPLOSION OF COLLODION
COTTON WHICH OCCURRED AT THE FAC-
TORY OF MESSRS. ELEY BROTHERS,
LIMITED, AT EDMONTON, IN THE COUNTY
OF MIDDLESEX, ON THE 7TH MARCH 1905**

**BY CAPTAIN J. H. THOMSON, H.M. CHIEF INSPECTOR OF
EXPLOSIVES**

(Time allowed, 1 hour)

For *Instructions*, see No. IV. Précis not to exceed about 300 words.

**HOME OFFICE, WHITEHALL, S.W.
15th March 1905.**

SIR,—I have the honour to report that, in pursuance of your Order made under the 66th Section of the Explosives Act, 1875, I have held an inquiry into the circumstances attending an explosion which occurred on the 7th inst. at the factory for pegamoid of Messrs. Eley Brothers, Limited, at Edmonton, near London.

By this accident one man, Harry Vicary, aged 24, lost his life. I also attended the inquest held by Mr. Forbes, coroner.

The factory at which the accident occurred, though nominally in the occupation of Messrs. Eley Brothers, Limited, and licensed in their name, is actually under the management of New Pegamoid, Limited. It adjoins the cartridge factory of the former firm, and is included in the same licence. The material, pegamoid, for the manufacture of which this factory

was erected, and which is extensively used for the manufacture of cartridge cases as well as for many other purposes, is a waterproof material formed by coating paper, etc., with a solution of collodion cotton and other substances.

Collodion cotton is a form of nitro-cellulose differing only from gun-cotton in being of a lower degree of nitration, and consequently of a less explosive character. Previous to the year 1894 it was not considered necessary to regard collodion cotton as coming within the provisions of the Explosives Act, and it was then believed that a more or less distinct line could be drawn between ordinary gun-cotton, which is practically insoluble in a mixture of ether and alcohol, and collodion cotton, which is wholly soluble in that mixture. Owing, however, partly to the evidence given in the trial of the patent case in connection with cordite, it came to be known that the physical property of solubility was not a definite guide as to the chemical constitution of a nitro-cotton, and that complete solubility may be accompanied by a fairly high degree of nitration and considerable explosive power. Consequently in 1894 it was decided to apply the provisions of the Explosives Act to collodion cotton when in the dry condition, and all factories in which it was necessary to use the material in this condition were required to be licensed under the Act. This decision affected factories where collodion cotton is used in the manufacture of celluloid, xylonite, etc., and also those in which this material is employed for the waterproofing of fabrics such as pegamoid. The particular form of collodion cotton used in these industries is, however, of such a low degree of nitration that it was not considered necessary to attach such stringent conditions to the licence as those which apply to factories for ordinary explosives. The limit of nitration being fixed by the licence, buildings in which the quantity is small were not required to be at greater distances from other buildings than those necessary for preventing the communication of fire.

In 1896 Messrs. Eley Brothers, Limited, applied for an amending licence to enable them to add buildings to their factory for the manufactory of collodion cotton and pegamoid, and on August 31st of that year the licence was granted. Only those buildings in which dry collodion cotton was to be present were regarded as "danger buildings," and of these

several were provided for by this and subsequent amending licences, but only two have actually been taken into use.

The building in which the explosion occurred is that lettered "A" on the plan of the factory. It was licensed for drying collodion cotton, the quantity being limited to 1000 lbs. It was substantially constructed of brick with a brick-arched roof, the walls being 14 inches thick. The lining was of painted cement and the floor was of wood. The collodion cotton was dried in a sort of cupboard erected in the middle of the building, and divided into four compartments. Into this cupboard warm air was drawn by means of a fan outside the building from an adjoining compartment in which there was a steam-heating arrangement. The collodion cotton was placed on trays which slid into a rack in the cupboard. In three of the compartments these trays slid on strips of felt fastened with brass nails, while in the fourth compartment they rested on brass angle-pieces fixed to the rack.

The construction and arrangements of this drying-room fall short of the most modern designs of gun-cotton stoves. In the latter the warm air is blown into the whole building, and the racks for the trays are not enclosed in any way, so that every portion of the building is readily accessible for the purpose of removing explosive dust.

The explosion occurred at about 5.30 p.m. About half an hour before this the deceased had gone into the drying-room for the purpose of emptying one of the compartments of the cupboard, this being the usual practice at five o'clock. From his own statements and from all the circumstances there is little doubt that he was engaged in this work when the explosion occurred. There were about 400 lbs. of dry collodion cotton present in the building, besides some in a wet condition.

From the nature of the damage done, it is evident that the explosion was one of very considerable violence. The drying-room and heating compartment were completely destroyed. The wooden floor of the former was practically all that remained *in situ*, and of this the planks were for the most part smashed by the downward pressure. The brickwork of the walls and roof was projected in all directions. On the north side the brickwork was thrown against the wall of another

building distant about 10 yards, and this wall was demolished, wrecking the building in which three men were present at the time. These men escaped unhurt. On the east side a mass of brickwork weighing nearly two tons was projected about 30 yards on to the boundary fence, which it destroyed. Other large portions were found at varying distances on this side. In this direction also the basket of wet collodion cotton appears to have been projected, and the ground was strewn with the unconsumed material. On the south side large fragments of brickwork covered the ground up to a distance of about 55 yards. On the west side two screen walls which separated the drying-room from the saturating-room were thrown down, and the latter was wrecked and set on fire. Another building used as a store was also wrecked. The main two-storied building of the factory, which was beyond the saturating room, was badly shaken and the roof slightly displaced, most of the window frames and windows on the side of the explosion being also broken. Two or three bricks were projected right over this building. Looking to the effects of the explosion it seems wonderful that no other person received serious injury. The deceased himself was not killed on the spot, and though momentarily stunned, he was able to get up and walk a short distance before assistance arrived. He lived three days, and was able to make a perfectly clear statement in regard to the accident.

According to the statement made by the deceased, both to the manager of the factory and to myself, he was engaged in removing the trays from No. 1 compartment of the cupboard, and had removed six of these when, in withdrawing the seventh, he saw a spark or flame underneath the tray, and remembered nothing more. The compartment from which he was removing the trays was the one in which the racks were fitted with brass angle-pieces, and on these the zinc bottoms of the trays slid. There can be little doubt that the ignition was due to the friction between these surfaces, collodion cotton dust having lodged on the brass angle-piece. When warm and dry all nitro-cotton is sensitive to ignition by friction. It is true that the deceased stated that the stove had been allowed to cool, but he judged the temperature to have been about 80° F. at the moment, and probably the brass-work was at a higher temperature. At about an hour

and a half before the accident the temperature in this compartment was 120° F.

In the Appendix * will be found a brief account of previous accidents which have occurred in nitro-cotton stoves. It will be seen that seven of these are attributable to friction on warm surfaces, and that four of them probably occurred in withdrawing a sliding tray. The present accident is, however, unique, in that it is an instance of a really violent explosion of collodion cotton of low nitration. In all factories for collodion cotton for use in collodion and not for an ingredient of explosives, the degree of nitration is limited by the licence, and may not exceed the theoretical figure for tetra-nitro-cellulose, which, measured by the amount of nitrogen, is 11·11 per cent. Samples taken at these factories have always been well below this figure. The results of tests of the particular batches which were present in the building, carried out by the company's chemist, gave a mean percentage of 10·61. It has always been believed that collodion cotton of such low nitration is incapable of exploding violently, although in accidents 7 and 10 of the Appendix there was some approach to an explosion. But in the factory where these occurred, a very high temperature is employed in drying the material. It is probable that in the present case the confinement due to the drying cupboard and the substantial construction of the building was the cause of the unexpected violence exhibited.

It is unfortunately impossible to remove all danger in the operation of drying nitro-cotton, but this accident shows the importance of certain precautions which are usually taken in gun-cotton stoves. The first of these is that the explosive should not be handled at all until the stove has been allowed to cool down to the temperature of the air outside the building. Again, there should be no friction between hard substances possible in any part of the building. If sliding trays are used, the portion of the tray which comes in contact with the rack should be of smooth deal, whilst those portions of the rack against which the tray slides should be covered with stout canvas or other soft material fastened on by glue or cement, without any nails on the sliding surface. It is, however, desirable to do away with sliding trays altogether. In one factory this has been accomplished by adding short

* Not printed.

legs to each tray, arranged so as to fit into recesses in the tray below, so that the trays form their own rack, and each one can only be removed by lifting it clear of the one below. Drying cupboards should not be used, as they are difficult to clean out. All corners in which explosive dust can accumulate should be avoided. Stoves for collodion cotton should be constructed of light material such as wood or corrugated iron, or should at any rate have light roofs, so as to avoid the confinement which probably accounts for the violence of the explosion in the present case, and certainly aggravated the effects.

I understand that the company are considering the question of removing moisture from collodion cotton by the method of displacement by spirit. If this method is found to be commercially practicable, it will do away with the necessity of drying the material, and with the dangers attending this operation. The method is, I believe, used to a large extent in Germany.

I do not attach any blame either to the manager of the factory or to the deceased in connection with the accident.

In conclusion, I have to say that I received every assistance from the company in carrying out my inquiry. I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

J. H. THOMSON, Captain,
H.M. Chief Inspector of Explosives.



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